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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the underlying cognitive and neural processes at play 
during retrieval of temporal and contextual source information. This was assessed across 
three experimental chapters. In the first experimental chapter, Chapter 2, the neural loci of 
context associations were assessed. Rats trained on an odour-context association task were 
given lesions to either the Lateral Entorhinal Cortex (LEC) or sham lesions. After surgery, 
performance on the odour-context task was assessed. It was hypothesised that memory for 
previously learned odour-context associations would be impaired following LEC lesions but 
not sham lesions. The results supported this hypothesis, demonstrating impaired memory for 
the previously learned odour-context associations in the LEC lesion group compared to the 
Sham lesion. In Chapter 3, the underlying retrieval processes used to retrieve time and 
context in human memory was assessed across three experiments. It was hypothesised that 
time would be remembered accurately using both recollection and familiarity, while correct 
context memory should rely on recollection alone. Two out of the three experiments 
supported this hypothesis, demonstrating that temporal information can be retrieved using 
familiarity in certain instances. The final experimental Chapter 4 used fMRI to extend 
Chapter 3 and examine whether neural activity would be greater in regions associated with 
recollection during memory for context, while activity in familiarity-related regions would be 
higher during memory for time. Results revealed no support for these predictions with no 
regions linked to recollection showing greater context-related activity, and no regions 
previously linked to familiarity exhibiting increased activation as temporal information was 
retrieved. The results are discussed in relation to established recollection and familiarity 
frameworks and previous work examining the neural substrates supporting memory for time 
and context. 
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“The hours are numerous and the clock seldom measures the time that passes inside us, the 
real lifetime, and because of this many days can fit into a few hours, and vice versa, and 
numbers of years can be an imprecise measure of a man's lifetime, he who dies at forty has 
perhaps actually lived much longer than he who dies at ninety.”  
― Jón Kalman Stefánsson, Heaven and Hell 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
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When we think about life we tend to see it as a continuous stream of events, one after 
another that seamlessly blend in to each other. Yet memories for the past events in our lives 
are tied to some information that allows us to keep them separate (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993). Thus, life is not simply a piece of rope with a beginning and an end without 
much difference between, but more like a chain with a number of individual links breaking up 
our existence into smaller pieces. Throughout our lives we accumulate a vast amount of 
memories and as we reflect back across the past, even just the previous week, we have the 
ability to distinguish certain events and situations from similar memories from other times 
and places, which gives structure to our memory. The ability to achieve this relies on each 
event having their own unique identifiers to set them apart from each other. The question 
then is what could constitute such an identifier that would allow for this event separation?  
It has been argued that our memory for past experiences is inherently temporally organised 
(Tulving, 1984), which is quite intuitive seeing as we are surrounded by temporal information 
that can be tied to events on a daily basis, such as the time or date of some occurrence. 
While it is easy to imagine time and memory being intertwined, the question is what 
evidence there is to suggest that our memories are organised by time and that this is in fact 
how we retrieve them? 
Using dates can be considered the most common way to identify when an event took place, 
since this form of time keeping is deeply ingrained in our society, and several studies have 
focused on the ability to remember the dates of past events (Brown, Rips, & Shevell, 1985; 
Janssen, Chessa, & Murre, 2006; Thompson, 1982; Wagenaar, 1986). Considering the 
prevalence of calendars and defining events by their date prior to their occurrence (i.e. going 
to a concert on the 29th of November or attending an important meeting on the 12th of March) 
our memory for dates once they are in the past is not very accurate, and instead it is 
common to place the date of an event either too far in to the past, or much too recently 
relative to its actual occurrence (Janssen et al., 2006; Rubin & Baddeley, 1989; Thompson, 
1982; Thompson, Skowronski, & Lee, 1988). 
Apart from just using dates to identify when something happened, there is a wide range of 
ways in which time can be measured and remembered. We can identify when an event took 
place by its position in a sequence (Hsieh et al., 2014; Jenkins & Ranganath, 2010), judging 
how long ago it happened (Ferguson & Martin, 1983), or when it took place relative to 
another event, i.e. before or after (Ekstrom, Copara, Isham, Wang, & Yonelinas, 2011). Thus, 
time provides multiple cues by which events can be identified and distinguished in memory. 
However, similar to memory for dates of events other measures of time can also be subject 
to distortion, where our sense and perception of time tends to be subjective and does not 
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always adhere to objective measurements of time (Ferguson & Martin, 1983; Janssen et al., 
2006; Wagenaar, 1986), also illustrated anecdotally in this thesis’ opening quote. 
Rather than just relying on time, events can also be kept separated in memory using non-
temporal identifiers of events, where they are attributed to some unique context that gives an 
event its own identity and sets it apart from similar experiences. The context of an event can 
be defined in multiple ways, but can generally be thought of as the defining environmental 
feature of a situation (Easton & Eacott, 2008; Smith, Glenberg, & Bjork, 1978). It has been 
argued that contextual information can be seen as snapshots that represent episodic 
memory, where experiences are remembered as discrete instances rather than continuous 
episodes without boundaries (Gaffan, 1994). This can be seen in examples when continuous 
experiences are segmented in to individual episodes (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011; Horner, 
Bisby, Wang, Bogus, & Burgess, 2016; Swallow et al., 2011) and memory is better for 
information encountered within the same context compared to memory for information that 
has to be retrieved across contexts (Horner et al., 2016; Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; 
Radvansky, Krawietz, & Tamplin, 2011). Further, contextual information has been 
demonstrated to be useful in keeping experiences separated in memory by showing that 
information presented over multiple contexts is remembered better than information 
presented in a single context when information does not have to be related across contexts 
(Smith, 1979, 1982), arguing that contextual information groups related experiences and 
prevents interference from surrounding episodes.  
Temporal and contextual information surrounds our everyday lives and there is evidence to 
suggest that we can remember this type of information (Smith, 1979; Tulving, 1984, 2002a), 
making them useful in separating past experiences. This thesis will explore how time and 
context are remembered and used to distinguish events in memory, drawing on both 
cognitive and neural processes to gain a full understanding of the underlying mechanisms 
used to disambiguate past experiences. 
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1.1 Episodic and Source Memory 
The ability to separate events in memory relies on episodic memory. Episodic memory, 
together with semantic memory, falls under the category of declarative memory, which is 
memory that is expressed, for example verbally or in writing, in contrast to procedural 
memory that is the memory for actions. Semantic memory involves the memory for facts 
about the world, such as knowing that Paris is the capital of France, while the episodic 
memory is instead concerned with memory for past events from our lives, such as 
remembering the first time you went to Paris. According to the original definition of episodic 
memory, formulated by Endel Tulving, the content of memories are argued to consist of 
“temporally dated episodes or events, and temporal-spatial relations among these events” 
(Tulving, 1972, p.385). This has been interpreted by some to mean that memories containing 
information about what happened, where it happened, and when it happened can be 
considered episodic (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998). However, it should be noted that, while the 
three pieces of information above give an unambiguous indication of episodic memory, 
memory for any of these types of information alone can be retrieved via the use of episodic 
memory (Tulving, 2002b). 
In addition to memory content, a specific type of consciousness is needed that allow an 
organism to mentally travel back in time and re-experience the past event. This time travel 
can be attributed to what has been termed autonoetic consciousness, a consciousness 
related to knowledge of the subjective time when the event took place. In addition to these 
components a traveller is required, which translates to having a knowledge of ‘self’. Finally, 
combining these two aspect we also need to be able to place ourselves in the past using the 
process of mental time travel (Tulving 1983). It is important to distinguish the consciousness 
structure from the memory system itself, as the former is concerned with the subjective 
experience of retrieval and the latter relates to the content of memory. The episodic memory 
system is concerned with the content of memory, whereas the consciousness is what gives 
rise to the subjective experience of mentally travelling back in time to retrieve information 
according to theory (Tulving, 1985). In summary, the content of episodic memories is what 
gives events their own identity that sets them apart from each other, while the 
consciousness gives rise to the subjective experience of remembering this information. 
The question we are faced with at this stage is what aspects of events that allow for the 
separation of experiences in memory? Underwood put it succinctly when he defined events 
as “a collection of attributes which serve to discriminate one memory from another” 
(Underwood, 1969, p. 559). In other words, it is the unique components of an event that sets 
it apart from other experiences. The main attribute of an event that gives it its own identity is 
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the source of that event. The source of an event can be viewed as the origin of an 
experience or the conditions under which it was encoded, and can range from temporal to 
spatial and contextual information present at the time of encoding (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993).  Source memory is distinct from memory for single items in that it requires 
memory for additional information surrounding an event. The classic example that is often 
used to exemplify this is known as the butcher on the bus (Mandler, 1980). Imagine being on 
a bus and recognising another person sitting in front of you, but you cannot remember who 
they are and from where you know them. This would constitute recognition without memory 
for the source. The following day you are in the supermarket and you see the same person 
again, only this time you recognize him or her as the butcher as they are now in the 
environment you are used to seeing them in and you can recall the source of the prior 
experience from which you know them. This example is also used to illustrate the difference 
between two retrieval processes, recollection and familiarity as the former requires memory 
for source (Yonelinas, 1994, 1999), which will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent 
Section, 1.2. 
Source memory can further be viewed as a component of episodic memory that shares 
many of the same characteristics and has been shown to engage similar processes and 
behavioural outcomes (Siedlecki, Salthouse, & Berish, 2005). However, rather than being 
seen as the same concept with different names, it has been suggested that source 
information is what gives episodic memories their episodic character and allows us to 
evaluate these as representations of past events (Johnson, 2005). All episodic memory 
tasks involve some form of source memory component, while all source memory tasks are 
ultimately aimed at understanding episodic memory (Johnson et al., 1993). Even item 
recognition can be said to have a source component in that participants have to remember 
which items were seen during the study phase, which would be their source, even though 
this information is not explicitly asked for. 
Here focus will be on the two main types of source, time and context as discussed above. By 
remembering the temporal or contextual surroundings of an event we have unique identifiers 
for each experience distinguishing it from similar and surrounding episodes. The following 
two sections will examine the literature on the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie 
the ability to retrieve temporal and contextual information and relate this to the process of 
event separation in memory. Both human and rodent literature will be covered in order to get 
a clear picture of both cognitive and neural processes at play in memory for time and context. 
Studies on rodents allow for a more in depth study of processing at the cellular level through 
single cell recording in a way that is generally not possible with human participants (with the 
exception of rare studies on epileptic patients) and through manipulating specific brain 
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regions. This gives us the ability to study the neural underpinnings of memory in a more 
direct manner that can yield great insight in to the mechanisms of memory systems. While 
the same methodologies cannot be used with human participants, we have the advantage of 
being able to ask human participants what they remembered and how they were able to 
retrieve it, getting at the phenomenological aspect of retrieval. Combining the research 
across species we can gain more detailed knowledge of the many processes that underlie 
our ability to encode and retrieve information about context and time, which we will see 
below. Before going in to more depth on the research on memory for time and context we 
must first examine the different cognitive processes that come in to play when remembering 
episodic memories and how they have been defined. This is in order to understand how 
these processes come in to play when retrieving temporal and contextual information, which 
will be discussed in more detail throughout the thesis. 
1.2 Retrieval Processes Underlying Episodic Memory 
Two complementary retrieval processes, recollection and familiarity support memory for past 
events (Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980). Recollection brings about a more detailed and vivid 
memory of a past episode, whereas familiarity is generally related to the feeling of knowing 
that something has happened in the past without being able to retrieve any information 
surrounding the event (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 1994). While it is agreed that retrieval of 
past events is supported by recollection and familiarity, it has been debated whether it 
consists of either a single process or dual processes (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 2001; Dunn 
2004). The single process theory of memory holds that all memories fall on a single 
continuum of memory strength where familiarity would reflect weaker source memory 
strength and recollection being represented by greater memory strength (Dunn, 2004). 
According to this model item and source information is retrieved through memory strength 
along the entire length of the continuum instead of through categorical retrieval processes, 
such as recollection and familiarity (Green & Swets, 1988; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). 
Extending the single process model, a dual process theory of memory has been proposed 
by Yonelinas (1994) where, as indicated by the name, recollection and familiarity are 
separate but complementary processes. This model still holds that there is a continuum for 
familiarity, while recollection is a threshold process on top of familiarity (Yonelinas, 1994; 
Yonelinas & Parks, 2007). In this model during retrieval of associative item-source 
information, item memory falls on the familiarity continuum whereas the source information 
can only be remembered accurately through the recollection threshold process (Yonelinas, 
1999). This means that accurate memory for time and context, which will be discussed in 
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more detail further below, should require the use of recollection while temporal and 
contextual source memory will not be supported by familiarity alone.  
It has been debated which of these models most accurately captures the processes at play 
when past experiences are retrieved from memory. A large body of work has further found 
sufficient empirical evidence arguing in favour of the dual-process model that the single-
process model cannot account for. This includes results demonstrating that distinct brain 
regions support recollection and familiarity (Duarte, Ranganath, Winward, Hayward, & Knight, 
2004; Rugg & Vilberg, 2013; Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005), that damage to distinct 
brain regions can impair recollection or familiarity alone (Brandt, Eysenck, Nielsen, & von 
Oertzen, 2016; Eichenbaum, Fortin, Sauvage, Robitsek, & Farovik, 2010; King, Trinkler, 
Hartley, Vargha-Khadem, & Burgess, 2004), and that the use of recollection and familiarity 
can be differentiated by manipulating the task at hand (Jacoby, 1991), suggesting that they 
are separate processes that do not only differ in terms of memory strength. Taken together, 
the explanations above demonstrate that the data can be interpreted under the dual-process 
theory, and do not necessarily support a single-process model. 
There is, however, a problem when trying to relate these two memory processes back to 
episodic memory. While recollection is unambiguously thought to be an episodic process, 
the relationship between familiarity and episodic memory is more equivocal. There have 
been suggestions that both recollection and familiarity contribute to episodic memory 
(Yonelinas, 2001). Here familiarity is regarded as an episodic memory process, albeit a less 
detailed and rich form of episodic memory compared to recollection that cannot, in theory, 
support memory for source information Others argue that familiarity is less episodic in nature 
than recollection (Easton et al. 2012), and even some equating familiarity with semantic 
memory (Holland & Smulders, 2011). Despite these discrepancies, in this thesis familiarity 
will be defined in line with the definition from Yonelinas (2001) where it is regarded as an 
episodic memory process alongside recollection. 
1.3 Temporal Memory 
As seen above, time holds a very central role in our lives and everyday experiences. So it 
might not come as a surprise that many researchers argue for time as being a major 
component in our episodic memories. Endel Tulving, one of the main proponents of the 
importance of time in episodic memory, put it succinctly stating that “one event precedes, co-
occurs, or succeeds another in time” (Tulving, 1984, p. 225). In other words, our lives follow 
an inherent temporal structure so it makes sense for our memories to work in a similar 
manner. Tulving further defined episodic memory, as discussed earlier, as memory that 
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“receives and stores information about temporally dated episodes or events, and temporal-
spatial relations between them” (Tulving, 1972, p.385), meaning that each event has some 
temporal information associated with it to allow us to remember when it happened, and also 
to place it in relation to other surrounding events. It is from this definition that much work on 
time in memory has drawn its inspiration. Tulving did not only suggest that the content of our 
memories contain some temporal component, but also that we require some form of 
awareness of time. First we possess chronesthesia, which is the awareness of subjective 
time. That is the knowledge that some event has taken place in the past and thinking back to 
that event over time scales ranging from days, months, and years (Tulving, 2002a). Adding 
to this we also possess autonoetic consciousness, being the ability to place ourselves in the 
subjective time and mentally travel back in time to relive past experiences (Tulving, 2002b). 
Combined, Tulving’s model of memory suggests that our experiences are encoded along a 
temporal dimension, and that we are both aware of this dimension through chronesthesia 
and can place ourselves along this dimension to re-experience the events that unfolded at 
that time. While this is sensible and we can see that humans, and to some extent non-
human animals, possess these qualities outlined by Tulving and that it might seem intuitive 
to think of our lives and memories as being temporally organised. We must, however, still 
assess the evidence from both psychology and neuroscience to understand the mechanisms 
underlying these abilities. This section will examine the extent to which we can remember 
temporal information and the underlying processes that help us achieve event separation in 
memory via temporal cues. The first thing to do, however, is to look at how we define time 
and the many ways to remember ‘when’ something happened.  
1.3.1 Definitions of Time 
The most intuitive way to think of time, or when something took place, is in terms of dates 
and times. Relating an event back to the day, month, and year it happened gives the event a 
unique identifier that sets it apart from similar situations or episodes taking place nearby in 
time, albeit on different days. Although dates can be said to be one of the main ways we 
conceptualise time, our memory for this information is generally not very accurate. 
Remembering dates of events has consistently been demonstrated to result in forward 
telescoping, whereby events are thought to have occurred more recently than the actual 
date of the event (Janssen et al., 2006; Rubin & Baddeley, 1989; Thompson, 1982; 
Thompson et al., 1988). The telescoping effect is evident when people are asked to provide 
dates for public events where it has been shown that errors in dating events increases 
linearly with time since the event occurred (Janssen et al., 2006; Rubin & Baddeley, 1989). 
One suggested explanation for the forward telescoping of public events is the accessibility 
principle, whereby events are thought to have occurred more recently if more information 
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about an event can be recalled. Mixed results have been found when assessing the 
accessibility principle using public news events. Brown, Rips, and Shevell (1985) found 
support for the accessibility principle asking participants to date several events in different 
categories (e.g. deaths and disasters, political, or cultural events) and then to rate the 
amount of information they could remember for each event. Better known events were 
indeed judged to have occurred more recently and lesser-known events to have happened 
further in the past than the actual date. Contrary to this, Wright et al. (1997) found no support 
for the accessibility principle, although they only asked participants about two major news 
events (the Hillsborough disaster and Thatcher’s resignation) as part of a larger survey. Only 
9% of participants could give the correct date for the Hillsborough disaster and 15% for 
Thatcher’s resignation, which must be considered low since both events took place 2-3 
years prior to the survey used in the study.  
The use of well-known events from the news is a viable approach to assess memory for 
dates, as this information can easily be verified. However, a disadvantage of using public 
and news events is that they are not personal and judgments of the dates on which they 
occurred could therefore be subject to the use of semantic knowledge of the event to assign 
a date. Indeed studies have found that the amount of knowledge of an event can lead to 
more accurate dating of that event (Burt & Kemp, 1991; Wright et al., 1997). Having 
knowledge of when a public or news event took place does not necessarily aid our ability to 
disambiguate events in our own memory. For example, knowing the date when Princess 
Diana died in Paris (as used in Janssen et al., 2006) is not necessarily relevant to 
disambiguate events in memory if it is memorised as a historical fact, similar to knowing that 
the attack on the world trade centre in New York took place on the 11th of September 2001 
since it is commonly referred to as 9/11. 
Using diaries to examine participants’ ability to date personal events instead gets at the 
processes expected to be at play when distinguishing everyday events in memory. 
Thompson (1982) had participants record personal events for themselves but also for their 
roommate who was unaware of the study up until one week before the memory test and 
found that, similar to studies on news events (Janssen et al., 2006; Rubin & Baddeley, 1989), 
dating errors increased linearly over time. There was also no enhanced memory for events 
rated as more memorable at encoding, tying in with results from a later study also 
demonstrating no effect on telescoping for personal events being rated as more clearly 
remembered (Thompson et al., 1988). Across these studies there was further evidence that 
errors in dating the events were smaller one month after the event took place, and then 
increased substantially when the event was two months old or older (Thompson, 1982; 
Thompson et al., 1988). In terms of accuracy, only 5-10% of events could be given exact 
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dates over any delay (up to 14 weeks), of which most were highly personal events such as 
birthdays. If dates were one of the main ways in which we separate events in memory we 
should expect accuracy for such information to be higher over relatively short time periods, 
such as the maximum of 14 weeks used by Thompson (1982). One criticism of using 
participants’ personal accounts to test their memory is that they could have some knowledge 
that they might be tested on that information in the future. Thompson (1982) assessed this 
by testing both participants’ accuracy for dates, as well as participants’ roommates that were 
not aware that they were going to be tested. There was no difference in the accuracy or the 
amount of telescoping between groups (aware and unaware participants) at test, suggesting 
that being tested on events from one’s personal diary does not bias accuracy (Thompson, 
1982). A slightly different approach to the diary studies is for the experimenter to keep a 
diary for him or herself and to test their own memory. Linton (1975) used this approach over 
seven years and found that her memory for dates was very high for recent events but then 
declined gradually for events further in the past. Wagenaar (1986) used a similar approach 
where he recorded daily events over six years, including what happened, who was present, 
along with where and when it happened. He then cued himself with certain aspects of events 
to see if he could retrieve parts of, or the whole, event. What he found was that cuing himself 
with ‘when’ something happened, i.e. the date of the event, his retrieval was extremely low to 
the point where he could only remember other aspects of an event in 2-3% of cases. 
However, when cuing himself with any of the other aspects of an event – who, what, or 
where – he could remember information about the event in around 25-60% of cases. 
Wageenar could accurately remember the date of an event in 7-20% of cases, depending on 
the cue, which is low compared to the 28-62% of cases when he could accurately retrieve 
other event information. 
An interesting point to consider when thinking about dates as a means to distinguish past 
events in memory is that the majority of studies looked at above were not aimed at 
assessing the accuracy of dating events, but were rather explicitly focusing on the amount of 
telescoping (i.e. inaccurate dating of events) and explanations for such errors (Brown et al., 
1985; Janssen et al., 2006; Rubin & Baddeley, 1989; Thompson et al., 1988; Wright et al., 
1997). In some way this suggests that it is agreed that our ability to remember dates is quite 
poor since focus of the research is on the frequency of errors instead of situations when 
dates are retrieved accurately. 
Seeing as dates are a uniquely human construct and cannot be considered an entirely 
natural way to process time, i.e. it is not something that exists in the natural world or in other 
species since it relies on semantic constructs (i.e. labelling time in terms of months and 
years) and language (i.e. demonstrating the ability to remember dates). Moving to non-
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semantic constructs of time, Friedman (1993) proposed three different theories of time that 
could be used to define past events in memory: distance based, location based and relative 
time. Distance based theories of time use the elapsed time between an event and retrieval to 
estimate when it took place. Location based theories hold that temporal information is laid 
down at the time of encoding and can include specific time tags for each event, or general 
contextual information that is associated with the event. At retrieval this contextual 
information is remembered and time of the event is inferred based on knowledge of temporal 
structure of events. Finally, theories of relative time are akin to sequence memory where the 
temporal structure of events is stored in associations between the events themselves. 
Memory for dates of events, as discussed above, could be argued to be separate from these 
three theories since it involves an absolute judgment of time and does not naturally fall under 
any of Friedman’s categories. However, some of the theories posited by Friedman could be 
used to remember the date of an event. For example, people might use the amount of 
elapsed time from an event to estimate the date on which it took place meaning that 
telescoping in memory could be attributed to errors in judgments of durations. A further 
possibility is that dates are retrieved through location-based strategies, where the dates are 
inferred from the contextual information surrounding an event. This could be the memory for 
an event that took place prior to Christmas, such as buying a Christmas tree. Knowing the 
temporal structure of the days leading up to Christmas Eve, the correct date of the event can 
be inferred from this. 
Friedman’s (1993) distance based definition of time can be said to correspond to using cues 
of how long ago something occurred. However, using a measure of ‘how long ago’ an event 
took place has been found not to be an accurate measure of time, as judgments of elapsed 
time tend to be inaccurate (Ferguson & Martin, 1983). Ferguson and Martin (1983) asked 
participants to judge how long ago a number of news events had occurred on a scale of 
months. They found that estimates of how long ago more recent events took place were 
more likely to be overestimated, i.e. though to have happened further in the past than what 
was the case. The opposite pattern was found for older events where estimates of the 
duration since the event were underestimated to a greater extent, resulting in judgments that 
these events occurred more recently than they actually did. Further studies on human 
temporal duration judgments have found similar results as Ferguson and Martin (1983) using 
shorter temporal intervals, ranging from a few hundred milliseconds up to intervals of 30 
seconds (Eisler, 1976). Additionally, studies by Block (1992; 1974) have demonstrated that 
the amount of information processed during an interval can affect judgments of durations, 
where more stimuli presented will lead to longer duration judgments. This argues that 
memory for how long ago an event took place can be influenced by the events taking place 
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between the present and the experience in question, making this judgment prone to bias and 
inaccuracy depending on the situation it is used. 
As with retrieving dates of events, attempting to determine how long ago an event took place 
tend to show forward telescoping for events further in the past, but also backwards 
telescoping for more recent events. In other words, distant events are judged to have 
occurred closer to the present and recent events are thought to have happened further in the 
past than what is actually the case (Ferguson & Martin, 1983; Janssen et al., 2006; Rubin & 
Baddeley, 1989).  Based on the above studies it seems like the use of ‘how long ago’ is not 
an accurate measure of time in memory as judgments of duration are not reliable over 
neither short nor long time periods. As such, it is unlikely that the ability of our memory 
system to differentiate between events would rely solely on measures of temporal distance 
between events. 
A way of investigating memory for time without asking for elapsed time or time of day is 
using memory for sequences. Memory for sequences has been suggested to work via 
associative chaining. Associative chaining models hold that items in a sequence are linked 
together through the strengthening of connections between pairs of items. The simplest 
forms of chaining models holds that the connections between items aids sequence memory 
through each item retrieved acting as a cue for the next item in the sequence. This type of 
model has been a popular choice for explaining ordering effects in recall (Friedman, 1993; 
Lewandowsky & Murdock, 1989), but has later been suggested to be too simplistic. The 
primary criticism of simple chaining models is that they cannot handle sequences with 
overlapping items, as during retrieval one cue can elicit two or more different responses all 
of which will have followed the cue item but in different parts of the sequence. Another issue 
is that there should be no way to resume the retrieval of a sequence if an error is made, as 
the erroneous response will then be an invalid cue for the subsequent item in the sequence 
(Henson, Norris, Page, & Baddeley, 1996). Chaining models have also been argued to suffer 
from the absence of any type of scale for temporal information to be ordered on to. Without 
such scales events are only ordered sequentially lacking any information if the relationship 
between occasions took place on an order of minutes, hours, or days (Friedman, 1993). 
Empirical data has supported some of the criticism of chaining models outlined above. First, 
when presenting people with sequences consisting of alternating confusable and non-
confusable items, where confusable items are ones that are phonologically similar, a 
sawtooth pattern of error proportions has been shown across output positions with higher 
proportions of error for confusable compared to non-confusable list items (Baddeley, 1968; 
Henson et al., 1996). How does this negatively impact chaining models? Chaining models 
predict that an accurately retrieved item will act as a strong retrieval cue for the subsequent 
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item, and vice versa, that an incorrectly retrieved item will act as a poor retrieval cue. What 
the sawtooth pattern of errors reveal is that correctly remembered items are not always 
efficient cues for the next item in the sequence, as error proportions increase if that item is 
more confusable. Similar, errors made for confusable items can still lead to correct retrieval 
of a subsequent non-confusable item. Furthermore, if a non-confusable item is retrieved in 
the incorrect temporal position, chaining models hold that this should still act as a valid cue 
and results in a greater probability that the next item is an error as well. However, this is not 
supported by data, instead showing that the frequency of these errors is not above chance 
levels meaning that it is not a reliable effect (Henson et al., 1996). A further issue with 
associative chaining models is the judgment of relative recency of two events. Chaining 
models posit that events or items presented close in time should share a stronger 
connection and it would thus be easier to judge the order of these based on their connection. 
Nevertheless, order memory has been demonstrated to be better for items presented further 
apart in a sequence, rather than ones presented in close proximity (McCormack, 1982; 
Winograd & Soloway, 1985; Yntema & Trask, 1963). It is evident that simple associative 
chaining models cannot account for temporal memory, as some of the most basic 
assumptions are not supported by empirical data. It should be noted that more sophisticated 
chaining models have been proposed that could account for some of the deficits outlined 
above. However, such models are mainly theoretical, and have yet to be supported by 
empirical data, and are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
There is still evidence to suggest that sequential information can be remembered, meaning 
that this could be used to separate events in memory, though it is not clear how this 
information is retrieved. Using sequential information to distinguish events in memory could 
be useful when determining which of two events took place earlier, as this could be solved 
by estimating ‘how long ago’ each event happened from the present. While it was argued 
earlier that the use of ‘how long ago’ was not an accurate measure of time, in the case of 
sequences there is no need to derive the exact duration since an event only which event 
happened further in the past. Nevertheless, this limits the use of sequential information to 
instances when two events have to be distinguished, and an exact measure of time such as 
the date or specific place in the sequence is not required. 
Further studies on human sequence memory involve fMRI and have focused on the role of 
the hippocampus in this process. This literature will be examined in more detail further below 
in Section 1.3.2.2.  
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Time could also be encoded in to memory via zeitgebers, naturally occurring phenomenon 
acting as cues, such as light/dark cycles, that regulate organisms’ circadian rhythms. 
Circadian rhythms are 24-hour intervals that are linked to the light/dark cycle, and are 
thought to originate in the suprachiasmatic nuclei (Crystal, 2001).  
Zeitgebers can influence neurons involved in the circadian rhythm by providing explicit cues 
as to the time of day, with circadian neurons subsequently suggested to encode the time of 
day an event occurs (Gerstner & Yin, 2010). This is though to be achieved by internal 
circadian oscillations that provide a time-stamp of when during the day an event took place, 
where this time-stamp can later be consulted to remember the time of day a positive or 
negative experience happened (Cain, Chou, & Ralph, 2004).  The use of circadian ‘time-of-
day’ cues to remember an event has been contrasted with theories of interval timing, i.e. 
how long ago something took place, to assess whether circadian rhythms are in fact used to 
encode and retrieve temporal information (Zhou & Crystal, 2009). The evidence supporting 
the use of circadian ‘time-of-day’ and information pertaining to ‘how-long-ago’ an event 
occurred in memory have been mixed. Roberts and colleagues (2008) devised an 
experiment using rats, in which these accounts were set against each other. Rats were 
trained to dig for a preferred food type that was either replenished after a long or short delay 
(interval timing), no matter what time of day the reward was first encountered, or the food 
was replenished depending on the time of day it was first encountered (circadian ‘time-of-
day’). Results indicated that how long ago the sample trial was experienced was a good 
indicator of temporal memory as accuracy was higher for these trials, while the circadian 
‘time-of-day’ was not. However, in a subsequent study Zhou and Crystal (2009) taught rats 
that a reward was replenished after a short delay in a morning session, but not after the 
same delay in the afternoon. Light onset was then shifted back 6 hours to 12am instead of 
6am, with the first test of the day occurring the same time of the day as the previous morning 
trial (7am) when reward had been present, but after the same temporal delay since light 
onset (6 hours) as the afternoon session when reward was absent. Rats revisited the re-
baited arm at an equal rate as in the previous morning session while entering it significantly 
more frequently than in the previous afternoon sessions when rewards had been absent. 
This supports the circadian ‘time-of –day’ hypothesis, as rats used the time of day to guide 
their behaviour to a greater extent than the temporal delay since light onset. It has, however, 
been argued that memory in relation to zeitgebers and circadian rhythms is not a good 
measure of episodic memory for time, as it is not sure whether animals displaying such time 
dependent behaviour remember a previous occurrence or are simply acting on instinct in 
relation to a previously cued stimulus (Zentall, 2006), and as such might not reflect 
conscious retrieval similar to that in human episodic memory (Roberts, 2002).  
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1.3.2 Temporal Context Model 
A different mechanism that may support sequence memory is via an internally generated 
and gradually changing representation. This theory posits that items in a sequence are not 
directly linked as in an associative chaining model, but instead share an overlapping 
temporal representation, or a temporal context. Such an idea has been around since the 
1950’s when Estes (1955) suggested a model of contextual variation whereby a set of 
internal elements are either active or inactive at any given time, with the active elements 
representing that event (Figure 1A). The status of these elements fluctuates randomly over 
time so that inactive ones become active and vice versa, thereby representing a shift in time. 
These elements could theoretically switch between activity and inactivity over time, where 
the overall patterns of active elements mark a specific point in time. Nevertheless, this model 
does not account for memory for time over longer durations, as it is not clear whether all 
possible patterns of active elements will have been used at some point and subsequently will 
have to be recycled, opening up for confusion between the temporal markers of individual 
events. The model further does not explain what constitutes the internal elements that mark 
the progress of time. Presumably these would be neurons changing their firing properties, 
however, no studies have demonstrated random fluctuations in neural firing properties in a 
way that would support this model. 
Estes’ random fluctuation model has been extended to a temporal context model. The 
temporal context model suggests that items or events are tied to a gradually changing 
contextual representation, where each event is tied to a temporal context that is distinct from 
past and future representations, but overlaps with surrounding episodes (Howard & Kahana, 
2002). This differs from Estes’s (1955) random fluctuation model in that contextual drift is not 
driven by random noise, but instead new contextual representations are driven by the 
previous state as well as current input to create a gradual change over time (Figure 1B). 
Recollection is analogous to jumping back in time, reinstating the context that was present 
during encoding, which facilitates the retrieval of surrounding information that shares an 
overlapping temporal context. During retrieval the neural activity at encoding becomes 
reinstated and allows for the mental time travel back to the previous experience when the 
event took place (Howard & Kahana, 2002). These fluctuation models differ from the 
associative chaining models presented above in that they do not emphasise the strength of 
the connection between items, but instead on the shared representation of items presented 
in close temporal proximity. Many of the behavioural effects supporting the temporal context 
model, which will be examined below, seem to mimic the associative chaining models. 
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However, the temporal context model is more flexible than the chaining models in that it 
relies on the reinstatement of the temporal representation during retrieval that can aid 
memory for items surrounding a specific time point without relying on specific connections 
between items. The temporal context model would predict that, for example, individual items 
in a word list would become associated with unique internal representations that would set 
them apart from surrounding items. At the same time, the internal drift ensures that proximal 
items share similar representations and would be covered by the same temporal context, 
which should result in better memory for sequentially presented items and the ability to judge 
the distance of two items based on the discrepancy in their individual temporal 
representation. In essence a temporal context represents a window in time that forms a 
temporal boundary around an experience, including events taking place within close 
temporal proximity to the event that is being remembered.  
 
Figure 1. Illustrations of theoretical models of temporal context.  A) Estes’ (1955) Random 
fluctuation model, arguing that the time of an event is encoded by a set of active elements. As 
time progresses the set of active elements will randomly fluctuate generating a change in the set 
of elements representing each point in time. This is illustrated by the three panels above where 
the left-most panel shows the initial state, the mid-panel shows the active elements at the point of 
encoding, and the right-most panel shows the active elements after a period of rest when a 
period of time has passed. B) Howard and Kahana’s (2002) Temporal Context Model. Here 
temporal context is not driven by randomness, but instead a change in time is represented by 
both the past temporal context, as well as input from the current environment generating a 
gradual change in the internal representation. This is illustrated above where tIN represents input 
from the current environment, and ti-1 represents the input from the past temporal context, both 
combining to form ti which is the temporal representation of the present moment. As time 
progresses ti becomes the new ti-1, as indicated by the connecting arrows between ti and ti-1, 
which then feeds back in to the updated ti and in this way ensures a gradual change in temporal 
context. 
1.3.2.1 Temporal Context Model: Behavioural Effects. As mentioned above, the 
temporal context model suggests that events that occur close in time would be 
encompassed by the same temporal context, where retrieval of an event reinstates the 
associated temporal context facilitating memory for surrounding information (Howard & 
Kahana, 2002). This is what is known as the contiguity effect. This effect has been 
demonstrated by looking at the probability of retrieving item j following the correct retrieval of 
item i, where the latter acts as a cue for the former, when i and j were presented in 
temporally adjacent positions during study (Kahana, 1996), and has been shown in both 
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recognition memory (Schwartz, Howard, Jing, & Kahana, 2005) and free recall (Kahana, 
1996). Depending on the conditions of retrieval, contiguity can be either symmetrical or show 
a forward asymmetry, that is events are equally well remembered both forwards and 
backwards or significantly better in the forward direction, i.e. accuracy is higher for more 
recent items (Kahana & Caplan, 2002; Kahana, 2002). Symmetrical retrieval has mainly 
been demonstrated for paired associates of events (Kahana, 2002). Forward asymmetry, on 
the other hand, is more robust and has been seen during free recall without any cues 
(Kahana, 1996) and for associations between three or more items in a sequence (Kahana & 
Caplan, 2002; see Kahana, Howard, & Polyn, 2008 for review). Temporal contiguity can 
further influence retrieval of episodic details, where being able to form and retrieve temporal 
associations between proximal items will lead to retrieval of more information from a study 
event. This works by retrieving one item that subsequently acts as a cue for the next item in 
the sequence, and so on. Better performance during encoding, i.e. forming stronger 
associations between study items occurring nearby in time, will lead to cues being more 
effective for subsequent retrieval (Sederberg, Miller, Howard, & Kahana, 2010). In meta-
analysis of free recall studies it was found that for item pairs presented further apart in a 
sequence participants were significantly more likely to remember either of the items 
compared to if they had been presented closer in time. While this might seem 
counterintuitive in relation to the contiguity effect, what it means is that should the first item in 
the pair not be remembered memory for an item further away in the sequence is more likely 
as it is represented by a more dissimilar contextual representation and thus does not rely on 
the previous item as a cue. For items presented closer in time if the cue item is not 
remembered that contextual representation will not be reinstated and lead to enhanced 
recall of surrounding items (Lohnas, Polyn, & Kahana, 2011). This study not only provides 
evidence in favour of the contiguity effect but also for the contextual variability over time 
suggested by the temporal context model (Howard & Kahana, 2002). 
It has been suggested that the cuing effect of previous items during test is not limited to only 
the prior item, but that the retrieval of multiple prior items can add up and act as a compound 
cue for further items (Chance & Kahana, 1997; Lohnas & Kahana, 2014). Enhanced recall 
has been shown when participants are cued with two adjacent items forming a compound 
cue compared to one adjacent cue or a remote cue (Kahana & Caplan, 2002). When 
recalling overlapping sequences, e.g. A-B-C-D vs. E-F-C-G, there will be some interference 
from the second list when getting to the letter C in the first list. Compound cuing has been 
found to overcome such interference as it is not only the current item, C in this case, that 
acts as a cue for the next item to be recalled but also A and B, which leads to the conclusion 
that the following item must be D rather than G (Howard & Kahana, 1999). These studies 
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support the temporal context model demonstrating that items presented in temporally 
proximal positions share the same contextual features, as evident by the effect of contiguity.  
1.3.2.2 Neural Underpinnings of the Temporal Context Model.  Evidence for the 
temporal context model has been found in electrophysiological studies with rats, where 
ensembles of cells in the hippocampus, termed time cells, have been found to track time 
over short intervals, forming discrete ‘time’ fields. Manns and colleagues (2007) trained rats 
on an odour-sequence task, where rats had to dig in odours presented earlier in the 
sequence. It was found that cells in the hippocampus increased or decreased their firing 
rates across the testing sequence, with more similar representations for events closer in time 
compared to events further apart. Time cells have also been found in delay periods between 
trials in memory tasks both when animals are running in a wheel (Pastalkova, Itskov, 
Amarasingham, & Buzsáki, 2008; Wang, Romani, Lustig, Leonardo, & Pastalkova, 2014) 
and when rats remain more or less stationary in a smaller compartment (Gill, Mizumori, & 
Smith, 2011; MacDonald, Lepage, Eden, & Eichenbaum, 2011). During memory tasks 
different populations of hippocampal time cells develop representing various task demands 
(Gill et al., 2011; MacDonald et al., 2011). For example different representations were 
evident when rats were about to run to the east or west arm in a plus maze (Gill et al., 2011), 
similarly in the study by Pastalkova et al (2008) the active cells during the wheel running 
predicted rats’ upcoming choice on the memory task. Time cells have been reported to be 
evident from the outset of the testing, while the differentiation between choices developed 
over time (Gill et al., 2011) and that this development led to better memory performance 
(Wang et al., 2014). This means that the time fields carry behavioural relevance and are 
used in memory rather than being caused by other factors such as self-movement or being 
epiphenomoligical and not related to memory per se. This gives further support to the 
temporal context model by suggesting that time cells carry temporal information as 
hypothesised, and that this information is involved in mnemonic decision-making. The 
majority of studies have demonstrated the existence of time cells in the hippocampal 
subregion CA1 (MacDonald et al., 2011; Manns et al., 2007; Pastalkova et al., 2008). A 
study by Mankin and colleagues (Mankin et al., 2012) further demonstrated a dissociation 
between CA1 and CA3 in temporal processing, where representations in CA3 were found to 
be stable and highly reproducible over time, arguing for a greater role in the encoding of 
non-temporal information of an event. Cells in CA1 instead demonstrated a decorellation in 
firing similar to that predicted by the temporal context model (Howard & Kahana, 2002), 
giving further support to findings that information regarding an events temporal information is 
processed in CA1. While CA1 appears to be tuned to temporal information, it is not the only 
hippocampal subregion shown to respond to time. Activity in area CA2 has been found to be 
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somewhat insensitive to changes in contextual information, but rather demonstrates a 
progressively dissimilar temporal code, similar to that seen in CA1, though found to extend 
over longer time periods on the scale of hours and days (Mankin, Diehl, Sparks, Leutgeb, & 
Leutgeb, 2015), potentially providing a framework for long-term temporal delays in the 
hippocampus. 
 However, these time cell studies have a number of issues that reduce their generalisation to 
an overall function for temporal memory. First, time cells have been shown only to operate 
over short time spans up to 15 seconds (Gill et al., 2011; MacDonald et al., 2011), meaning 
that this might not be a viable mechanism for keeping track of time over longer time courses. 
Second, some studies have only been able to demonstrate the existence of time cells when 
animals are engaged in a memory task, but not when they are idle (Pastalkova et al., 2008; 
Wang et al., 2014). This is a serious limitation to time cells as a general time keeping 
function as it limits the use to situations when information is actively being encoded, whereas 
information in episodic memory has been suggested to be encoded automatically (Morris & 
Frey, 1997). 
In addition to the evidence supporting the processing of temporal context in the 
hippocampus discussed above, several studies have found hippocampal involvement in a 
range of temporal memory tasks. Hippocampal lesions have been found to disrupt rats’ 
ability to remember previously learned sequences (Fortin, Agster, & Eichenbaum, 2002) and 
to disambiguate overlapping sequences (Agster, Fortin, & Eichenbaum, 2002). Damage to 
the hippocampus has also been shown to impair memory in a what-where-when episodic-
like memory task (Ergorul & Eichenbaum, 2004), and the ability to keep track of elapsed time 
(Jacobs, Allen, Nguyen, & Fortin, 2013). These studies illustrate that hippocampal damage 
generates deficits to temporal processing in a multitude of ways and suggests that the 
hippocampus supports the memory for several types of temporal information. 
The hippocampus does not act alone in processing temporal information, but is part of a 
network in the medial temporal lobe and could receive its temporal input from the MEC. Sets 
of cells in the MEC, termed island cells, have been found to control temporal associations in 
trace fear conditioning paradigms (Kitamura et al., 2014). In this paradigm, rats are 
presented with a tone that is followed by a foot shock after a delay. After repeated 
presentations of these stimuli, rats will eventually exhibit a freezing response when the tone 
is presented alone as a result of forming an association between the tone and shock across 
the temporal delay. Inhibition of MEC pyramidal, non-island, cells and excitation of island 
cells, impair the acquisition of the trace fear conditioning and rats will not exhibit freezing 
when the tone is presented. These results demonstrate that excitatory MEC input to the CA1 
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of the hippocampus is responsible for the formation of temporal associations while island 
cells exert feedforward inhibition to supress excitatory MEC input to CA1 which control the 
strength and duration of temporal associations (Kitamura et al., 2014). This is thought to be 
important for linking successive events (Kitamura, Macdonald, & Tonegawa, 2015), and 
could thus be a function for encoding and retrieving sequence information by providing a 
mechanism for binding temporally separated experiences to a coherent representation. 
Additionally, recordings from the MEC while rats are running on a treadmill have found 
similar firing properties of sets of grid cells as time cells in the hippocampus. These MEC 
cells show temporal selectivity in that sets of cells fire at specific times during a period of 
running, giving a gradually changing pattern of activity across time (Kraus et al., 2015), 
strikingly similar to hippocampal time cells. The MEC shares connections with the CA1 of the 
hippocampus, where time cells have been found, suggesting that the temporal processing 
occurring in the hippocampus receives its input in part from the MEC. Alternatively temporal 
activity in the MEC could originate from feedback from CA1 (Eichenbaum, 2014). 
Evidence for the temporal context model has been demonstrated in human participants 
using fMRI, looking at the level of voxels in the brain rather than individual neurons . In a 
study by Hsieh and colleagues (2014), participants learned sequences of objects. Some 
sequences shared overlapping items, either in the beginning or middle of the sequence, a 
‘fixed’ sequence consisted of unique non-overlapping objects presented in a fixed order 
while a ‘random’ sequence had a set of unique items that were presented in a random order 
to control for learning of specific object irrespective of temporal order. Following learning, the 
sequences were presented continuously as participants underwent fMRI scans. Multivoxel 
pattern similarity analysis (MVPA) found that hippocampal activity was more similar across 
sequences that shared the same objects in fixed temporal positions compared to sequences 
with different objects and the random sequence. The hippocampus also disambiguated 
overlapping sequences by demonstrating lower pattern similarity between the same object in 
different sequences compared to the same object across repetition of its associated 
sequence. Finally, again using MVPA it was found that the hippocampus only tracked 
objects in temporal positions, but neither objects nor temporal information alone. Instead the 
perirhinal cortex processed the object information while the parahippocampal cortex carried 
information about temporal positions. This is in contrast to the rodent time cell studies where 
it is mainly the hippocampus, and not the perirhinal or parahippocampal cortices, that has 
been found to carry information on time. Alternatively it could be argued that time cells 
incorporate more than just temporal information as different time fields have been found for 
different types of trials (MacDonald et al., 2011; Pastalkova et al., 2008), indicating that 
these cells demonstrate firing in relation to a combination of item (type of trial) and temporal 
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information. Additionally, looking at temporal sequence judgments the parahippocampal 
cortex has been found to predict accuracy on fine temporal judgments whereas the 
hippocampus and areas of the prefrontal cortex show greater involvement in coarse 
judgments (Jenkins & Ranganath, 2010). Interestingly activity in the rostrolateral prefrontal 
cortex, rather than the hippocampus, represented a variable temporal context in line with the 
temporal context model. This indicates that there are areas other than the hippocampus that 
are capable of representing the progress of time in the manner predicted by the temporal 
context model (Jenkins & Ranganath, 2010). In contrast to the animal time cell studies, in 
human participants, there is some debate over the specialisation of hippocampal subfields 
for temporal context retrieval. Two studies have found no difference in hippocampal 
subfields during temporal order judgments compared to spatial retrieval, instead arguing for 
the dentate gyrus as a universal pattern separator across sources (Azab, Stark, & Stark, 
2014; Kyle, Smuda, Hassan, & Ekstrom, 2015). However, in line with the time cell literature, 
a study by Wang and Diana (2016) found that the human CA1 is sensitive to temporal 
context information while the dentate gyrus and CA3 are not. This discrepancy could be due 
to the way in which temporal context was defined and what analysis methods were used 
between experiments. Kyle and colleagues (2015) measured it as the temporal distance 
between items presented in a sequence, where items presented closer in time were argued 
to be part of the same temporal context. Both univariate and multivariate analysis methods 
were used to identify sub-regions being more sensitive to information presented in close 
proximity. Wang and Diana (2016), on the other hand, defined a temporal context as two 
items preceding a target item in a sequence of item triplets, e.g. A-B-C, where A and B 
provide a temporal context for C. Item triplets were then repeated either exactly the same 
(e.g. A-B-C), with slight variation (e.g. a-b-C), or in a new temporal context (e.g. E-D-C). The 
argument was that sub-regions within the hippocampus being sensitive to temporal context 
would show repetition suppression when the original temporal context was repeated. 
However it is not clear how such repetition suppression in CA1 is consistent with the rodent 
literature where time fields have been found through repeated testing without reports of 
reduced activity. 
Further studies on human participants’ memory for time have provided evidence for the 
involvement of the hippocampus in the process of sequence retrieval. In studies using virtual 
environments, greater hippocampal activity has been seen during retrieval of temporal 
sequence information compared to recognition of environmental landmarks (Copara et al., 
2014; Ekstrom & Bookheimer, 2007; Ekstrom et al., 2011). Greater hippocampal activity 
during study has been found to predict subsequent successful memory for temporal order of 
items (Tubridy & Davachi, 2011a), while increased activation in the hippocampus has been 
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associated with accurate temporal ordering of sequences during recall (Lehn et al., 2009). 
Similar to the animal literature, the human hippocampus has been found to aid the 
discrimination of overlapping sequences. More specifically, activity in the right hippocampus 
has been shown to increase during learning of overlapping compared to non-overlapping 
sequences and that this activity is associated with greater learning rate. The activity in the 
right hippocampus was analysed in more detail, indicating that increased activity for 
overlapping items and items subsequent to the overlap drove the increased learning rate. 
This suggests that learning of overlapping sequences is aided by increased hippocampal 
activity during shared items potentially as a means of distinguishing the sequences 
(Kumaran & Maguire, 2006). Finally, hippocampal activity has been found to increase as 
people form associations between stimuli presented discontiguously in time, arguing that the 
hippocampus does not only bind items in a sequence but also information across time to 
form coherent representations of events (Hales & Brewer, 2010; Staresina & Davachi, 2009). 
A problem for the studies above is the finding that time cells only seem to be evident when 
rats are engage in a memory task in which they are required to keep track of time, but not 
during control tasks where no memory is required (Pastalkova et al., 2008; Wang et al., 
2014). This could suggest that while time cells track the passing of time, they only do so 
when this is behaviourally relevant and not spontaneously. It is difficult to argue that these 
time cells could be what underlie our ability to judge elapsed time, as we do not normally 
make a conscious effort to encode this type of information. This is also assuming that time 
cells exist in human, which has yet to be demonstrated. Should time cells not exist in 
humans the point above becomes moot, as it would then be clear that temporal information 
is not encoded or retrieved via information encoded in such time cells. If time cells, similar to 
those found in rodents, exist in humans it would be difficult to argue that these underlie our 
temporal processing, should they suffer from the same drawbacks as those in rodent studies 
where cells are only active in certain conditions. The studies examining the neural 
underpinnings of the temporal context model in human participants further involve learned 
sequences repeated multiple times and not memory for sequences presented only once. 
Episodic memory involves memory for unique event sequences and not ones that are 
learned through repetition. It has been argued that as a sequence is repeated the type of 
temporal coding seen in the temporal context studies can be achieved through forward 
prediction, whereby repeated exposure to the same sequence will lead to stronger inter-item 
associations over time but is not something that emerges spontaneously (Davachi & DuBrow, 
2015).  This would mean that while the temporal context model provides a neat explanation 
for how temporal information could be encoded and retrieved from memory the empirical 
data does not support the predictions of the model, such as that temporal contexts are 
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formed naturally and support memory over long time periods. For the temporal context 
model to be useful in explaining the mechanism underlying memory for time the conditions 
under which it holds true has to be broader than what is indicated by the results discussed 
above rather than only being able to explain temporal memory during specific memory tasks. 
1.3.3 Time Outside the Hippocampus 
Much of the literature discussed above suggests that the hippocampus is the main area in 
which time is processed. Nevertheless, areas outside of the medial temporal lobe are also 
thought to contribute to temporal cognition.  As mentioned above, patterns of activity in the 
rostrolateral prefrontal cortex have been shown to follow the predictions of the temporal 
context model (Jenkins & Ranganath, 2010). Other neuroimaging studies have 
demonstrated the involvement of the prefrontal cortices in temporal order judgments. 
Bilateral activity in the prefrontal cortices has been found in relation to temporal order 
judgments compared to single item recognition, with the right prefrontal cortex associated 
with order judgments between different lists while the left prefrontal cortex being more active 
within lists (Suzuki et al., 2002). A study by Cabeza and colleagues (1997) revealed a larger 
network of brain regions involved in temporal order memory compared to item recognition, 
including areas in the dorsal prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and the posterior 
midline. Similar to some of the rodent work presented further down, Jenkins & Ranganath 
(2016) found that accurate recency memory was associated with increased activity in the 
medial prefrontal cortex, whereas recency judgments independent of accuracy was 
predicted by activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex. This was interpreted as supporting the 
existence of two distinct mechanisms for when an event occurred, one that simply deals with 
the recency of items and events and the other that aims to place these events accurately in 
time. These results could be related back to Friedman’s (1993) theories of time and could 
suggest different functions within distance based memory, one for placing an event more or 
less recent on a coarser scale and one for fine grained temporal judgments that is more 
likely to result in accurate retrieval. Combined, these studies highlight an extensive network 
around the frontal cortex involved in processing temporal information. The next section will 
examine regions that are necessary for temporal processing by looking at studies illustrating 
impaired memory for time in relation to damage to the prefrontal cortices, first in human 
patient studies and then in rodent lesion work. 
Studies on patients with damage to the prefrontal cortices have demonstrated selected 
deficits in processing temporal information. Comparing memory between three groups of 
patients, those with damage to the frontal lobes, amnesic patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, 
and non-Korsakoff’s amnesiacs. Patients with isolated frontal lobe lesions had damage 
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across a varying extent, and as a result more fine-grained analysis of the specific sub-
regions was not reported in the study. The study reported that patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome exhibit atrophy in the frontal lobes and damage to the temporal lobes, but no 
mention is made of the exact locations or extent of damage in neither Korsakoff’s nor 
amnesic patients, only that the latter group did not have any frontal lobe lesions. Both 
patients with frontal lobe damage and Korsakoff’s patients (whose damage included the 
frontal lobes) were impaired on temporal order judgments, i.e. remembering the correct 
order of a previously learned sequence of words, compared to amnesic patients without 
frontal lobe damage. There was no difference in word recognition which suggests a specific 
deficit in temporal processing rather than a general memory impairment (Shimamura, 
Janowsky, & Squire, 1990). Additionally patients with lesions across a range of areas in the 
frontal lobes seem to be able to accurately judge the recency of items when they have been 
coupled with an action, but not when words have simply been read (Mcandrews & Milner, 
1991), nor when stimuli is pictorial (Milner, 1971; Milner, Corsi, & Leonard, 1991). This 
demonstrates that the frontal lobes are necessary for the memory of time. However, it is 
difficult to draw any conclusions as to which regions within the frontal lobes contribute to this 
since the studies examined included patients with lesions across a varied range of the frontal 
lobes. Interestingly, while deficits have been seen when patients attempt to order sequences 
of actions, such as the steps involved in boiling pasta, and in ordering natural events. Frontal 
lobe patients do to some extent have spared knowledge of temporal structures, including the 
days of the week, i.e. knowing that Monday comes after Sunday and is followed by Tuesday 
which could be seen as having a spared semantic knowledge of time rather than episodic 
memory for time (Zanini, 2008). While patients with frontal lobe damage exhibit deficits in 
temporal memory, this does not include semantic structures of time such as knowing the 
correct order of the days of the week or the alphabet. It further highlights the importance of 
using tasks that assess temporal memory, which cannot be solved by using knowledge for 
general temporal structures as this could skew results and would not measure the outcome 
variable of interest. 
These patient studies have been corroborated in rodent studies, demonstrating a decline in 
temporal processing following lesions to parts of the frontal cortices. Here, selective lesions 
to the medial prefrontal cortex have resulted in impaired ability to discriminate between 
sequences of spatial locations (Chiba, Kesner, & Gibson, 1997). The connection between 
medial prefrontal cortex and the perirhinal cortex is also of importance as combined 
unilateral lesions of the medial prefrontal and perirhinal cortices produced a deficit in recency 
judgements, as did bilateral lesions to the medial prefrontal and perirhinal cortices 
respectively. Interestingly, combined prefrontal and perirhinal lesions only caused an 
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impairment when the lesions were in contralateral and not ipsilateral hemispheres, nor were 
any deficits seen for either unilateral prefrontal or perirhinal lesions (Barker, Bird, Alexander, 
& Warburton, 2007; Hannesson, Howland, & Phillips, 2004). This would indicate that it is not 
the prefrontal cortices or the medial temporal lobe alone that are necessary for temporal 
memory, but rather the connection between the two regions. 
Temporal processing in the striatum has been demonstrated using fixed-interval (FI) tasks, 
where a subject’s response, for example a lever press in animal studies, is rewarded after a 
certain interval has elapsed since the previous reward occasion. After training on specific 
intervals, subjects will start to respond, i.e. press a level, after a certain amount of time close 
to the fixed interval has passed in the absence of changes in any environmental cues 
indicating that they are capable of interval timing (Oprisan & Buhusi, 2014). It is thought that 
the striatum holds a central role in this process by integrating temporal information via the 
input from a range of inputs from cortical regions, where medium spiny neurons acts as 
coincidence detectors that detect and respond to specific patterns of cortical patterns that 
are associated with a previously learned interval and reward (Yin, Lusk, & Meck, 2017). This 
has been demonstrated by showing that striatal cells tend to fire in a narrow time window 
after a specific interval that has been associated with a reward, i.e. cells increase firing 
around the 10 second mark when a 10 second interval was used (Matell, Meck, & Nicolelis, 
2003). The mechanism underlying such timing behaviour is in part thought to rely on a 
coupling of glutamatergic release from cortical regions providing input to the striatum, 
followed by striatal dopamine release after the presentation of reward. This coupling 
promotes selective dendritic spine growth in striatum and promotes long-term potentiation in 
relation to inputs corresponding to specific intervals (Lusk, Petter, MacDonald, & Meck, 
2016). This further illustrates that temporal information can be encoded and integrated in to 
memory via other means than just neuronal firing, which is implied in several of the previous 
articles discussed on time cells in the hippocampus (MacDonald et al., 2011; Manns et al., 
2007; Pastalkova et al., 2008). 
Time cells, akin to those found in the hippocampus, have also been found in the striatum, 
where cells will fire in an ordinal sequence to cover a set temporal interval (Mello, Soares, & 
Paton, 2015).  Striatal time cells could be said to have a timing function, whereby they keep 
track of the duration of an interval before reward is delivered. However, similar to the 
circadian clocks, it is difficult to deduce whether this function indicates a conscious use of 
memory or if it is more akin to operant learning where behavioural responses after a specific 
interval are being reinforced. 
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1.3.4 Summary: The problem With Time 
In this section we have seen that temporal information can be used to separate events in a 
multitude of ways. This ability spans many definitions of time, from judging how long ago 
something took place to being able to temporal order judgments. Although it has been 
shown that temporal processing is evident in humans and rodents, most theories of how this 
is achieved are not supported by empirical evidence. Using dates to define events, which 
might be the most common way for humans to think of and define time, is not very accurate 
as discussed in Section 1.3.2. The telescoping of events is so common that most research 
takes this as a matter of fact and most work focuses on trying to understand this bias rather 
than situations when dates can be retrieved accurately. Moving to other definitions of time, 
such as how long ago something took place, we again see similar patterns with humans 
consistently under or over estimating the duration between the present and past events, 
making this an inaccurate measure of when an event took place. 
Associative chaining models aiming to explain sequence memory are intuitive as it is easy to 
imagine experiences being linked together via inter-event associations. Temporal tags would 
be stored in these associations allowing us to infer time based on the relationship between 
two events. Nevertheless, the assumptions made by such models are not supported by 
empirical data. For example, erroneous responses do not necessarily propagate further 
incorrect responses and correct responses do not always act as helpful cues for subsequent 
retrieval. 
One of the more compelling mechanisms for achieving event separation using temporal 
information is proposed in the temporal context model, where both behavioural evidence in 
the form of cueing paradigms in free recall, and neural underpinnings as time cells have 
been found to support this model. Nevertheless, even the time cell literature has a number of 
shortcomings. First, most studies have only demonstrated time cell activity over very short 
time scales of up to a couple of minutes, much shorter than we would expect for it to be the 
underlying mechanism for temporal processing in everyday life. Although it is possible that 
other mechanisms could continue to track time when the spiking signal of time cells end, no 
such function has been demonstrated to date. One of the few exceptions being the study by 
Manns et al ( 2007). Second, it is troubling that there is evidence to suggest that time cells 
are only evident when an animal is engaged in a memory task. This could suggest that time 
cells only come in to play when a conscious effort is made to keep track of time, which again 
would argue against time cells being the mechanism underlying temporal processing on an 
everyday basis, especially seeing as much of our episodic memories relies on incidental 
encoding. In addition, research with human participants has used learned sequences 
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repeated over time to generate the overlapping neural representations predicted by the 
temporal context model. Learned sequences are not something that is frequently encoded in 
episodic memory and can be said to relate more to habits and routines where we can predict 
the next step from experience. 
As it has been demonstrated that most theories of temporal memory cannot account for all 
empirical findings, it can be argued that the temporal information used to identify an event, 
and in extension the theory used to account for such memory, could vary across situations. It 
is possible that we make use of the temporal information available during retrieval (Friedman, 
1993). For example, to answer the question of when an event took place we could answer 
this using the date if this information can be retrieved. Alternatively, if the event is more 
strongly associated with a temporal order code this can be used to specify when the event 
happened, or we can keep searching through temporal alternatives such as how long ago it 
might have happened or if time can be inferred from the context of the event, until a temporal 
identifier can be retrieved. The issue with this kind of theory of memory for time is that it is 
not falsifiable. If it is demonstrated that participants are unable to remember a specific type 
of time in a study it could always be suggested that another type of temporal measure could 
have been remembered more accurately under the circumstances instead of concluding that 
memory for time is not necessarily accurate. 
If our memory for time is not very accurate and the mechanisms thought to underlie temporal 
processing are not entirely reliable, are there other cues that might give more accurate 
representations of past events used to separate events in memory? Non-temporal context 
has been suggested to be an important cue for specifying occasions (Easton & Eacott, 2008) 
and could be argued to underlie the location based memory defined by Friedman (1993), 
serving as a mean to distinguish experiences in memory. Support for this proposition can 
been found in research on both human participants and rodents, which will be looked at in 
more detail below.  
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1.4 Context Memory 
1.4.1 Introduction 
As we saw in the previous section, using temporal information does not always give an 
accurate representation of the identity of an event. It has instead been proposed that non-
temporal information should be considered in the process of disambiguating events (Eacott 
& Easton, 2010; Easton & Eacott, 2008). Friedman (1993) discussed three kinds of temporal 
memory processes: distance, location, and sequence based, where location based 
memories corresponds closely to memory for occasions. He found that location based 
memories were the most accurate representation of human memory with the best fit of 
experimental results as he found few results contradicting the involvement of location 
information during retrieval in his review. Friedman found that distance based theories 
suffered from results demonstrating that this type of memory was only accurate for more 
recent events, and as such not a function for long-term temporal memory, which in 
agreement with the studies reported in Section 1.3.2 demonstrating that duration judgments 
tend to be over- or underestimated (Eisler, 1976; Ferguson & Martin, 1983) or subject to 
distortion based on intervening events (Block, 1992; Block, 1974). Theories of relative time, 
such as associative chaining, were found to be inconsistent with findings that participants 
are better at judging the recency of items if they were presented further apart in time 
(McCormack, 1982; Winograd & Soloway, 1985; Yntema & Trask, 1963), while chaining 
models would suggest the opposite since temporal information would be stored in the 
associations between neighbouring items. Friedman (1993) further argued that components 
of memory do not hold specific temporal information, and instead people refer to contextual 
information surrounding the remembered event. When remembering when an event took 
place people retrieve contextual information associated with the event, or the relationship 
with surrounding events. This information subsequently aids the ability to retrieved temporal 
information, which can be inferred from our general knowledge of time patterns, suggesting 
that: 
Our ability to judge the time of events is not based in special time codes assigned to 
memories, an inherent temporal organisation of memory, or age-of-memory codes 
created by the passage of time. Instead, elementary information is the ordinary 
contents of memory (Friedman, 1993, p. 58).  
However, can we disambiguate events using non-temporal event identifiers? The idea that 
contexts or scenes could be used to separate events in episodic memory emerged in studies 
on monkeys. Gaffan (1994) argued for the importance of scene information in object 
discrimination studies, as it was possible to acquire knowledge of objects outside of the 
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experimental setting. In order to be sure that the memory for a specific object in a study is in 
fact from that experiment the subject, human or monkey, needs to encode the scene to 
accurately relate it to the correct setting. The context of an event has to be encoded for its 
separation from other similar experiences. The context of an event can loosely be described 
as information present and encoded in memory when the event happened, and the many 
ways in which the word ‘context’ can be interpreted and defined will be discussed on more 
detail in the next section. Studying monkeys’ performance on an object-scene discrimination 
task, argued to be the most similar to a naturalistic episodic memory according to the author, 
it was found that animals with fornix lesions performed similar to human patients with 
episodic memory deficits with similar damage, suggesting that using scenes or contexts to 
assess episodic memory performance is viable (Gaffan, 1994). This has eventually led to the 
development of further animal models of episodic memory placing contextual information as 
a potential cue for distinguishing individual events (Eacott, Easton, & Zinkivskay, 2005; 
Eacott & Norman, 2004; Easton & Eacott, 2008). Referred to as what-where-which occasion 
memory after Clayton and Dickinson’s’ (1998) definition of episodic-like memory in animals, 
where the occasion is defined as an environmental context. Studies using this model have 
found similar impairments in rats as Gaffan (1994) found with monkeys, which mimics the 
impaired episodic memory performance seen in human amnesiacs (Davis, Eacott, Easton, & 
Gigg, 2013; Eacott & Norman, 2004). These results provide further support for the 
hypothesis that contextual information may be used to separate events in our memory. The 
question that remains is how such event separation using contextual cues can be achieved. 
Here, research on contextual processing across cognitive and neural domains will be 
examined in an attempt to answer this question. 
1.4.2 Definition of Context 
Before delving into more detail about context memory in general an important aspect is to 
consider how we define the word context. As discussed earlier, context can be temporal, 
where events are defined by their temporal proximity and overlap (Howard & Kahana, 2002). 
In this section we will look at types of non-temporal contexts and how these have been 
operationalized in experimental settings. Context has been notoriously difficult to define as it 
is a relatively abstract term, even leading some to say that the term itself is “a kind of 
conceptual garbage” (Smith, Glenberg, & Bjork, 1978, pp. 342). This is evident in the 
numerous ways in which the term context has been used throughout memory research, 
including but not necessarily limited to auditory (Geiselman & Bjork, 1980) and olfactory 
stimuli (Isarida et al., 2014), mood (Robinson & Rollings, 2011), and task demands (Smith & 
Mizumori, 2006). Manipulating context in both human and animal research tends to involve 
altering visual or spatial features of the testing environment (Robertson, Eacott, & Easton, 
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2014). However, even this can range from changing the coloured background on a screen 
(Isarida & Isarida, 2007) to the colour and texture of the walls and floor of the environment 
(Eacott & Norman, 2004), or changing the physically location of the environment (Suzuki, 
Tsukiura, Matsue, Yamadori, & Fujii, 2005) compared to using virtual environments (Trinkler, 
King, Spiers, & Burgess, 2002) or using images of different physical locations (Wang, 
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2013).  
In order to narrow down the definition of context, for the remainder of this section the term 
context will be taken to mean the physical aspects of the environment in which the study 
item is presented. As such, the main focus here we will be on environmental aspects of 
context, like distinct backgrounds on which items are presented during a study, and 
environmental context, which has been defined as “the physical aspects of the experimental 
situation” (Smith, Glenberg, & Bjork, 1978, pp. 343), such as the colour or pattern of the 
walls in the testing apparatus in rodent studies (Eacott & Norman, 2004). The reason for 
excluding part of the literature is that when examining the use of context in event separation 
we want to get as close as possible to the mechanisms we use in everyday life. This is the 
type of context that we encounter on a daily basis and can refer events to, as it is a salient 
cue that surrounds most events. This does not necessarily involve the location of an event, 
but could instead relate to the general features surrounding an experience, such as the 
nature of an event (e.g. the Christmas party), who was present, or even the weather 
condition at the time. 
1.4.3 Context Reinstatement 
One benefit of using contextual information to separate events is that memory for items are 
enhanced when they are presented in the same context at retrieval as they were during 
encoding, referred to as the context reinstatement effect (Smith & Vela, 2001) or encoding 
specificity principle (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). This creates a strong memory cue that can 
aid the retrieval of discrete events. The encoding specificity principle holds that this effect is 
due to information laid down at the time of encoding acting as cues during retrieval. More 
specifically the effectiveness of cues during retrieval relies solely on how those cues were 
encoded during learning (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). The difference between the context 
reinstatement effect and the encoding specificity principle is that the former posits that 
encoding of contextual information is incidental while the latter holds that it is non-incidental. 
In other words, the context reinstatement effect argues that the encoding of contextual 
information occur as a default without participants paying explicit attention to binding 
contextual information to events, while the encoding specificity principle states that the 
information that is to be encoded must be encoded with some reference to the context for it 
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to be effective as a cue during retrieval (Smith & Vela, 2001; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). 
This small difference between the models might not seem very important, but can still offer 
some insight in to how contextual information is encoded and retrieved in memory. An 
example of this from the encoding specificity principle is that if the word CHAIR is encoded 
together with the word GLUE as a context, then GLUE will be a more efficient cue for 
retrieval compared to TABLE. Although TABLE is generally more associated with the target 
word than GLUE, the latter will generate more accurate retrieval due to its association with 
the target word during encoding (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). This illustrates that contexts 
have to be integrated with other event information during encoding to be efficient cues 
during retrieval. Context information not associated during encoding will produce less 
accurate retrieval, even if it has a semantic relatedness to the item being retrieved. This 
effect has been called in to question by a set of studies carried out by Epstein and 
colleagues (Epstein & Dupree, 1977; Epstein, Dupree, & Gronikowski, 1979), in which they 
found that cues presented at retrieval enhanced retrieval accuracy both when they had been 
presented at encoding and when they had not. This goes against the encoding specificity 
principle, which argues that cues should only be effective when processed during encoding, 
leading Tulving to modify his definition of the encoding specificity principle in line with the 
results from Epstein and colleagues (1979) to say that cues presented only at retrieval could 
be effective but would be less so compared to ones that were processed during the original 
presentation (Epstein et al., 1979). It could be argued that in these examples contextual 
information increased retrieval accuracy simply by providing more information at test. Simply 
providing more information should not have an effect on retrieval unless there is some 
relatedness between the item and its context, and it could be hypothesised that the results 
found by Epstein and colleagues (1979) would have been different had they not used words 
carrying semantic relatedness to the test items as contexts. 
The context reinstatement effect relates more to the kind of incidental encoding of events 
that we engage in normally, as we generally do not make a conscious effort to bind the 
features of our environment to a coherent representation. This effect has been found across 
a range of different contexts, including environmental context (Smith & Vela, 2001), coloured 
backgrounds (Isarida & Isarida, 2007) and natural scenes (Hayes, Nadel, & Ryan, 2007). 
One of the most well-known examples of the context reinstatement effect stems from a study 
by Godden and Baddeley (1975) in which divers learned word lists either under water or on 
dry land. Their memory for the word lists was subsequently tested either in the same context 
in which they had been studied (i.e. study and test both under water), or in different contexts 
(i.e. study underwater and test on dry land). The results showed that memory was 
significantly better when both study and test took place in the same context (Godden & 
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Baddeley, 1975). While the context reinstatement effect has generally been accepted as 
reliable there are a few interesting aspects to it. One such is the repeated finding that only 
recall, and not recognition memory, is affected by context shifts (Godden & Baddeley, 1980; 
Smith et al., 1978). It has been suggested that this is due to free recall requiring participants 
to try to come up with various cues in order to access the target stimuli, with environmental 
context being a particularly effective cue. In recognition memory participants are already 
presented with an explicit cue in the item or word to be recognised which reduces the 
dependence on any other cue sources (Smith et al., 1978). Another interesting effect is that 
people do not necessarily have to be in the same physical environment during both study 
and test, instead it could be sufficient to simply recall the original learning environment prior 
to test to get the same effect as being physically present (Smith, 1979; Smith & Vela, 2001). 
This effect was removed when the original learning environment was made more difficult to 
remember (Smith, 1979), suggesting that mental reinstatement is possible when the original 
learning context is sufficiently easy to bring to mind without external cues. 
The context reinstatement effect has been questioned by a set of negative results (Eich, 
1985; Fernandez & Glenberg, 1985; Saufley, Otaka, & Bavaresco, 1985). Saufley et al. 
(1985) did not find any evidence in favour of the context reinstatement effect where students 
where either tested in the classroom in which learning had taken place, or in a new 
classroom across 21 exams in 7 different University courses. Fernandez & Glenberg (1985) 
carried out 8 experiments over which they found no reinstatement effects despite controlling 
for a number of factors that could have explained the null results, such as task difficulty, 
generating versus reading sentences, and primacy and recency effects. What could explain 
an absence of reinstatement, as demonstrated by Eich (1985), is that when people are 
instructed to associate stimuli with the context it is presented in the reinstatement effect is 
seen. However, if instructed to visualize the stimuli independently from its surroundings 
testing in the same context did not incur any advantage. In doing this, participants created a 
mental representation of the stimuli independently from the context, meaning that the 
context was a less effective cue during retrieval. While this could explain some of the null 
results outlined above, it is not clear whether this type of processing could underlie all of the 
null findings. 
To assess the validity of the reinstatement effect, Smith and Vela (2001) conducted a meta-
analysis of 75 studies across 41 separate articles. They suggested four different hypotheses 
for the meta-analysis that could identify the factors influencing the context reinstatement 
effect. The reinstatement hypothesis holds that reinstatement of the learning context should 
benefit retrieval across situations as contextual cues are encoded by default. The 
overshadowing hypothesis states that if contextual encoding is suppressed during learning, 
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this would limit the use of context reinstatement at retrieval. The outshining hypothesis is 
similar to overshadowing, but instead suggests that contextual information can be supressed 
during retrieval, which would again reduce the context reinstatement effect. Finally, the 
mental reinstatement hypothesis holds that the mental reinstatement of the learning context 
when tested in a novel environment should reduce any negative effect of the change in 
context between study and test. The main finding of the meta-analysis was that there was a 
reliable effect of the reinstatement hypothesis across studies, although mainly under 
favourable conditions listed next. The reinstatement effect was lower when participants had 
engaged in associative processing between list items, as compared to item specific 
processing. This latter finding supports both the overshadowing and outshining hypotheses 
in that the associative processing could have supressed the environmental context during 
encoding making it ineffective as a cue later on, or that the inter-item associations are 
retrieved during test and thus supressing the influence of the environmental context. Finally, 
the mental reinstatement hypothesis was also supported with results demonstrating that 
instructing participants to mentally reinstate the study context improved recall. 
In summary, the context reinstatement seems to be a real effect that can have a significant 
effect on memory, with some caveats. The way in which information is processed during 
encoding can affect the magnitude of the reinstatement effect, but will not completely 
eradicate it. The reinstatement effect is further evident both when retrieval takes place in the 
same physical environment and when the learning environment is reinstated mentally. The 
effect of mental reinstatement means that the context reinstatement effect generalises 
beyond physical space and can be an effective means of retrieval as long as the original 
learning context can be remembered more easily compared to when this is made more 
difficult to remember (Smith, 1979). This speaks to our ability to mentally travel back in time 
and relive past events, which as we have seen is a key component of episodic memory. 
1.4.4 Context and Interference Reduction 
Contextual information can aid the disambiguation of events in memory by dividing 
sequences in to discrete units, and can in that sense reduce interference from similar or 
overlapping episodes since each one will have a different contextual tag attached to it. Early 
work on the role of context in relation to interference in memory suggested that the more 
similar two learning situations are the more difficult it will be to discriminate between what 
has been learnt (Bilodeau & Schlosberg, 1951). It was demonstrated that when learning a 
number of word lists took place in two different environmental contexts, as opposed to 
learning in the same context, re-learning of early information was improved as was recall of 
the word lists (Bilodeau & Schlosberg, 1951; Greenspoon & Ranyard, 1957), illustrating that 
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different contexts help to keep information separate. Further studies have found that only 
recall and not recognition is better when learning takes place across multiple contexts 
arguing that this effect is not due to superior learning in different contexts, which would 
generate both higher recall and recognition accuracy. Instead this can be attributed to 
improved recall of information learned in different contexts (Dallett & Wilcox, 1968; Smith, 
1982). Smith (1982) revealed that as the number of contexts over which learning was 
distributed increased, recall improved despite testing taking place in a novel context, thus 
showing that accurate recall is not only relying on the reinstatement of the original learning 
context. However, when comparing distributed learning over multiple contexts to single 
context learning, the highest recall performance was still seen in the single context 
reinstatement condition. Smith suggested that using multiple contexts during learning acts as 
organisational cues for information, and that as the number of contexts increase participants 
will be less reliant on the testing environment to provide cues for recall. A study looking at 
applied learning in the classroom found that while distributing learning over multiple days led 
to better retrieval compared to single day learning, increasing the number of learning 
environments improved retrieval further in both single and multiple days of learning (Smith & 
Rothkopf, 1984), which further supports the idea that grouping events by context leads to 
better future recall. 
The positive effect on memory when events are grouped by contextual cues is further 
supported by work showing that recall is better for information that has been presented in the 
same context during study, whereas when information has to be retrieved across changes in 
context recall is significantly worse (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011). Entering a new room can 
reduce the ability to remember items encountered in a previous room, thought to be caused 
by an update to a person’s situation model where features in the new environment become 
readily available and items associated with the previous environment become less available 
in memory (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Radvansky et al., 2011). Temporal order 
judgments have further been found to be enhanced for items presented within the same 
context, compared to sequences interrupted by context boundaries (Dubrow & Davachi, 
2013; DuBrow & Davachi, 2014). It has been argued that it is the boundaries between 
events that are of importance, not just a difference in context. Pettijohn & Radvansky (2012 
in Radvansky, 2012) found that moving from one and of a room to another did not incur any 
memory benefit, while moving the same distance to a different room separated by a doorway 
did. A more recent study further demonstrated enhanced memory for word lists when they 
were divided by event boundaries, additionally showing this to be the case when boundaries 
were represented by shifts in the physical environment, as well as moving between two 
computer screens, and in narrative shifts (Pettijohn, Thompson, Tamplin, Krawietz, & 
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Radvansky, 2016). The latter study extends the view that events are structured by shifts in 
environmental context to include the organisation of events by other contextual features.  
The Event Horizon model has been developed to reconcile the results showing that 
contextual shifts can both improve (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011) and impair (Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2006) memory (Radvansky, 2012; Radvansky & Zacks, 2011). This model 
suggests that events are segmented into discrete episodes as boundaries are encountered. 
As a boundary is encountered the current event model is also updated, an event model 
being a mental state that “capture the contents and structure of the events that people 
experience” (Radvansky, 2012, pp. 269), which leads to information associated with the 
previous event model being less active and thus less memorable across boundaries.  Causal 
connectivity between information is also expected to lead to better retrieval, which is more 
likely for information within the same event as it is part of the same event model, compared 
to across contextual shifts (Radvansky, 2012; Radvansky & Zacks, 2011). In a recent paper 
by Horner and colleagues (2016) participants walked through a sequence of rooms in a 
virtual environment where they encountered two objects in each room. At test participants 
were first asked if an object was old or new, and if old, to select the subsequent object in the 
study sequence. In line with the studies by Radvansky and colleagues (Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2006; Radvansky et al., 2011) Horner and colleagues found that temporal 
memory was significantly better for objects presented within the same context compared to 
ones separated by a contextual shift. A computational model based on the temporal context 
model (Howard & Kahana, 2002) was constructed to account for these results. This model 
suggests that rather than having a uniformly changing representation over time there is a 
greater shift in the active elements as a contextual shift is introduced, thus generating more 
similar representations for information presented within the same context and more 
dissimilar representations across contexts. Taken together, these studies suggest that 
defining events by shared contextual information can be beneficial for memory as it breaks 
each episode in to individual categories that could reduce interference from surrounding and 
similar events. Nevertheless, a logical conclusion of this is also that grouping events by 
context can impair memory as it only improves retrieval within, but not between, contexts. 
Meaning that as a result of interference reduction memory across events is sacrificed for 
better retrieval within events. 
1.4.5 Neural Basis of Context Memory 
After considering the behavioural and cognitive effects of context on memory I will now turn 
to the neural underpinnings of context memory and disambiguation. The first part, 1.4.5, will 
look at functional MRI research in human participants to see how context is represented on a 
somewhat larger scale. Focus in Section 1.4.6 will then shift to studies using single cell 
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recordings in rats for a view of the mechanisms that underlie contextual representations in 
the brain.  
Context reinstatement is not merely a behavioural effect but is also evident on a neural level. 
The same pattern of neural activity seen during encoding can also be present during 
retrieval in cortical areas when participants remember contextual details pertaining to the 
study event (Johnson, McDuff, Rugg, & Norman, 2009; Johnson & Rugg, 2007; Rugg, 
Johnson, Park, & Uncapher, 2008). Retrieval-related reactivation of cortical regions active 
during encoding could act to preserve associations between the individual components of an 
event, including the context, which makes that episode distinct (Rugg et al., 2008). Johnson 
& Rugg (2007) presented words overlaid on natural backgrounds for participants to create a 
mental image of the two, or words on a grey background for a sentence generation condition. 
At test, words were presented on pixelated backgrounds and participants had to judge 
whether the word was old and they could retrieve details of the study phase (‘remember’), if 
it was old but no details could be retrieved (‘know’) or whether the word was new, for more 
detail on the Remember/Know procedure see Section 3.1. Cortical reinstatement, measured 
by multivoxel pattern analysis as the similarity in neural activity between study and test, was 
found in left superior and lateral occipital cortex and left anterior fusiform gyrus for 
recollected words studied on natural backgrounds. Cortical reinstatement has further been 
found in the left inferior frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, and lateral temporal gyrus 
(Johnson et al., 2009),  as well as both the right and left fusiform cortex (Wong et al., 2013; 
Vilberg & Rugg, 2007),with some regions varying with the categories of information being 
retrieved (Polyn, Natu, Cohen, & Norman, 2005; Summerfield et al., 2006). One area of 
particular interest is the anterior fusiform gyrus, which forms part of the temporal and 
occipital lobes, where reinstatement has been shown when pictures, resembling contextual 
information, are being retrieved, compared to word stimuli, across a number of studies  
(Johnson & Rugg, 2007; Vaidya, Zhao, Desmond, & Gabrieli, 2002; Wheeler & Buckner, 
2004; Woodruff, Johnson, Uncapher, & Rugg, 2005). As the anterior fusiform has been 
demonstrated to become active in relation to retrieval of pictorial information and not for 
words, it has been suggested that this area is not involved in recollection success per se but 
rather that it is functionally specialised for a particular class of stimuli (Woodruff et al., 2005). 
These findings indicate that the neural representation of contextual information might hold 
some unique features, similar to the temporal processing in the hippocampus, though 
without currently defining a specific mechanism for how contextual information is processed 
in this area. 
Cortical reinstatement is thought to be driven by hippocampal activity. Encoding has been 
suggested to take place by activity in cortical regions being stored as sparse representations 
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in the hippocampus. During retrieval the hippocampal representations reactivated which in 
turn leads to cortical reinstatement (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Rugg et al., 2008). This has 
been supported by a study finding that retrieval of multi-element events reinstated activity in 
distinct areas associated with each feature, with hippocampal activity correlated with the 
amount of cortical reinstatement seen (Horner, Bisby, Bush, Lin, & Burgess, 2015). This 
indicates that cortical reinstatement is dependent on distributed regions across the brain.  
Significantly more research has been conducted on the role of the medial temporal lobe in 
context memory. Within the medial temporal lobe, the parahippocampal cortex has, along 
with the hippocampus, been argued to be one of the crucial regions in which contextual 
information is processed (Bar, 2004; Ranganath, 2010b). The hippocampus has been found 
to become active as relational information is retrieved, i.e. item-context associations 
(Hannula, Libby, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2013), or to co-vary its activity with the amount of 
contextual information relating to an episode that is to be encoded or retrieved (Rugg et al., 
2012). Hippocampal activity at study has further been found to predict later context memory, 
where items later remembered being associated with greater activation in the hippocampus 
during study compared to items that were later forgotten (Davachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003; 
Ranganath et al., 2004). Based on a large body of studies finding hippocampal activity in 
relation to correct retrieval of source context in contrast to incorrect source memory (see 
Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007 for review), it has been suggested that the 
hippocampus is not only sensitive to context information alone but rather acts as a hub that 
integrates contexts with other event information, such as binding items with their associated 
contexts (Diana et al., 2007; Ranganath, 2010b).  
The parahippocampal cortex (PHC) has been implicated in context processing in a number 
of ways. It has been shown to be sensitive to context information through increased activity 
during correct retrieval (Hannula et al., 2013), and to demonstrate reinstatement during 
retrieval of previously encountered contexts through significant pattern similarity between 
encoding and retrieval (Staresina, Henson, Kriegeskorte, & Alink, 2012). It has further been 
suggested that mental reinstatement of a context should be processed in the PHC. When 
priming participants with a previously seen context it has been found that subsequent 
increase in PHC activity could predict that the associated item would be remembered, 
argued by the authors to reflect the mental reinstatement of the study episode (Diana, 
Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2013). Similar to the hippocampus the magnitude of activity in the 
PHC during encoding has also been found to predict later context memory (Davachi et al., 
2003), and that the degree of reinstatement in the PHC correlates with hippocampal activity 
(Staresina et al., 2012).  
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It has been debated what type of contextual information the PHC responds to, with evidence 
to suggest that it processes both spatial and non-spatial context. Much research has 
demonstrated that the PHC is involved in processing spatial context, even referring to it as 
the parahippocampal place area (PPA; Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998; Epstein, Harris, Stanley, 
& Kanwisher, 1999). Others have argued that the PHC, along with the retrosplenial cortex, 
processes both spatial and non-spatial context (Aminoff, Gronau, & Bar, 2007; Bar & Aminoff, 
2003). Extending this it has been demonstrated that PHC is not only responding to simple 
scenes but to more complex contexts, finding that PHC activity is significantly greater for 
scenes that have more complex and rich contextual associations compared to more sparse 
scenes (Bar, Aminoff, & Schacter, 2008). Further, Wang et al. (2013) kept stimulus type 
constant using fractals where participants were to learn associations between two fractals, 
one acting as the item and the other as context. PHC activity was found during retrieval of 
fractals acting as contexts, suggesting that the PHC is involved in a general processing of 
different types of information that could be considered contexts.  
1.4.6 Contextual Representation on a Cellular Level 
Contextual information can be represented on a smaller neural scale compared to the 
distributed activity seen in cortical reinstatement. As a rat explores an environment place 
cells in the hippocampus will form a cognitive map of the environment where each cell will 
only be active in a specific location (O’Keefe, 1976). Place cell activity can be selective to 
certain contexts and events, such that their pattern of activity form unique representations 
that allow for disambiguation between similar events (Komorowski, Manns, & Eichenbaum, 
2009), referred to as pattern separation during encoding as similar experiences are assigned 
distinct pattern of activity (Leutgeb, Leutgeb, Moser, & Moser, 2007). When the rat is moved 
to a new location or context the firing property of the cells undergo some change known as 
remapping. Remapping can manifest itself in different ways either by cells changing the rate 
at which they fire, referred to as rate remapping, by changing the location within the 
environment where they fire causing a complete change in the neural representation of that 
space, called global remapping, or finally, by partial remapping where some cells alter their 
firing properties in relation to minor alterations in the environment (Colgin, Moser, & Moser, 
2008). These processes are thought to be the neural mechanisms that allow for contextual 
disambiguation, and will be discussed here, starting with global remapping. 
1.4.6.1 Global Remapping.  Global remapping describes the phenomenon when place 
fields in the hippocampus shift completely from one representation to another as features of 
the surrounding environment are changed, including cells changing their firing location, cells 
stop firing, or inactive cells becoming active (Colgin et al., 2008). Evaluating the conditions 
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under which hippocampal place cells remap, Muller and Kubie (1987) altered individual 
elements of the environment to see what effects it would have on the place field map. 
Rotating a cue card by the side of the environment led cells to rotate to the same degree, 
changing the size of the environment caused some place fields to scale to the same degree 
while others remapped completely, whereas moving between environments of different 
shapes caused a complete shift in the firing properties of most cells (Muller & Kubie, 1987). 
In a subsequent study it was enough to change the colour of a cue card from white to black 
to cause global remapping (Bostock, Muller, & Kubie, 1991), suggesting that place cells are 
sensitive to a range of features in the environment that can induce remapping. 
Complete shifts in the environment, i.e. not only manipulations of cue cards, leads to 
complete shifts in cell responses, not just in the firing rate. When an environment is gradually 
morphed from one context to another the place cells representing the initial context shifts 
abruptly and simultaneously at some point during the transition to the representation of the 
second context (Wills, Lever, Cacucci, Burgess, & O’Keefe, 2005). Following the transition 
from one context to another the hippocampal representation is not necessary stable but 
instead it can flicker rapidly between the pattern of activity associated with the past context 
and the representation of the current environment (Jezek, Henriksen, Treves, Moser, & 
Moser, 2011), meaning that place field remapping between contexts might not be 
instantaneous and that each context has its own unique representation without any 
intermediate stage as the place fields did not gradually morph with the environment. There 
might also be a difference between hippocampal subfields in terms of remapping, where 
CA1 has more similar representations across different contexts and acquire new 
representations in novel contexts faster compared to CA3. CA3 exhibits more independent 
representations across contexts suggesting a greater degree of global remapping compared 
to the CA1 (Leutgeb, Leutgeb, Treves, Moser, & Moser, 2004). However, this does not mean 
that the CA1 is insensitive to changes in the environment. Exposing rats to two environments 
of different shapes over several days firing patterns start out the same in both environments 
but eventually start to diverge up to a point where cells fire in one but not the other 
environment, or remapped to fire in different places across environments. To assess 
whether the remapping was stable over time, rats were re-tested several weeks after the 
initial testing demonstrating that the majority of cells could still discriminate between the two 
shapes (Lever, Wills, Cacucci, Burgess, & O’Keefe, 2002). A similar dissociation as between 
CA1 and CA3 has further been demonstrated between CA3 and dentate gyrus (DG; 
(Leutgeb, Leutgeb, Moser, & Moser, 2007). In this study CA3 again demonstrated a high 
degree of remapping between spatial environments, and complete shifts in place field 
representations as an environment was morphed from a square to a circle. Conversely, 
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representations in the DG where less independent across different locations and between 
square and circle boxes, indicating a similar role to CA1 where place fields show greater 
similarity across shifts in environmental features (Leutgeb et al., 2007). 
What these studies illustrate is first the complexity of remapping different hippocampal sub-
regions support remapping to a different degree, and second that the hippocampus can 
readily switch between representations of the environment, which can serve a functional 
purpose by swiftly updating the neural representation of the environment to follow changes 
in the immediate environment. However, it is not only changes in the external environment 
that can induce remapping. By keeping geometrical, spatial, and visual information constant, 
rats have still been found to develop independent patterns of activity that are not reliant on 
these external cues, but instead distinguish between varying task demands (Ainge, Meer, 
Langston, & Wood, 2007; Smith & Mizumori, 2006; Wood, Dudchenko, Robitsek, & 
Eichenbaum, 2000). This suggests that it is not only external features that can influence 
hippocampal representations and serve to distinguish events, but also internal states. 
While these studies have demonstrated that cells in the hippocampus form different 
representations of varying contexts, the different neural representations have also been 
demonstrated to have behavioural implications. Bulkin et al. (2016) trained rats on a task 
designed to induce proactive interference. The methods were the same as used by Butterly 
et al. (2012) where rats were trained on a set of odour discrimination problems in one 
context, and then learned a second set either in the same or in a different context. Activity 
was recorded in hippocampal area CA1, and showed that rats who learned the 
discriminations in different contexts had independent representations in each of the two 
contexts, while rats that did not experience a context shift had consistent activity patterns 
across learning discrimination set one and two. Of more interest is the finding that on a trial-
to-trial basis the neural representation was predictive of behavioural performance, where a 
more distinct pattern of activity, compared to previous activity, meant that rats were more 
likely to accurately discriminate the different odour sets. Thus giving direct evidence for 
hippocampal representations of context being used to reduce interference between events 
and aid memory. 
1.4.6.2 Partial Remapping. Remapping does not necessarily work in an all-or-none 
fashion. Instead place cells can alter their firing properties individually in relation to minor 
changes in the environment rather than solely following a complete change of contextual 
features (Anderson & Jeffery, 2003). The features of the environment that triggers 
remapping is not entirely homogenous, in other words, all hippocampal place cells do not 
change their firing properties in relation to the same features of the environment. As 
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mentioned earlier in the study by Muller and Kubie (1987), they found that as the testing 
environment was made larger some cells scaled with the environment while others 
remapped completely. Additionally it has been shown that some cells will alter their firing 
field only as the colour of the walls or floor is changed, in relation to specific odour cues or to 
combinations of multiple features such as only remapping when both odour cues and colour 
of the walls change, while at the same time some cell do not remap at all (Anderson & 
Jeffery, 2003; Jeffery, Anderson, Hayman, & Chakraborty, 2004). It has been suggested that 
this is a result of place cells receiving elements of contexts independently via boundary cells, 
potentially located in the medial entorhinal cortex, rather than a single context signal that 
alters all place cells simultaneously (Anderson & Jeffery, 2003; Jeffery & Anderson, 2003; 
Jeffery et al., 2004). This would give the hippocampus the ability to signal minor changes in 
the environment that would not warrant global remapping, but might be significant enough to 
alter cells firing location rather than just their firing rate as in rate remapping. 
1.4.6.3 Rate Remapping. Whereas global remapping introduces complete shifts in the 
spatial firing locations of place cells, in rate remapping spatial firing remains constant while 
the intensity of firing is altered either by being increased or decreased (Colgin et al., 2008; 
Leutgeb et al., 2005). Rate remapping has been found by keeping the spatial location of the 
environment constant while altering the surrounding context, even when the colour and the 
shape of the environment is changed which might otherwise induce global remapping. A shift 
in spatial location with constant contextual features will introduce global remapping, 
suggesting that rate remapping is a mechanism for distinguishing non-spatial context and 
global remapping distinguishes spatial contexts (Leutgeb et al., 2005). 
However, this distinction is not entirely clear as global remapping can be induced despite the 
spatial location remaining constant. It could be that the type of remapping is determined by 
the degree of change in the environment, with more substantial changes leading to global 
remapping (Colgin et al., 2008). A further explanation being that significant changes to 
contextual features leads animals to think that they are in a different location, hence the 
global remapping. Compared to human memory and our everyday experiences with spatial 
and non-spatial context, it is extremely rare for our surroundings to change so rapidly and 
drastically as in the rodent studies. A change in context but not in space could potentially be 
likened to experiencing different weather conditions or seeing the walls of a room in a 
different colour. Despite these changes there would still be other cues in the environment 
that would tell us that the location had not changed, and it could be these types of minor 
changes that induces rate remapping. Dissociations between hippocampal sub-regions 
sensitive to rate remapping have been found, similar to the differences observed in global 
remapping discussed above. Again, place fields in the CA3 show more pronounced rate 
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remapping compared to cells in CA1 (Leutgeb et al., 2005), with the DG also exhibiting rate 
remapping albeit in a less coherent manner compared to CA3, where the latter show 
increasing rate changes with increased changes in the environment whereas the former 
show rate changes independently of the gradual morphing of the environment (Leutgeb et al., 
2007) 
These three types of remapping illustrate how contextual information can be represented in 
the brain, and how the brain can flexibly alter its representation of the surrounding 
environment depending on changes in individual features leading to partial remapping or a 
shift in spatial context resulting in global remapping.  
1.4.7 Context in the Hippocampal Input Areas 
As seen above, the role of the hippocampus in contextual processing has been extensively 
studied. Nevertheless, the hippocampus is not the only part of the medial temporal lobe 
where contextual information is handled.  The two main input areas to the hippocampus are 
the lateral and medial entorhinal cortices, LEC and MEC respectively. These, in turn, receive 
input from the perirhinal cortex, which mainly projects to the LEC, and the parahippocampal 
cortex (also known as the postrhinal cortex in rats) which provides the majority of input to the 
MEC (Figure 2; van Strien, Cappaert, & Witter, 2009). A large body of research on human 
memory using fMRI has demonstrated involvement of the parahippocampal cortex in the 
memory for contexts and scenes (Aminoff et al., 2007; Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Hannula et al., 
2013; Staresina et al., 2012), which has been corroborated to a lesser extent in rats where 
the postrhinal cortex has been shown to be necessary for context memory (Bucci, Phillips, & 
Burwell, 2000; Bucci, Saddoris, & Burwell, 2002; Burwell, Bucci, Sanborn, & Jutras, 2004; 
Norman & Eacott, 2005). Processing of context information has also been demonstrated 
downstream from the parahippocampal cortex in the MEC (Hunsaker, Chen, Tran, & Kesner, 
2013; Schultz, Sommer, & Peters, 2012), which has led to the suggestion that context 
information is relayed through the parahippocampal-MEC stream in to the hippocampus 
(Eichenbaum, Sauvage, Fortin, Komorowski, & Lipton, 2012; Keene et al., 2016; Ranganath, 
2010a). In the parallel stream the perirhinal cortex has been well studied in relation item 
recognition, but has been shown to be non-responsive to context information (Buckley & 
Gaffan, 1997; Deshmukh, Johnson, & Knierim, 2012; Kesner, Ravindranathan, Jackson, 
Giles, & Chiba, 2001; Norman & Eacott, 2005). The LEC, on the other hand, has been 
shown to be involved in memory when contexts are associated with other event information, 
such as odours (Boisselier, Ferry, & Gervais, 2014) and items (Wilson, Langston, et al., 
2013; Wilson, Watanabe, Milner, & Ainge, 2013).  
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It could be the case that both the LEC and MEC contribute to contextual memory, albeit in 
slightly different ways. LEC lesions have been found to impair rate remapping (Lu et al., 
2013), whereas inactivation of the MEC causes remapping of hippocampal place fields 
despite environmental features remaining constant (Miao et al., 2015). These findings are 
consistent with the idea that the LEC processes sensory and non-spatial features of an 
environment (Deshmukh & Knierim, 2011; Reagh & Yassa, 2014; Van Cauter et al., 2013). 
The MEC, on the other hand, is central for spatial processing where global remapping is 
correlated with different representations of the spatial map being active in the MEC (Fyhn, 
Molden, Witter, Moser, & Moser, 2004; Hafting, Fyhn, Molden, Moser, & Moser, 2005; 
Reagh & Yassa, 2014). This could explain how the LEC and MEC could both be involved in 
contextual memory by providing complementary information to the hippocampus about non-
spatial and spatial context changes respective, both contributing to the disambiguation of 
contexts (Knierim, Lee, & Hargreaves, 2006).  
At this stage it is also worth considering where the sensory information enters the MTL, and 
allows for the integration in to memory. It has been demonstrated that regions in the MTL 
receive input from several sensory regions (REF). Olfactory information is processed in the 
olfactory bulb before being relayed through the piriform cortex before being projected to the 
LEC (Bekkers & Suzuki, 2013; Canto, Wouterlood, & Witter, 2008), where it is thought to be 
integrated in memory (Boisselier et al., 2014). Visual information has been well 
characterised in the ventral visual pathway, originating in the occipital lobe before projecting 
to area TE in the inferotemporal lobe, which then shares connection with the PER and PHC 
in the MTL (Buffalo et al., 1999). These latter regions then provide input to the entorhinal 
cortices, enabling the integration of visual information in these areas (Canto et al., 2008). 
Finally, tactile information originates in the vibrissae mechanoreceptors, where it is then 
projected through the brainstem and on to the primary somatosensory cortex (S1). The 
tactile information subsequently goes from the S1 through the secondary somatosensory 
cortex before ending up in the hippocampus (Diamond, von Heimendahl, Knutsen, Kleinfeld, 
& Ahissar, 2008; Pereira et al., 2007). The S1 and S2 further share connections with the 
perirhinal cortex (R D Burwell, 2000), establishing another path for tactile information to 
enter the MTL. This adds the important notion that the MTL does not function in isolation, but 
is rather a network highly connected with other cortical and subcortical regions. Due to the 
complex nature of the sensory projections to the MTL only a very simplified diagram of 
intrinsic MTL connections is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Medial Temporal Lobe network. Illustrating the areas and connections within the 
medial temporal lobe. Adapted from van Strien et al. 2009. 
 
1.4.8 Summary 
In this section on context memory we have seen that context is a multifaceted word that can 
be defined in many ways. Here, the focus was on environmental context in order to narrow 
down the literature to sets of studies that can be said to closer resemble our everyday life 
experience where contextual information is more likely to consist of the immediately 
surrounding environment rather than different voices or locations on a computer screen. 
Contextual information can alter both learning and memory through the context 
reinstatement effect where the separation of events in memory can be aided by returning to 
the initial context were an event was encoded or by simply reinstating the context mentally. 
Evidence supporting the usefulness of contextual information in separating events in 
memory was further illustrated by studies finding improved memory when information is 
learned across multiple contexts, and that memory is better for information presented within 
the same context compared to retrieval across contexts. Neural representations show that 
reinstatement also takes place on a cortical level and that retrieval of contextual information 
is distributed across the brain. Mechanisms on a cellular level also illustrate how different 
contexts can be encoded in memory in a single region, the hippocampus, and how changes 
to such context affect the representations through different types of remapping.  
Taken together, contextual information could be encoded by unique cellular representations 
in the hippocampus, which would set individual events apart from each other. Upon revisiting 
the same context again, the same neural representations become active facilitating retrieval 
of context specific information and driving the reinstatement of further event related 
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information across cortical areas. Due to mental reinstatement it is not necessary to 
physically revisit previous environments to benefit from contextual information laid down 
during encoding. 
1.5 Time and Context: Open Questions 
Comparing the cognitive and neural mechanisms for temporal and contextual memory, there 
is a considerable amount of overlap. Both types of information can be remembered 
accurately and are supported by cognitive processes that aid retrieval. Temporal memory 
benefits from cueing effects where recalling one event from a sequence will increase the 
probability of recalling the subsequent event, and whereby multiple prior events can be 
aggregated to form a compound cue that can both lead to increased memory accuracy and 
the ability to disambiguate two overlapping sequences. Context memory, on the other hand, 
benefits from the context reinstatement effect in which learning and retrieval takes place in 
the same location leading to more accurate retrieval. The reliability of temporal and 
contextual cues could vary with the conditions at encoding and retrieval, which could 
influence the specific process that comes in to play when allowing us to disambiguate 
memories. If an experience is recalled and the surrounding environmental cues are weak, or 
were weakly encoded, this could lead to better memory for a sequence of events. Whereas a 
strong influence of the surrounding context could facilitate memory for the events that took 
place in that context alone, rather than chaining together a sequence of events spanning 
multiple contexts.  
As with the cognitive processes, there are similarities in the way that the brain encodes time 
and context on a cellular level. More specifically, cells in the hippocampus have been found 
to create unique representations of time as in the temporal context model where there is a 
decorrelation of activity reflecting the passage of time, and for context where place cells form 
different representations of distinct contexts. Since it has been found that time and place 
cells exists independently but are active at the same time when a rat is running on a 
treadmill, it would seem possible that the hippocampus can encode both the passing of time 
and the context simultaneously. This shows that both types of information are capable of 
generating unique representations of events on a neural, as well as a cognitive level. 
Despite the similarities, there are obvious differences in how time and context are treated on 
a cognitive and neural level. Time is somewhat abstract, measured by internal states, clocks 
and calendars, or natural evens such as sunrises and sunset. Context is more concrete in 
the way that it has been defined here as the features of our immediate surroundings, it is 
something that we can see and sometimes touch. It is therefore not so strange that we 
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process these types of information differently. Place cell representations do not drift over 
time to the extent that time cells do, but rather shift drastically in response to changes in the 
environment. Thus making them a poor maker of the passing of time, but much better for 
representing context.  
One significant difference between the two sources is that contextual information does not 
suffer from similar drawbacks as many of the theories on temporal memory. As has been 
discussed previously, memory for time has been shown to be inaccurate when measured in 
terms of dates or how long ago something happened. Empirical data does not support the 
associative chaining models for sequence memory, and support for the temporal context 
model has either failed to find evidence for time cells outside of memory tasks or has used 
learnt sequences to demonstrate shared temporal contexts between items. While some 
negative studies have been reported in relation to the context reinstatement effect, on the 
whole the evidence in favour of this effect is robust and includes both physical and mental 
reinstatement of the learning environment. Contextual representations on a cellular level 
have been found to have distinct firing fields in different contexts, and that they are able to 
modify their firing in response to changes in the environment. The research suggests that 
time and context are different, in that they engage different cognitive and neural 
mechanisms during both encoding and retrieval. However, that does not mean that they 
exist independently and that we only use one type of information at a time. To understand 
how memory for time and context fundamentally differ, or do not differ, from each other we 
must compare them directly and attempt to dissociate them within an experimental setting. 
A big gap in the literature reviewed is the absence of research comparing memory for time 
and context directly. More work examining the ability of these cues to separate events in 
memory is required to shed further light on cognitive and neural processes underlying 
episodic memories. This could tell us more about situations in which context and time may 
play different or complementary roles. For example, if there are factors that can influence 
retrieval of time and context, and whether there is any interaction between them. 
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1.6 Aims and Overview of Thesis 
The broad aim of this thesis is to examine how events are disambiguated in memory, how 
time and contexts are used as sources in this process. To achieve this, experiments using 
both humans and rats have been conducted, giving the ability to answer questions across 
cognitive and neural levels of evidence. Using human participants we can ask how people 
came to their memory judgments, attempting to assess the underlying cognitive processes. 
Working with rodents, on the other hand, we can instead investigate the role of specific brain 
regions in memory tasks by using more invasive procedures. 
The first experimental chapter, Chapter 2, aimed to examine the neural underpinnings of 
long-term multimodal item-context associations. It was hypothesised that the LEC in the 
medial temporal lobe is necessary for memory of context associations, as this region has 
been demonstrated to be necessary for object-context memory over short time periods. It is 
further hypothesised that deficits will be seen for multimodal associations as the LEC 
receives input from several sensory regions. 
Chapter 3 will then go on to compare memory for time and context in human participants. 
The aim of this chapter is to test whether temporal and contextual information can be 
remembered equally well, and as such can be considered viable sources for distinguishing 
events in memory. The underlying retrieval processes involved in retrieval of time and 
context will further be assessed to gain a better understanding of the way in which this 
information is processed on a cognitive level. It is further an attempt to develop a paradigm 
for use with functional MRI that will later examine the neural substrates underlying temporal 
and contextual retrieval. Based on previous research (Easton, Webster, & Eacott, 2012; 
Saive, Royet, Garcia, Thévenet, & Plailly, 2015) it is hypothesised that contextual 
information will only be retrieved accurately using recollection, while time could be 
remembered using both recollection and familiarity. 
Chapter 4 builds on Chapter 3, and has the aim to examine the regions of the brain are 
involved in the memory for time and context using fMRI. This allows for testing whether the 
same network of brain regions support memory for these sources, and whether any 
differences between temporal and contextual memory found in Chapter 3 would be reflected 
on a neural level. Here it is hypothesised that content specific activity will be found, based on 
findings that temporal memory engages regions across the frontal lobes while memory for 
context is supported by in and around the medial temporal lobe, such as the 
parahippocampal cortex and the fusiform cortex. 
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Chapter 2 
Retrieval of Context Associations 
Relies on the Lateral Entorhinal Cortex 
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2.1 Introduction 
When remembering an event the association between what happened, which is often 
characterised as an item in memory research, and the unique source will distinguish that 
experience from other similar events. If the source of an event cannot be remembered the 
ability to disambiguate similar experiences will be greatly reduced since there will be 
significantly less information to set one experience apart from others. Thus making the 
integration of item and source information essential for separating events in memory.  A 
topic that is still being debated in the literature is which neural systems and mechanisms 
underlie such integration of item and source information. The current experiment will focus 
specifically on the neural substrates supporting the retrieval of item-context associations, as 
it has been argued that event separation can be achieved using the unique context of 
episodes in both human and animal memory (Eacott & Easton, 2010; Friedman, 1993). The 
most prominent set of regions in the brain involved in context memory, and in the integration 
of context with additional aspects of experiences, are those in the medial temporal lobe. This 
is illustrated by a large body of literature showing involvement of the medial temporal lobe in 
binding individual features in to complete episodic memories (Eacott & Norman, 2004; 
Hannula et al., 2013; Langston & Wood, 2010; Staresina et al., 2012), and by the deficits 
seen in episodic memory following damage to the medial temporal lobe (Scoville & Milner, 
1957; Spiers et al., 2001; Vargha-Khadem, 1997). 
It is not yet clear which parts of the medial temporal lobe contribute to the retrieval of 
contextual information and context associations. Much of the research on context has 
focused on the role of the hippocampus in the encoding and retrieval of contextual memory 
(Ranganath, 2010b; Smith & Bulkin, 2014).  Studies on place cells have shown a role of the 
hippocampus in creating unique neural representations of contexts whereby distinct sets of 
cells will fire across different contexts (Bulkin et al., 2016; Jezek et al., 2011; Muller & Kubie, 
1987). It has further been argued that the hippocampus is involved in the encoding and 
retrieval when contextual information is bound to other components of an event, specifically 
items, supported by research in both humans (Davachi, 2006; Diana et al., 2007; Hannula et 
al., 2013) and rats (Anagnostaras, Maren, & Fanselow, 1999; Morris, Weeden, Churchwell, 
& Kesner, 2013). Referred to as the Binding of Items to Contexts, or BIC, model (Diana et al., 
2007; Hannula et al., 2013; Ranganath, 2010b), this theory of medial temporal lobe function 
argues that item and context information are processed separately in the main input areas to 
the hippocampus, the lateral (LEC) and medial (MEC) entorhinal cortices respectively 
(Eichenbaum et al., 2012; Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Hunsaker et al., 
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2013). Item information is thought to be relayed through the LEC from the perirhinal cortex, 
an area shown to be important for object recognition (Buckley & Gaffan, 1997, 1998; Kesner 
et al., 2001; Norman & Eacott, 2005), through to the hippocampus (Eichenbaum et al., 2012; 
Ranganath, 2010a). The LEC itself has been shown to be involved in memory for items in 
rats whereby cells in the LEC will fire within close proximity to objects and move their firing 
fields along with objects that are moved (Deshmukh et al., 2012; Tsao, Moser, & Moser, 
2013). Impaired item recognition has further been demonstrated following lesions to the LEC 
(Hunsaker et al., 2013), giving additional evidence for item processing in the LEC. On the 
other hand the LEC has not been shown to be sensitive to spatial information, where cells 
recorded from the LEC tend to have low spatial specificity. In other words, cells do not fire in 
consistent locations over time (Hargreaves, Rao, Lee, & Knierim, 2005; Yoganarasimha, 
Rao, & Knierim, 2011), contrary to hippocampal place fields that have high spatial specificity 
and consistently fire in the same location (Leutgeb et al., 2005; O’Keefe, 1976). In addition 
LEC cells tend to have low spatial stability in the absence of objects, and tend not to have 
firing fields away from objects (Deshmukh et al., 2012; Deshmukh & Knierim, 2011). In 
human fMRI studies activity in the LEC has been examined when participants retrieve either 
simple item information or the spatial location in which items were presented. Consistent 
with the animal literature it has been found that there is enhanced activity in the LEC during 
retrieval of items, but not for spatial information (Reagh & Yassa, 2014; Schultz et al., 2012).  
The BIC model further suggests that context is processed in the parahippocampal-MEC 
stream (Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Hannula et al., 2013; Hunsaker et al., 2013). Activity in the 
parahippocampal cortex has been shown to increase during retrieval of context and scene 
information when cued with item information during fMRI studies, as discussed in Chapter 1 
section 1.4.5 (Bar et al., 2008; Hannula et al., 2013; Staresina et al., 2012). This information 
is thought to be relayed through the MEC to the hippocampus, which has been shown to 
process spatial information (Fyhn et al., 2004; Hafting et al., 2005; Van Cauter et al., 2013). 
One of the most significant findings of MEC function in representing space is through activity 
in so called grid cells. These cells fire in a hexagonal grid-like pattern across an environment 
and are thought to convey information about the distance an animal has travelled or to 
represent the current spatial context (Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Hafting et al., 2005). 
Compared to the LEC, the MEC also exhibits higher spatial selectivity in that cells tend to fire 
in consistent locations over time (Fyhn et al., 2004; Hargreaves et al., 2005), and MEC 
lesions have been shown to disrupt spatial processing in the Morris water maze (Van Cauter 
et al., 2013). This spatial selectivity has led to the suggestion that the MEC processes the 
spatial context of events, treating the spatial location and the surrounding environmental 
features as combined features of an experience (Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Ranganath, 
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2010b). Human fMRI studies adds further evidence to this hypothesis by finding that activity 
in the MEC increases as people retrieve information pertaining to the spatial location of an 
item, but not when retrieving information about the item itself (Reagh & Yassa, 2014; Schultz 
et al., 2012). Item and context information is then bound at the level of the hippocampus to 
create a conjunctive representation of an event. This has been illustrated in a study where 
rats were taught to associate odours with distinct spatial contexts, in which rewards could be 
found. As rats learned where to find rewards unique hippocampal place fields emerged for 
each individual item-context association, showing a conjunctive representation of item-
context pairing in the hippocampus (Komorowski et al., 2009). 
The functional properties of the medial temporal lobe might not be as clear as outlined above, 
however, with item and context information processed in parallel LEC and MEC streams 
before converging in the hippocampus. LEC involvement in context memory have been 
found in studies using contextual fear and aversion paradigms, where rats are taught to 
associate a context with an unconditioned stimulus either inducing fear, such as a foot shock, 
or an aversive stimulus, such as lithium chloride which makes animals nauseous. Rats are 
subsequently placed in the same context without the unconditioned stimulus, and the 
amount of freezing the rat exhibits is measured as memory for the context. Lesions to the 
LEC have been found to decrease the amount of freezing exhibited by rats in the 
conditioned context (Ji & Maren, 2008), and the degree to which they avoid the context all 
together (Ferry, Herbeaux, Javelot, & Majchrzak, 2015), indicating impaired memory for 
contexts. Context information has also been suggested to be bound to events prior to the 
hippocampus. In a study by Langston & Wood (2010), rats with hippocampal lesions showed 
impaired memory in an episodic-like memory task where item, place, and contextual 
information has to be integrated and retrieved, but could reliably remember item-context 
pairings. This opens the possibility that item-context information can be integrated prior to 
the hippocampus, possibly in the LEC. LEC lesions have been found to disrupt performance 
on a novel item-context recognition task. This type of task utilises rats’ preference for novelty, 
and tests their ability to recognise which of two items that has not previously been presented 
in the current context by measuring the amount of time that rats’ spend investigating the 
novel compared to the familiar item-context configuration (Wilson, Watanabe, Milner, & 
Ainge, 2013; Wilson, Langston, et al., 2013). In simple item recognition tasks, where rats are 
presented with a familiar and a novel item and tested to see whether they spend more time 
exploring the novel item, LEC lesions do not affect performance meaning that rats are able 
to distinguish between novel and familiar items (Kesner et al., 2001; Wilson, Watanabe, et 
al., 2013; Wilson, Langston, et al., 2013). 
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Previous research on LEC involvement in item-context memory has predominantly used the 
novel item-context recognition paradigm described above, a paradigm that induces relatively 
short term memory and only employs visual stimuli. As the LEC receives input from not only 
visual, but also olfactory, somatosensory, and auditory areas (Canto et al., 2008; Insausti, 
Herrero, & Witter, 1997), this information could be integrated in the LEC, supported by 
anatomical evidence that the LEC is a sensory convergence zone (Bota, Sporns, & Swanson, 
2015). Adding to this Boisselier et al. (2014) trained rats to associate odours with tactile 
information, characterised by different media on the outside of cups filled with scented sand 
in which rewards could be found. They found that LEC lesions disrupted the acquisition of, 
but not memory for, such odour-tactile associations, supporting the notion of the LEC as a 
region involved in multisensory integration in memory.  
The aim of the current experiment is to attempt to bridge the two views outlined above, that 
context is processed in the parahippocampal-MEC stream and items in the perirhinal-LEC 
stream before being integrated in the hippocampus, or whether it is the case that such 
integration takes place upstream in the LEC. This will be done by examining the role of the 
LEC in memory for contexts, and the integration of item and context information. As object-
context memory has already been assessed in relation to the LEC (Wilson, Watanabe, et al., 
2013; Wilson, Langston, et al., 2013), we focused on the memory for multimodal information, 
here defined as odour-context associations. Testing will take place over a longer time scale 
where a retention period on a magnitude of days between learning and test will be used, 
rather than a few minutes as is used in many standard recognition memory paradigms. To 
achieve this rats were trained on an odour-context association task over a course of several 
days to a set criterion, after which they either received LEC or sham lesions. 10 days 
following the surgery, rats were re-tested on the previously learned odour-context 
association. As context memory alone has been shown to be impaired following LEC lesions 
we also assessed rats’ ability to discriminate contexts independent of explicit odour cues, to 
see whether a deficit would be seen in either associative or non-associative context 
processing. Based the research suggesting a role for the LEC in associative processing 
(Boisselier et al., 2014; Wilson, Watanabe, et al., 2013; Wilson, Langston, et al., 2013) along 
with anatomical studies demonstrating that both olfactory and visual information passes 
through the LEC (Canto et al., 2008; Insausti et al., 1997), it is hypothesised that rats with 
LEC lesions would show memory deficits for multimodal context associations.  
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2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Subjects 
21 Lister Hooded rats (Harlan & Charles River – average weight at start of experiment = 
463g) were subjects in this experiment (LEC Lesion n = 12; Sham lesion n = 9). The LEC 
and Sham lesion groups had uneven numbers of rats as it was deemed a better strategy to 
ensure a large enough sample size in case some LEC lesions missed their target. The rats 
were housed in groups of 2-3 animals per cage, and kept on a 12 h light/dark cycle, with 
testing taking place within the light phase. Animals were kept under food restriction (20g/day) 
within 10% of their free feeding weight in order to motivate them to dig for rewards. The 
study was carried out in compliance with national and international legislation governing the 
use and maintenance of laboratory animals in scientific research [Animals (Scientific 
Procedures) Act, 1986; European Communities Council Directive of November 24, 1986 
(86/609/EEC)], under project license 60/4069 and personal license IA4E0C7D4. 
2.2.2 Apparatus 
Testing took place in a 65x65 cm box with 40 cm high interchangeable wall panels giving 
different sets of contexts. For the odour-context discrimination task two sets of contexts were 
used, one with white and green checked walls and a black and white striped floor covered 
with a metal grid. The second context had walls covered in patterned green Christmas 
wrapping paper and a plain green floor. For the odour discrimination task a plain white 
context was used. In the context discrimination the box was split in to two compartments, 
one with green sandpaper and one in smooth silver with black dots, divided by a wall going 
2/3 down the middle. The context was constructed in such way that the spatial locations 
could be counterbalanced (Figure 3).  
Common household spices were mixed with play sand to create odour cues. Spices included: 
mint (0.9g/100ml sand), coriander (0.9g/100ml), ginger (0.5g/100ml), and cinnamon 
(0.5g/100ml). These odours were selected to give rats distinct odour cues across tasks, 
avoiding any confusion due to similarity between the odours. Sand was placed in ceramic 
pots that were fixed to the floor of the apparatus using Dual Lock Velcro (3M™, St. Paul, 
MN). The pots were 8.5cm in diameter with a height of 4.3cm, each pot holding 
approximately 150ml of sand. 
2.2.3 Habituation 
Two pots of unscented sand with buried pieces of chocolate cereal (1/2 Weeto, Weetabix 
Kettering UK) were placed in the rats’ home cages each morning over four days in order to 
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habituate rats to dig for rewards. Rats were then habituated for 10 minutes per context over 
two days without any pots of sand or rewards present. On the first day of habituation rats 
spent 10 minutes in the checked context, 10 minutes in the holding cage, and 10 minutes 
being handled. This was subsequently repeated with the Christmas context. The second day 
of habituation followed the same structure, but with the order of the contexts reversed, i.e. 
rats were first put in the Christmas context followed by the checked context.  
2.2.4 Behavioural Testing 
Across all tasks, a trial consisted of two pots of sand being placed in the box on the far side 
away from the rat. The rat was lowered in to the box facing the wall away from the pots of 
sand (Figure 3). The rat was then allowed to explore and dig in the pots of sand until a 
choice was made, with maximum trial duration of 2 minutes. If a choice was not made within 
the two-minute limit the rat was taken out of the apparatus and the trial was marked as nil 
(neither correct nor incorrect). A choice was defined as the rat using two paws to dig, rather 
than just sniffing or swiping in the sand with one paw. Once a choice had been made the trial 
was over, and rats were either allowed to eat the reward if their choice was correct, or they 
were taken out of the box. Between each trial the sand covering the floor of the box was 
stirred around and the pots were wiped down with veterinary disinfectant (F10 Products, UK) 
to cover up any olfactory cues that did not originate from the scented sand in the pots. The 
correct pot was then re-baited and put in to the box. The side of the baited pot was 
counterbalanced between the left and the right, with the pot not being on either side for more 
than two trials in a row. One in ten trials was a probe trial where no reward was buried in the 
sand in order to ensure that the animals did not simply dig in the pot where they could smell 
the reward. Instead, the reward was dropped in to the pot if the animal made the correct 
response.  
2.3 Pre-Surgery Training  
2.3.1 Odour-Context Discrimination 
Prior to surgery rats were trained on the odour-context discrimination task. Rats were trained 
to dig for rewards in pots filled with scented sand in two different contexts (Figure 3A). In the 
first context (checked) a reward could be found in the bowl scented with mint, while if digging 
in the bowl scented with coriander the rat got no reward. The opposite rule applied to the 
second context (Christmas) where digging in coriander gave a reward, and mint gave no 
reward. Odour-context pairings were counterbalanced across animals. Training was split in 
to two stages. In the first stage rats performed up to 60 trials per day, split in to 6 blocks with 
 
 
 66 
10 trials in each block. Contexts remained the same within each block. Animals were 
allowed to correct their choice the first four trials in a new context on the first day of training, 
after this they were taken out of the box following an incorrect choice. When a rat reached a 
set criterion of getting 8 out of 10 trials correct in one block, the context was changed and 
the rat was trained until it could reach the same criteria in the other context. If a rat got less 
than 8 trials correct, the same context was kept for subsequent blocks until the criterion was 
reached. As soon as rats could alternate between contexts in at least 5 out of the 6 blocks, 
rats were moved to the second stage where context presentation was pseudo-randomised. 
This criterion was based on the results from a pilot cohort of rats used to develop the 
procedure, who after meeting the criteria described above demonstrated high levels of 
accuracy on the pseudo-randomised context presentation. This was taken as an indication 
that they could remember the odour-context associations. Rats were trained for 30 trials per 
day in the pseudo-random context presentation, with each context not being presented more 
than three times in a row, until they could get 75% of the trials correct on two consecutive 
days.  On reaching this criterion rats underwent surgery. 
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Figure 3. Overview of pre- and post-surgery discrimination tasks.  A) Odour-context task. 
The green Christmas context is seen on the left, and the checked context is on the right. The 
arrows illustrate an example of which odour was rewarded in each context, coriander (brown 
bowl) or mint (green bowl). Odour-context pairings were randomised across animals. B) Odour 
discrimination task. Only a plain white context was used. The arrow illustrates which odour was 
rewarded; in this example it was cinnamon (dark brown) and not ginger (orange). C) Context 
discrimination task. The box was split in to two compartments, a green sandpaper and a smooth 
silver dotted one, with a divider going down the middle. The arrow illustrates the context that was 
rewarded, here the silver one, while the green one did not give any reward. For all tasks, the 
odour and side in which the reward could be found was counterbalanced across animals. The 
circled S in the panels refers to the rat’s starting position in each trial. 
2.4 Post-Surgery Testing 
2.4.1 Odour-Context Discrimination 
After recovering from surgery rats were first tested on the previously learned odour-context 
associations over three consecutive days. On each day rats were given 30 trials pseudo-
random context presentation, with the same context not being presented more than three 
times in a row (Figure 3A). 
2.4.2 Odour Discrimination 
Animals were next trained on a simple odour discrimination task to see whether lesions 
caused any impairment in odour processing alone. In this task rats were trained to dig in 
either cinnamon or ginger in a plain white context to find a reward. Only olfactory information 
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from the sand was required to solve the task and find the reward. Rats were tested over 50 
trials per day for two days, giving a total of 100 trials. The odour being rewarded was 
counterbalanced across animals (Figure 3B). 
2.4.3 Context Discrimination 
Rats’ ability to discriminate contexts alone following surgery was also assessed. In the 
context discrimination task the testing box was split in to two compartments, a green and a 
silver one. Each compartment had a pot filled with odourless sand, and rats were trained to 
dig for reward in one of the contexts. Rats were trained for three consecutive days with 40 
trials per day. The sides of the contexts were counterbalanced across trials, with the 
rewarded context not being presented on the same side for more than three consecutive 
trials (Figure 3C).  
2.4.4 Surgery 
Rats were initially anaesthetised in an induction box using isoflurane (5% isoflurane, 1.2 
l/min O2; Abbott Laboratories, Maidenhead, UK) before being placed in a stereotaxic frame 
(David Kopf Instruments, Tujunga, CA) where anaesthesia was maintained via a facemask 
mounted on the incisor bar (2–3% isoflurane, 1.2 l/min O2). The rat’s head was shaved, an 
analgesic, Carprieve, was injected subcutaneously (0.05ml/rat; 5% w/v carprofen, Norbrook 
Laboratories, UK) before an incision was made along the midline and the skull was exposed. 
Measurements were taken at both bregma and lambda to ensure that the skull was level. 
Holes were drilled bilaterally over the LEC at the following coordinates: AP: -6.5mm relative 
to bregma and ML: ±4.5mm relative to midline. Dura was cut using the bent tip of a 30 gauge 
needle and a glass micropipette (tip diameter 30-40 µm) was inserted at a 10° angle along 
the x-axis: DV: -6.4mm relative to dura (coordinates taken from Wilson et al., 2013). 200nl of 
ibotenic acid (0.03 M in sterile phosphate buffer, Sigma Aldrich, UK) was injected bilaterally. 
The pipette was left in situ for 5 minutes before being retracted. Rats who received sham 
lesions went through the same procedure as detailed above, but only had the vehicle 
solution (sterile phosphate buffer) injected in the LEC.  Animals were put in a heated box 
until they recovered from the anaesthetic. The following two days after surgery an analgesic, 
Metacam (Boehringer Ingelheim, St Joseph, MO), was mixed in to the rats’ food. Animals 
were left to recover for 10 days before the post-surgery testing began. 
2.4.5 Perfusion 
Once testing was concluded, rats were deeply anaesthetised using (0.9ml) Pentobarbital 
(JML, UK) before being perfused transcardially with at least 250ml paraformaldehyde (4% 
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made up in 0.1 M phosphate buffer) per rat. After perfusion, brains were removed and placed 
in 20% sucrose (made up in 0.1 M phosphate buffer) over night.  
2.4.6 Histology 
Brains were individually embedded in egg in small tubs, and placed in a jar with 
paraformaldehyde (40%) for approximately 5 days until the egg had fixed to the outside of 
the brains. Brains were then cut in 50µm slices using a freezing microtome. Separate sets of 
slices were then stained with NeuN and cresyl violet independently, before being mounted 
on to slides and cover slipped using DPX.  
2.4.7 Lesion Data Analysis 
Lesion analysis was made using sections stained with NeuN, with cresyl violet stained 
sections used to complement the analysis. Slides were viewed under an Axio Imager 2 light 
microscope (Carl Zeiss Microscopy), where lesion damaged was defined as a lack of 
neurons and cell bodies relative to sham brains. 
The volume of LEC was calculated by tracing the area of the LEC on 10 sections between -
8.28mm to -4.68mm from bregma in sham lesioned animals, using Zen lite imaging software 
(Carl Zeiss Microscopy). The area of the LEC was measured in µm2 across both 
hemispheres, which was then combined to give an estimate of the volume of the LEC 
throughout the brain. 
For animals with LEC lesions, the damaged area within the LEC was traced in the same way 
to get a measure of the extent of the lesions. This measure was then compared to the 
complete volume of the structure to see what percentage of the LEC had been lesioned. 
2.4.8 Statistical Analysis 
Pre-surgery performance was calculated as the mean accuracy of correct trials on the last 
two days of training when the animals reached the set criteria. Post-surgery performance 
was the average accuracy of correct trials over the 3 days of post-surgery testing.  
Odour-context memory was analysed using a mixed factorial ANOVA with group as the 
between subjects factor (LEC and Sham lesion) and surgery (pre- and post) as within 
subjects factor. Performance across the three days of post-surgery testing on the odour-
context task was also assessed using a mixed factorial ANOVA again with group (LEC and 
Sham lesion) as the between subjects factor, and day of testing (1,2, and 3) as the within 
subjects factor, in order to examine whether the performance of either group improved 
across time.  
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Odour and context performance was calculated as the average accuracy across the two 
days of odour and three days of context testing respectively. Difference in performance on 
the odour and context discrimination tasks between the LEC and sham lesion groups was 
analysed using independent samples t-tests.  
Finally, a multiple linear regression was run to examine any variables that might have 
influenced the post-surgery performance in the lesion group. The predictive variables 
included in this analysis were: lesion size, pre-surgery performance, and number of trials to 
reach criterion. While both data on number of days and number of trials to criterion were 
collected, only number of trials to criterion was included in the regression analysis. Both 
measures serve to indicate the learning rate of rats and are somewhat interchangeable. 
Trials to criterion were chosen for the regression analysis as this served as a better measure 
of the amount of exposure to the odour-context pairings.  
All behavioural analysis was carried out using SPSS version 22 (IBM). 
2.5 Results  
2.5.1 Histology Results 
Histology was inconclusive for 6 animals: 2 from the sham lesion group and 4 from the LEC 
lesion group, leaving 7 rats with sham lesions and 8 with LEC lesions for histological 
analysis. One of the LEC lesioned rats was excluded since lesion damage could not be 
attributed to the LEC, i.e. the brain had become severely dehydrated during the histological 
process, and so despite lesion damage being evident it was not possible to attribute this to 
the LEC.  Another LEC lesioned animal was excluded due to lesions affecting <5% of the 
LEC and instead showing extensive damage to the perirhinal cortex and the CA1. Lesion 
damage in 2 other rats in the LEC lesion group and 2 sham lesioned rats could not be 
assessed as neither the NeuN nor the Cresyl Violet resulted in any proper staining of the 
cells.  
All 8 of the rats in the LEC lesion group had bilateral lesions, ranging from 15.0-54.0% of the 
total volume of the LEC, with the average lesion size being 34.7% (Figure 4). During the 
histological analysis it was found that a number of rats had damage to the perirhinal cortex 
(PRC), as well as the LEC. The extent of damage was quantified in the same way as the 
LEC lesion, by measuring the area of the PRC in sham lesioned animals and comparing it to 
the size of lesions to get the percentage of damage across animals. All rats in the lesion 
group had some damage to the PRC, ranging from 10.1-55.6%, the average lesion size 
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being 32.8%.  This means that lesion damage was not isolated to the LEC, but instead 
covered parts of both the LEC and PRC. 
Some additional damage was seen in the surrounding areas, mainly the CA1, this was, 
however, estimated to be <5%. None of the rats in the sham lesion group showed any 
damage to the LEC or surrounding areas. 
Analyses of behavioural results were first run excluding the 6 rats for which histology was 
inconclusive, to examine effects between animals with clear lesion damage or intact brains. 
All analyses were then re-run including the rats with poor staining (2 LEC and 2 sham lesion), 
for a number of reasons. First, we followed the exact same surgical procedures used by 
Wilson et al. (Wilson, Watanabe, et al., 2013; Wilson, Langston, et al., 2013), who across 3 
experiments had LEC lesion error rates of 1/13, 1/13, and 2/10, which is similar to our known 
error rate of 2/10. Judging by this there is a high probability that the animals with poor 
staining did in fact have lesions in the right place. Second, the inclusion of animals is also in 
line with the guidelines of the NC3Rs (“The National Centre for the Replacement, 
Refinement and Reduction of Animals in Research,” n.d.), whereby we are increasing the 
reliability of our behavioural analysis by increasing sample size while at the same time 
reducing the waste of animals’ lives. The outcome across all analyses were the same 
regardless of whether those four rats were included or excluded, suggesting that the 
performance of these animals did not differ from that of the rest of their respective groups. 
All results reported below include these animals. 
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Figure 4. Lesion analysis. A) Examples of the extent of lesions across the brain. Grey = largest 
lesion (rat 7), and black = smallest lesion (rat 144). B) Table showing lesion classification and the 
percentage of the total LEC area lesioned for all animals in the experiment. C) Example images 
showing extent of LEC lesions (top), and the absence of any damage in sham lesioned animals 
(bottom). 
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2.5.2 Behavioural Results 
2.5.2.1 Pre-Surgery Training. The mean number of trials to reach the set criteria was 
675 trials (SD=137), and pre-surgery accuracy on criterion days was 0.821 (SD=0.035). Rats 
were matched for performance across the two groups to ensure that any differences seen 
following surgery would not be due to differences in the pre-surgery training (Table 1). Rats 
allocated to the LEC lesion group reached the criteria after an average of 14.2 days 
(SD=3.46) and 660 trials (SD=153). Their average accuracy across the two days of meeting 
criteria was 0.818 (SD=0.024). In comparison rats in the sham lesion group reached the 
criteria after an average of 15.1 days (SD=3.41) and 692 trials (SD=123), meeting the 
criteria with an average accuracy of 0.824 (SD=0.045). Independent samples t-tests 
revealed that there was no difference between the groups for the number of trials to reach 
criteria, t(17)=-0.496, p = 0.627, d=0.241, nor the number of days to criteria, t(17)=-0.577, p = 
0.571, d=0.291. Due to unequal variances in pre-surgery performance a Mann-Whitney U-
test was carried out to compare accuracy between groups, showing no significant difference, 
U=43.0, p=0.905. 
Table 1. Pre- and post-surgery performance for LEC and sham lesion groups. Pre- and 
post-surgery performance columns indicate performance accuracy. Values in brackets indicate 
standard deviations. 
Group Days to crit. Trials to crit. Pre-surgery Post-surgery 
LEC Lesion 14.2 (3.46) 660 (153) 0.818 (0.024) 0.522 (0.062) 
Sham Lesion 15.1 (3.41) 692 (123) 0.824 (0.045) 0.785 (0.067) 
 
2.5.2.2 Post-Surgery Performance. 
2.5.2.2.1 Odour-Context Association. As described above, there was no difference 
between the LEC and sham lesion groups in pre-surgery performance. Taking the average 
of the 3 days of post-surgery testing on the odour-context task, the accuracy in the LEC 
lesion group dropped to 0.522 (SD=0.062), while the accuracy in the sham lesion group 
remained high at 0.785 (SD=0.067) (Figure 5A). 
A 2(Group: Sham vs. Lesion) x2 (Surgery: pre- vs. post-surgery) mixed factorial ANOVA, 
with Surgery as a within subjects factor and Group as a between groups variable was carried 
out in order to look at differences in accuracy (see Table 1 for means). A main effect of 
Surgery was found, F(1,17)=143.38, p<0.001, ƞ2=0.894, as well as a main effect of Group, 
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F(1,17)=47.45, p<0.001, ƞ2=0.736. Further, the interaction between Surgery and Group was 
also significant, F(1,17)=84.53, p<0.001, ƞ2=0.833. The interaction effect in the ANOVA shows 
that LEC lesions significantly disrupts memory for odour-context associations both in 
comparison to the same rats performance prior to having lesions as well as rats who have 
sham lesions. Paired sample t-tests were conducted to quantify the difference in pre- and 
post-surgery performance in the LEC lesion and the sham lesion groups. A significant 
difference in pre- vs. post-surgery accuracy was seen in the LEC lesion group, t(9)=18.13, 
p<0.001, d=6.71. In the sham lesion group no difference in accuracy was found, t(8)=1.67, 
p=0.133, d=0.683. Comparing accuracy post-surgery between the LEC and sham lesion 
groups, an independent samples t-test revealed a significant difference, t(17)=-8.83, p<0.001, 
d=4.14.  
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Figure 5. Performance on the odour-context task pre- and post-surgery. A) Pre- vs. post-
surgery performance for the LEC and sham lesion groups on the odour-context task. B) 
Performance across the 3 days of post-surgery testing on the odour-context task for the LEC and 
sham lesion groups. Error bars represent SEM. *** = p<0.001. 
Looking at the individual days of post-surgery testing on the odour-context task, the LEC 
lesion groups’ performance was consistently low across days, at 0.526 (SD=0.086), 0.487 
(SD=0.042), and 0.553 (SD=0.121) on days 1-3 respectively. Sham lesioned animals, on the 
other hand, performed consistently high across days at 0.748 (SD=0.088), 0.808 (SD=0.073), 
and 0.804(SD=0.061) on days 1-3 respectively (Figure 5B). A 2 (Group: LEC lesion vs. 
Sham lesion) x3 (Day: 1,2,3 post-surgery) mixed factorial ANOVA with Day as within 
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subjects factor and Group as between subjects factor, was used to examine whether 
performance improved over the 3 days of post-surgery testing, either due to remembering or 
re-learning the odour-context association. There was a non-significant effect of Day, 
F(2,34)=2.72, p=0.119, ƞ2=0.118. A main effect of Group was shown, F(1,17)=78.03, p<0.001, 
ƞ2=0.821. Finally, the interaction between Day and Group was non-significant, F(2,34)=2.86, 
p=0.071, ƞ2=0.144. Taken together this demonstrates that neither group’s performance 
improved across days and that animals in the sham lesion group performed significantly 
better than the LEC lesion group throughout the post-surgery testing. 
Performance on probe trials when no reward was placed in the pots, the LEC lesion group 
had a mean accuracy of 0.522 (SD=0.129) and the sham lesion group 0.802 (SD=0.133). 
These scores were compared to the overall accuracy for each individual group using paired 
sample t-tests to examine whether performance was affected in probe trials, which could 
indicate that the scent of the reward guided rats’ choices. Nevertheless, there was no 
significant difference in accuracy between probe and normal trials for either the LEC lesion 
group where performance on probe and normal trials was exactly the same, t(9)=0.00, p=1.00, 
d=0, or the sham lesion group, t(8)=0.392, p=0.706, d=0.161. This illustrates that rats did not 
use the smell of the reward to guide their behaviour, as they performed equally well when no 
reward was present. 
A multiple linear regression was run to see whether pre-surgery performance, number of 
days to criterion, and/or LEC or PCR lesion size predicted rats’ averaged performance on 
the odour-context task across the three days of post-surgery testing (Figure 6). An overall 
non-significant effect was found, F(4,7)=0.621, p=0.680, with an R2 of 0.453. Looking at the 
individual predictors none of them had a significant effect on post-surgery performance 
(Table 2), meaning that post-surgery performance was not influenced by any pre-surgery 
factors or extent of damage to the LEC or PRC. 
  
 
 
 77 
Table 2. Regression variables and parameters 
 Unstandardized Standardized    
Coefficient 
    
t-value p tolerance 
Constant -0.618 - -0.531 0.632 
 
Pre-op 
performance 1.44 0.497 1.04 0.372 
 
0.806 
Trials to crit. 0.000006 0.011 0.026 0.981 0.934 
LEC lesions 
size 0.073 0.126 0.256 0.815 
 
0.751 
PRC Lesion 
size -0.167 -0.328 -0.596 0.593 
 
0.601 
 
 
Figure 6. Partial regression plots showing relationship between regression variables and 
post-surgery performance. A) Relationship between LEC lesion size and post-surgery 
performance on the odour-context task for the LEC lesion group. B) Relationship between PRC 
lesions size and post-surgery performance. C) Relationship between pre- and post-surgery 
performance for the LEC lesion group. D) Relationship between the number of trials it took rats to 
reach criterion and their subsequent post-surgery performance. 
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2.5.2.2.2 Odour discrimination. In the odour discrimination test both groups had high 
accuracy with the LEC lesion group having a slightly higher average accuracy of 0.931 
(SD=0.099) compared to the sham lesion group at 0.902 (SD=0.059, Figure 7A). This 
difference was shown to be non-significant using an independent samples t-test, t(17)=0.751, 
p=0.463, d=0.364, suggesting that both rats with LEC and sham lesion were able to 
discriminate odours equally well. However, it could be the case that we had a ceiling effect 
after training the rats for too long on a relatively simple discrimination task. 
 As it has been shown that LEC lesions can facilitate, rather than impair, the acquisition of 
odour discrimination (Otto et al., 1991) we analysed the first 20 trials (trial 4-23, excluding 
the 3 first trials when rats could correct as these could not be incorrect) on day one of the 
odour discrimination task to see whether the rats in the LEC lesion group learned the 
discrimination faster. The LEC lesion group had an average accuracy of 0.800 (SD=0.288) 
compared to the sham lesion group at 0.772 (SD=0.172), an independent sample t-test 
revealed that the difference was not significant, t(17)=0.252, p = 0.804, d=0.122 (Figure 7B). 
These results demonstrate that LEC lesions did not improve nor impair rats’ ability to 
process odours in a simple odour discrimination task. 
Similar to the odour-context task accuracy on probe trials was examined to exclude the 
possibility that rats used the smell of the reward to select the correct pot. The proportion of 
correct responses on probe trials in the LEC lesion group was 0.970 (SD=0.048), and the 
proportion of correct responses for the sham lesion group was 0.922 (SD=0.067). 
Comparing this performance to the overall odour-discrimination accuracy using paired 
sample t-tests it was found that performance did not differ between baited and non-baited 
trials for either the LEC lesion group, t(9)=1.82, p=0.102, d=0.501, or for the sham lesion 
group, t(8)=1.13, p=0.291, d=0.317. This again illustrates that any odour cues from the 
reward itself did not influence performance, as accuracy was no different when the reward 
was present at the time of the choice or not. 
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Figure 7. Performance on odour discrimination between LEC and Sham lesion groups.  
A) Performance on the odour discrimination task for the LEC and sham lesion groups. B) 
Performance on the 20 first trials on day 1 of the odour discrimination task for the LEC and sham 
lesion groups. Error bars represent SEM. 
2.5.2.2.3 Context Discrimination. Similar to the odour discrimination, the context 
discrimination task controlled for any impairment in the LEC lesioned animals in processing 
contextual information alone. Performance on this task was similar between the groups with 
the sham lesion group having an average accuracy of 0.696 (SD=0.049) and the LEC lesion 
group 0.713 (SD=0.057) (Figure 8). An independent samples t-test showed that there was 
no significant difference between the sham and LEC lesion groups on this task, t(17)=0.693, 
p=0.498, d=0.336, indicating that LEC lesioned animals did not exhibit any deficit in 
processing context information alone. The absence of any impairment in odour and context 
processing in the LEC lesion group compared to the sham lesion group demonstrates that 
the deficit seen in the combined odour-context task is due to a deficit in retrieving the 
associated odour-context information rather than the processing of the individual 
components alone. 
In line with previous analyses, performance on non-baited probe trials was compared to 
normal baited trials. The mean accuracy for probe trials in the LEC lesion group was 0.608 
(SD=0.104) and 0.639 (SD=0.191) for the sham lesion group. When compared to the overall 
accuracy for each group using paired sample t-tests it was found that performance on the 
probe trials was significantly lower for the LEC lesion group, t(9)=4.05, p=0.003, d=1.25. 
However, this was not the case for the sham lesion group where there was no difference 
between probe and standard trials, t(8)=1.15, p=0.281, d=0.409. Despite the finding that 
performance was worse on probe compared to normal trials for the LEC lesion group, this 
does not necessarily mean that the odour cues from the reward influenced rats’ responses, 
as this was not seen in the sham lesion group or any of the other tasks. 
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Figure 8. Context discrimination performance between LEC and Sham lesion groups.  
Error bars represent SEM. 
2.6 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the neural underpinnings of contextual integration into 
long-term memory. A large body of research has suggested that the binding of separate 
features of events takes place in the medial temporal lobe (Davachi, 2006; Diana et al., 2007; 
Eichenbaum et al., 2012). Two models of medial temporal lobe function in context memory 
and context integration have been proposed, one arguing for contextual processing in the 
parahippocampal-MEC stream with integration taking place at the level of the hippocampus 
(Diana et al., 2007; Ranganath, 2010b). Another suggestion has been that both memory for 
and integration of contextual information could take place in the LEC, prior to the 
hippocampus (Wilson, Watanabe, et al., 2013; Wilson, Langston, et al., 2013). Here it was 
tested whether context processing or the retrieval of integrated odour-context information 
requires the LEC. 
Before going in to the discussion of the results, it should be noted that as the histology 
revealed that the majority of animals in the lesion group had significant damage to the PRC 
as well as the LEC, we cannot fully attribute any effects specifically to LEC lesions. Although 
it is likely that any effects seen in the lesion group was due to LEC and not PRC damage for 
a number of reasons. First, while the PRC has been demonstrated to be required for object 
recognition (Albasser et al., 2011; Kesner et al., 2001; Norman & Eacott, 2005), is not 
required for odour discrimination (Albasser et al., 2011). Odour information is relayed from 
the olfactory bulb to piriform cortex, where the identification and discrimination of odours 
takes place (Bekkers & Suzuki, 2013; Gottfried, 2010). This odour information is then 
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projected on to a range of brain regions, including the LEC (Bota et al., 2015; Johnson, Illig, 
Behan, & Haberly, 2000), suggesting that the PRC is not necessary for processing olfactory 
information. Second, the PRC has consistently been shown not to process contextual 
information in either humans (Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2010; Wang et al., 2013) or 
rats (Norman & Eacott, 2005). Context processing has instead been shown to rely on the 
adjacent parahippocampal cortex (Diana et al., 2010; Hannula et al., 2013; Wang et al., 
2013), indicating that the PRC is not necessary for accurate contextual discrimination. Due 
to there not being any evidence of PRC involvement in any of the components in this study, 
any effects will be interpreted here as a result of LEC damage. 
Rats in the lesion group were found to have significantly impaired memory for previously 
learned odour-context associations, while rats with sham lesions did not show any significant 
deficit in the same task. The deficits in the lesion group was consistent across all three days 
of post-surgery testing, meaning that they did not re-learn the association following the 
surgery. This pattern of results was found both when animals with inconclusive histology was 
included and excluded. The inclusion of these animals in the final analysis can be seen as a 
quite conservative measure since if the lesions were not in the right place this would add 
noise to the behavioural data that would reduce the overall effect. 
It was demonstrated that LEC lesion size did not predict post-surgery performance. The 
extent of damage to the LEC did not influence the extent of the impairment in the odour-
context task, suggesting that either the lesions consistently damaged the area within the 
LEC where associative information is stored, alternatively associative context memory is 
distributed in a network across the LEC and memory for such association will be impaired as 
long as part of such network is disrupted. Nor did the size of PRC lesions predict the extent 
of the behavioural impairment post-surgery, which could either be interpreted in the same 
light as the LEC lesion above, or taken as further evidence that the PRC damage did not 
affect any of the outcome measures as outline earlier. Finally, neither pre-surgery 
performance nor the number of trials to criterion had a significant effect on the post-surgery 
accuracy. These results illustrate that there was not a linear decrease in performance or that 
faster learning rates led to better performance following surgery. 
Rats’ ability to discriminate odours and contexts alone were assessed to see whether the 
impairment in the odour-context task could be due to a deficit in processing the individual 
components of the association. The results showed that rats with LEC lesions were not 
impaired, compared to rats in the sham lesion group on neither the odour nor the context 
discrimination task. This means that the impairment seen in the odour-context association 
task was not due impairment in processing either odours or contexts alone and supports the 
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hypothesis that the LEC is involved in memory for associative information rather than the 
simple odour or context processing alone. 
These results are in contrast to previous work suggesting that item and context information 
are processed separately in the LEC and MEC respectively (Eichenbaum et al., 2012; 
Hunsaker et al., 2013), before being bound at the level of the hippocampus (Hannula et al., 
2013; Morris et al., 2013). According to this model of the medial temporal lobe, the LEC 
relays item information from the perirhinal cortex to the hippocampus (Eichenbaum et al., 
2012; Ranganath, 2010a), supported by studies showing that cells in the LEC are mainly 
responsive to item information but not to spatial or contextual changes (Hargreaves et al., 
2005; Yoganarasimha et al., 2011). The current results instead support a model of medial 
temporal lobe function where item information is processed in the perirhinal cortex or in 
piriform if the item is olfactory, and context information in the parahippocampal-MEC stream. 
This information then converges in the LEC to form item-context associations, which are 
then bound with spatial information at the level of the hippocampus to form complete 
episodic-like memories (Eacott & Norman, 2004; Langston & Wood, 2010). Support for this 
idea can be found in a study by Keene and colleagues (2016) where rats were taught to 
associate rewarded odours with specific spatial contexts while recording activity from the 
PRC, LEC, and MEC. The results revealed that representations of item, context, and spatial 
dimensions across the individual regions were not as clear-cut as expected, with PRC and 
LEC only coding for item information and MEC for context and space. Instead it was found 
that both PRC and LEC exhibited activity in relation to both spatial and contextual features, 
however, not to the same extent as the MEC. Due to the greater spatial and contextual 
selectivity in the MEC it is likely that this is the primary area for contextual processing of the 
three regions examined in the paper, and that information regarding context is transmitted on 
from the MEC to the LEC, which could explain the involvement of the LEC in processing 
contextual information. 
Our findings further add to a body of work suggesting involvement of the LEC in both 
associative and contextual memory processing. We replicate the findings by Wilson and 
colleagues (Wilson, Watanabe, et al., 2013; Wilson, Langston, et al., 2013) in that LEC 
lesions disrupt the retrieval of associative information. We add to this by further suggesting 
that the LEC is involved in memory for multimodal associations, i.e. both olfactory and visual 
information, over retention periods spanning several days which is longer than has been 
used in previous novel object-context recognition paradigms. The involvement of the LEC in 
processing sensory information has previously been shown where LEC lesions impaired 
acquisition of, but not memory for, odour-tactile associations (Boisselier et al., 2014). Studies 
have also shown some function of the LEC in memory for contexts alone using context fear 
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paradigms (Ferry et al., 2015; Ji & Maren, 2008). The reason why no deficit was observed in 
context processing in the current study could have been due to the fact that only encoding of, 
and not memory for, a contextual discrimination was assessed. It is possible that LEC 
lesions would cause impairments across both associative and non-associative context 
retrieval. Another explanation for the discrepancy in context processing is that context fear 
paradigms engage somewhat different neural processes, such as increased activity in the 
amygdala (Trogrlic, Wilson, Newman, & Murphy, 2011), due to the use of emotional stimuli 
that will result in activity in additional regions not seen in non-fear memory paradigms 
(Maratos, Dolan, Morris, Henson, & Rugg, 2001). The LEC shares some connections with 
the amygdala (Bota et al., 2015), which has been shown to be involved in the retrieval of 
emotional memories (Buchanan, 2007; Erlich, Bush, & Ledoux, 2012; Hall, Thomas, & 
Everitt, 2001), making it possible that damage to the LEC could impair memory for context 
when fear is involved by interrupting the projections between the LEC and amygdala. In 
context tasks when fear is not used, as in the current study, deficits are not seen as the 
discrimination could be solved using the parahippocampal cortex or the MEC without the 
involvement of additional regions outside the medial temporal lobe. 
It could be suggested that the odour and context discrimination tasks did not assess the 
same processes as the odour-context task as the former examined the acquisition of and the 
latter the memory for a discrimination. More specifically our data does not tell us whether 
LEC lesions impair retrieval across both associative and non-associative stimuli, while 
sparing encoding across conditions. This could have been circumvented by training rats on 
the simple odour and context discriminations prior to surgery, along with the combined 
odour-context association, and to test their retention upon recovery. This was not done here 
since the odour-context task was already quite difficult for rats to acquire, and attempting to 
train rats on further tasks prior to surgery could have occluded any effects of lesions due to 
forgetting of the associations in the initial task. Similarly, a future experiment could be aimed 
to examine whether animals with LEC lesions would be capable of acquiring new odour-
context associations to see whether encoding in both simple non-associative and associative 
tasks are spared following LEC lesions. Further experiments could also be aimed at 
investigating temporal memory in LEC. It could also be argued that a limitation of the 
comparison between the odour-context association task and the individual odour and 
context tasks were not well matched in terms of difficulty, with rats needing on average 14-
15 days to reach criteria whereas only 2-3 days were needed to reach at least 70% accuracy. 
While our results suggest that the odour-context task is an interesting way to potentially 
model memory impairments, we have only investigated one of the two types of source 
information used when modelling episodic memory in animals, context but not time (Babb & 
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Crystal, 2005; Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Eacott & Norman, 2004). To make a stronger 
case in favour of the use of context in modelling memory impairments it would be beneficial 
to study the effect of LEC lesions on temporal memory to see whether similar deficits would 
be found, arguing that time and context would be equally affected by LEC lesions and could 
be used interchangeably in animal episodic memory models. If temporal cognition would be 
spared following LEC lesions then contextual memory could be a better indicator of cognitive 
decline in the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease. 
In summary, this chapter has demonstrated that memory on an odour-context task, where 
both encoding and retention covered several days, relies on the lateral entorhinal cortex. In 
contrast, encoding of simple odour and context information was spared as both rats with 
sham and LEC lesions could acquire odour and context discrimination. These results are 
contrary to the idea that associative information is processed in the hippocampus, and 
instead suggests that multimodal integration can take place further upstream in the medial 
temporal lobe. 
The aim going forward in the thesis is to examine the brain regions involved in context 
integration in human participants using functional MRI, to investigate whether similar 
processes of context integration are seen across species. Using this method we can not only 
examine activity in the regions of the medial temporal lobe during source memory, but also 
activity in networks across the entire brain to gain a better understanding of the full extent of 
activity that underlies the accurate representation of past events in memory. Before running 
a full fMRI study we need to develop a behavioural paradigm with human participants 
whereby we can assess context memory in a manner as similar as possible to the current 
rodent work. The next chapter will focus on behavioural tests of item-source memory in 
human participants. The benefit of working with humans rather than other non-human 
animals is that we can ask them more questions about their memories. As experiences can 
be separated in memory using both contextual and temporal information, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, we expanded the current item-context memory task and added a temporal 
component, allowing for the assessment of memory for both item-context and item-time. This 
gives the added benefit of being able to test the retrieval of two types of sources in the same 
experimental paradigm, something that would have been difficult to achieve in the current 
odour-context task. Humans are also able to judge the subjective experience of retrieving 
memories, such as whether an event was remembered very vividly through the use of 
recollection, or less if very few details came to mind and the experience felt merely familiar. 
Asking for the subjective experience of retrieval will not only allow for testing if people can 
retrieve contextual and temporal information accurately, but can help us understand the 
processes behind how these types of sources are retrieved.!
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Chapter 3 
Accurate memory for time and context 
relies on different retrieval processes 
 
Parts of this chapter contributed to the publication: Persson, B.M., Ainge, J.A. & O’Connor, 
A.R. (2016). Disambiguating past events: Accurate source memory for time and context 
depends on different retrieval processes. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 132, 40-48 
I, Bjorn Persson, co-authored this article together with Dr Ainge and Dr O’Connor. The 
content of this article has been rewritten by Bjorn Persson for this thesis. 
See Appendix A for full article.  
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3.1 General Introduction 
The ability to separate events in memory hinges on being able to retrieve some unique 
aspect of an experience that sets it apart from similar occasions. This can be achieved 
through remembering the source of an event, which is information that specify conditions 
under which memories were encoded (Johnson et al. 1993). Source information, as used to 
separate events in memory, can either consist of the time or the environmental context in 
which an experience took place. As discussed in Chapter 1, Sections 1.3 and 1.4, both 
contextual and temporal information can serve as unique identifiers of events and aid the 
process of disambiguating past events in memory. Context by segmenting continuous 
experiences in to discrete episodes, which enhances the ability to remember the information 
encountered within each individual context (Dallett & Wilcox, 1968; Smith, 1982). Time, on 
the other hand, can aid the process of event separation in memory by assigning unique 
temporal identifiers to events, such as ordering episodes in a sequence (Lewandowsky & 
Murdock, 1989) or relating events to the temporal context in which they took place (Estes, 
1955; Howard & Kahana, 2002). 
According to the dual process theory of recognition memory two separate retrieval 
processes can be used to remember past episodes, recollection and/or familiarity (for 
reviews, see Vilberg & Rugg, 2008, and Yonelinas, 2002), where accurate source memory 
requires the use of recollection, which reinstates the surrounding details of the remembered 
event. Familiarity, on the other hand, merely results in the awareness that the recognised 
stimulus has been encountered in the past, but does not support source retrieval. To assess 
these processes experimentally, what is commonly referred to as the Remember/Know (R/K) 
procedure is used. Here participants are presented with a number of items, alternatively 
items and sources, during a study phase, and given a recognition memory test for the same 
stimuli at a later stage  (c.f. Jacoby, 1991). Correctly identified items are then justified by 
Remember or Know responses. This procedure was originally developed by Tulving (1985) 
to distinguish between episodic and semantic memory, where he argued that Remember 
responses reflected a recollection process necessary for episodic memory while Know 
responses indicated the mere knowledge of some previous occurrence akin to semantic 
memory. In further development of the R/K procedure by Gardiner, the definition of Know 
responses to measure semantic memory shifted towards representing familiarity, which was 
defined as the knowledge that an item had been seen in a previous study phase without the 
ability to recollect the details surrounding its occurrence (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner, 
Richardson-klavehn, & Ramponi, 1997). Relative to Tulving’s (1985) original implementation 
of this procedure, it is commonly held that Remember responses are supported by 
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recollection and Know is mapped on to the process of familiarity (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner, 
Java, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996) establishing the current operationalization of the R/K 
procedure (Yonelinas, 2002). An important addition to the R/K procedure was the inclusion 
of Guess responses, giving a R/K/G procedure (Gardiner et al., 1996). This was done to 
separate any contribution of genuine guesses to estimates of familiarity, as these responses 
have been found to be better represented as distinct categories where G responses do not 
differ from chance level performance whereas K responses do invoke some memory of a 
past experience (Gardiner et al., 1996). If a G response category is not included then K 
responses will be contaminated by guesses, which will reduce the overall accuracy of these 
responses in a way that does not reflect the true nature of familiarity (Gardiner, Ramponi, & 
Richardson-Klavehn, 1998). Given the established framework of the dual processes, 
discussed in Section 1.2, accurate source memory should only be served by recollection, 
and not familiarity (Diana et al., 2010; Yonelinas, 1999).  
Combining memory for time and context with the dual-process theory, it should be expected 
that both temporal and contextual source information would both necessitate the use of 
recollection in order to be remembered accurately. This has led some researchers, mainly in 
the animal literature, to suggest that familiarity cannot support the retrieval of episodic 
memories, as it does not support the retrieval of integrated memories including source 
features. Recollection, which does require retrieval of source information, is argued to be 
necessary to accurately remember episodic memories (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Easton 
et al., 2012). This would mean that familiarity-based retrieval alone would not be as useful in 
disambiguating events as recollection, though familiarity can still contribute to recollection as 
retrieval is not process-pure. However, it should be noted that there is little debate in the 
human R/K literature that familiarity can support episodic memory (Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 
1994, 2001). 
Contextual and temporal source information both constitute cues that could be used for the 
separation of events in theory. However, to date relatively few attempts have been made to 
assess the accuracy of temporal and contextual memory with human participants. Previous 
research has shown that while memory for both time and context can be accurate (Easton et 
al., 2012; Holland & Smulders, 2011), different retrieval processes within the dual process 
framework are engaged during memory for the two sources (Easton et al., 2012). Easton et 
al. (2012) examined the retrieval processes underlying memory for both temporal and 
contextual information in human participants. They did this by projecting images of abstract 
figures on either a zebra or a checked background on to a large screen in a lecture theatre, 
where the backgrounds represented individual contexts and temporal information being 
represented by the sequence of object presentation. Participants were shown individual 
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objects and reported either which context it was paired with during study or whether it was 
presented in the first or second sequence position. Accurate retrieval of contextual 
information was shown to be achieved only through recollection, but not familiarity. Contrary 
to what would be expected within the dual process framework, it was further shown that 
accurate memory for the order of stimulus presentation could be supported by either 
recollection or familiarity. This finding questions whether time adheres to the definition of a 
source under the dual-process theory. Alternatively, familiarity-supported temporal retrieval 
could be explained by the use memory strength supported by familiarity (i.e. how little the 
encoding episode had decayed from memory indicating how recently it was encountered) 
rather than the retrieval of a true temporal source. This is a particularly important 
consideration as only two time points, and two contexts, were used in the presentation 
sequence, meaning that participants could have remembered whether a cue item was seen 
early, and was associated with a weak memory trace, meaning that it was encountered at 
the first time point. Conversely, an item with a strong memory trace would most likely have 
been seen at the second time point, a judgment that could be made without referring to the 
actual time point, only that it was late in the sequence. 
The current experiments aim to conceptually replicate the findings from Easton et al. (2012) 
using a longer presentation sequence both during study and test (6 time points compared to 
2). This allowed for the examination of memory for absolute time points as well as the nature 
of the errors produced when attempting to judge the accurate temporal source. Should 
temporal source be retrieved using memory strength rather than retrieval of the precise 
temporal source, then incorrect responses would be expected to cluster around the position 
of the correct response within the sequence of presentation at encoding. A longer temporal 
sequence would further allow us to assess serial position effects, such as whether memory 
strength was used to retrieve the temporal source of items presented in the very beginning 
or end of the sequence, resulting in higher source accuracy for these items. Additionally an 
immersive testing environment was used to more closely match the conditions under which 
source information is encoded during everyday life. 
To this end, temporal and contextual retrieval was assessed in an immersive virtual 
environment across three experiments, using an amended version of the standard 
Remember-Know procedure (Dewhurst et al., 2009; Donaldson et al. 1996), with the only 
difference being that Familiar instead of Know responses was asked for. This was done as it 
has been suggested that familiarity can have two distinct meanings. It can either be referred 
to as the feeling that something is familiar without being able to recollect any details 
surrounding the source of the event, or interpreted as a feeling of just knowing that 
something has been encountered through, for example, frequent repetition of some 
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information (Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, & Cohen, 1997; Dewhurst et al., 2009). 
As the current studies aimed to assess the feeling of familiarity, rather than just knowing, 
Familiar instead of Know responses was used. 
Over the three experiments, a paradigm was used where participants moved through a 
virtual environment, in which they encountered a series of 3D objects. The environment was 
made as immersive as possible through projection onto a wall in a darkened room, intended 
to give participants a stronger sense of being present within the environment. During study 
phases, participants navigated around the virtual environment, in which they came across 
objects in different weather contexts, representing contextual information, where the 
sequence of objects presented represented temporal information. Memory for the items and 
their associated temporal or contextual sources was assessed together with judgements of 
recollective experience: Remember judgements indicating a use of recollection where 
participants could retrieve details surrounding the study episode; and Familiar judgements 
indicating that participants only knew that an object had been seen without memory for 
surrounding information, indicative of retrieval using familiarity. Based on the results from 
Easton et al. (2012) and a paper by Saive and colleagues (2015) demonstrating the need for 
recollection to remember contextual information, it was predicted that both contextual and 
temporal source memory would be accurate following self-reported engagement of 
recollection, while temporal, but not contextual, source memory would be accurate for 
judgments that engaged familiarity. 
 !
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3.2 Experiment 1 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Experiment 1 was carried out to assess whether retrieval of temporal and contextual source 
information is based on the process of recollection, or if there are instances when source 
information can be retrieved using familiarity as suggested in Easton et al (2012). In the 
current study participants moved through a virtual environment where they encountered a 
number of objects in different weather conditions. The virtual environment used in the 
current experiment consisted of two rooms in which participants could move around, and an 
external outdoor environment. Context was manipulated by altering the weather conditions 
surrounding the environment, while time was defined as the sequence of object presentation. 
Each time participants entered the room containing the stimuli, a new object was presented 
and the weather condition changed, thus resulting in each stimulus being associated with 
one weather condition and one position in the sequence. It was hypothesised, based on the 
general assumptions of the dual-process theory (Yonelinas, 1994, 1999), that accurate 
retrieval of both temporal and contextual information would involve the use of recollection. 
However, based on the results by Easton and colleagues (2012) it was also predicted that 
memory for time, but not context, could be supported by familiarity. 
3.2.2 Materials and Methods 
3.2.2.1 Virtual Environment and Stimuli. The virtual environment was created using 
the Valve Hammer World Editor (Valve Corporation, 2006). At study, the virtual environment 
was projected onto a 375 cm x 250 cm screen at 1024 x 768 resolution. Participants were 
seated 420 cm from the screen and navigated through the environment via the use of a 
games console controller (Xbox 360, Microsoft). The virtual environment consisted of two 
rooms connected by a single doorway: a Start Room, where participants began each trial; 
and a Main Room in which the stimuli were presented (Figure 8A). In the Main Room there 
were three windows facing a Courtyard giving participants a clear view of the outside 
environment. The Courtyard contained a number of landmarks, such as a sculpture, a car 
and a perimeter of buildings that represented the border of the environment. To manipulate 
context, weather conditions were altered in the Courtyard whilst the landmarks were kept 
constant. Six different contexts were used: sun, snow, lightning, rain, fog, and wind (Figure 
8B). Rain used the appearance and sound of rain hitting the windows. Wind used leaves 
blowing in the courtyard and the sound of howling wind. Lightning used flashes and the 
sound of thunder. Sun used clear blue skies and bird song. Fog used grey mist and was 
silent. Snow used falling snowflakes and snow-covered ground and was silent.  
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A pool of 186 3D stimuli was used, with objects representing a range of everyday objects 
(see Figure 8A for examples), from the Valve Hammer (Valve Corporation, 2006) and 
Garry’s mod databases (Valve Corporation, 2004). 72 objects were randomly drawn for each 
participant, with 36 objects being presented in the virtual environment and the recognition 
test (targets), while the remaining 36 were presented during the recognition test as new lures. 
Instructions and memory test were displayed on a laptop using Psychophysics Toolbox 
version 3 (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al. 2007) for Matlab (Natick, MA, 2013). 
3.2.2.2 Participants. 34 participants (28 female) with an average age of 22.6 were 
recruited through the University of St Andrews research participation system.  Five 
participants had to stop the study early due to feelings of nausea caused by the virtual 
environment. This left 29 participants (23 female) with an average age of 22.9 years who 
contributed data for analysis. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the University 
of St Andrews’ University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix B for 
letter of ethical approval). All participants gave informed consent prior to taking part in the 
study. Participants were compensated at a rate of £5/hour for taking part in the study. 
3.2.2.3 Procedure. Study Phases consisted of six self-paced trials. During a single trial, 
participants navigated from the Start Room to the Main Room and located the stimulus 
behind a barrier (Figure 9B). Once the object had been seen, participants were instructed to 
identify the object, i.e. state that it was a football, and judge its size relative to the 
surrounding furniture and give their response verbally, i.e. small, medium or large. These 
responses were not recorded but served as a measure to ensure that participants attended 
to the stimuli.  Once responses had been given participants made their way back to the start 
room. This procedure was repeated until six objects had been encountered, one in each 
context, as each time participants entered the Main Room a new object was presented and 
the context was changed. As a result, within each Study Phase, each stimulus became 
associated with one context and one position in the presentation sequence (1-6). Contexts 
were presented once during each study phase and presentation was randomised using a 
Latin square design, meaning that each context was presented once in every position in the 
presentation sequence. This also ensured that a certain context was only presented after 
another once (i.e. wind was only followed by rain once in the experiment).  
Test Phases (Figure 9C) comprised 12 self-paced trials, 6 trials for old items seen in the 
virtual environment and 6 new lure trials. Memory for the stimuli and sources encountered in 
the virtual environment was assessed using four different questions per trial. To assess 
object recognition participants were shown an image of an item on the screen and asked 
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whether it was ‘old’ (seen in the Virtual Environment; indicated using the ‘1’ key) or whether 
it was ‘new’ (not seen in the Virtual Environment; indicated using the ‘0’ key).  
After the object recognition participants gave a Remember (R), Familiar (F) or Guess (G) 
response. Definitions for these judgements, adapted from Gardiner et al. (1996), were 
provided at the beginning of the experiment. These definitions could also be reviewed at the 
beginning of each new test phase, if participants wished to do so: 
• Remember - Recognition of the object brings back details of the experience when the 
object was encountered in the virtual world.  
• Familiar - Knowing that the object was encountered because of a feeling of familiarity, 
without recollecting the particular occurrence. 
• Guess - A decision strategy used when object information does not elicit either the 
experience of remembering or that of familiarity. 
Subsequently, participants were asked whether they could retrieve the source of the item. 
Source questions either asked when in the presentation sequence the item was encountered 
or in which context the item was seen. Context and sequence questions were randomised 
within participants, and were presented at a 50:50 ratio in each test phase to give equal 
numbers of questions for each source. All source response options were displayed on the 
screen for the respective questions, and responses were subsequently given using keys 1-6 
on the keyboard. Participants were asked source questions regardless of whether an item 
had been responded to as old or new. This was to allow for the ability to analyse the 
accuracy of source judgments in the absence of correct object recognition. Participants were 
instructed to select a source response at random if they were certain that an item was in fact 
new and did not have any associated source information. The final question asked 
participants to rate their confidence in their source response, using a scale from 1 (low 
confidence) to 3 (high confidence). Across the entire study there were six Study-Test Phases 
with 12 trials in each, amounting to a total of 72 trials: 36 lure trials and 36 target trials (18 
context and 18 sequence trials). 
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Figure 9. Overview of structure of study and test phases in Experiment 1.  A) Overview of 
the virtual environment in Experiment 1 and 2 when only one object was presented per trial. B) 
Study phase illustrating the sequence of object presentations across contexts. C) The sequence 
of questions in test phases in Experiment 1. 
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3.2.2.4 Data Analysis. Accuracy of object recognition was assessed by looking at 
discrimination sensitivity (d′) between old and new objects, as well as bias in criterion 
placement. A d′ value of 0 indicates chance level performance with higher values indicating 
greater discrimination sensitivity (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Discrimination sensitivity 
measured as d′ is calculated by converting both Hit rates (correctly identified ‘old’ objects) 
and False Alarm rates (‘new’ objects incorrectly identified as ‘old’) to z-scores and 
subtracting the former from the latter to give an indication of the degree to which ‘old’ items 
are discriminated from ‘new’ items: !! = !! ! − !!(!")      (1) 
A criterion (c) of exactly 0 indicates that participants are completely unbiased in their old/new 
responses, while an increasingly positive value indicates an increasingly conservative bias 
(tendency to respond New) and an increasingly negative value an increasingly liberal bias 
(tendency to respond Old; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). The value of c is calculated as 
follows:       ! = !− !! ![! ! + !! !" ]     (2) 
The value of c is calculated as the summary between Hit and False Alarm rates as the 
combination of these give an indication of the degree to which participants report items as 
being ‘old’ or ‘new’. For example, high Hit and False Alarm rates show that participants are 
prone to responding that items are ‘old’, indicating a liberal bias, whereas low Hit and False 
Alarm rates instead demonstrate that few items are endorsed as being ‘old’ and results in a 
conservative bias (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). 
Due to missing values as a result of low proportions of F judgments, a linear mixed model 
(LMM) was used to analyse the effect of source (context/sequence) and recollective 
experience (Remember/Familiar) on accuracy of retrieval. The approach was justified since 
the data met the missing-at-random definition (Seltman, 2009). That is, the missing data 
could be explained by another variable for which the full data-set was available. In this case 
the missing Familiar values could be explained by higher confidence, i.e. participants who 
did not use the Familiar response option for either context or sequence had significantly 
higher confidence ratings for that source. Using an independent samples t-test comparing 
confidence levels between cases in which participants used the F judgment and cases when 
they did not it was demonstrated that participants gave significantly higher confidence 
ratings when F judgments were not used, t(56)=2.03, p=0.047, d=0.543, meaning that missing 
F judgments could be explained by higher confidence ratings. 
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The LMM was selected by fitting models with different covariance structures and selecting 
the model with best fit according to the lowest Corrected Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(AICC). The corrected rather than the standard Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) was 
used since the former is more appropriate for data sets with smaller sample sizes (Burnham 
& Anderson, 2002). The AICC indicates model fit by estimating the loss of information when 
summarising the data with a specific model, where AIC and AICC are calculated as follows: 
!"# = 2! − 2!"(!)      (3) 
!"#$ = !"# + !2!(!+1)!−!−1      (4) 
In these formulas, K represents the number of parameters in the model and log-likelihood 
represents the likelihood or probability of the model given the data. The ‘2K’ part of the 
formula penalises complex models with many parameters in favour of simpler models by 
increasing the AICC value, whereas the – 2In(L) part rewards goodness of fit assessed by 
the likelihood function, where greater likelihood values will result in lower AICC values. The 
AICC extends the AIC by further taking sample size in to account and increases the penalty 
of more complex models fitted to small data sets (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). It should be 
noted that the absolute AICC values do not say anything about the data itself, only which 
model provides a better fit to the data. As the value of the AICC depends on the underlying 
likelihood function of the model fit, there is no range of AICC values indicating a better fit 
across data sets, instead it is only the smallest value for each data set that is of relevance. 
The covariance structures assessed were first-order autoregressive (AR1), unstructured, 
and compound symmetry.  The aim of these covariance structures is to capture patterns of 
covariance to create a representation of the data. The AR1 fits 2 parameters and specifies 
homogenous variance and covariance that decline with increasing lag between observations. 
The unstructured covariance structure assumes that there is no pattern in the data and that 
each variance and covariance is different. As a result this covariance structure aims to 
model each data point individually, often resulting in a good model fit but also resulting in a 
greater number of parameters having to be estimated. Finally, the compound symmetry 
estimates 2 parameters, and holds that each variance and covariance is equal. 
The model evaluation found that the unstructured covariance structure resulted in the lowest 
AICC and value, indicating a better model fit (Table 3). However, the analysis results in 
errors suggesting that the model was being over-fitted as a result of the unstructured 
covariance structure having more parameters than any of the other covariance structures, 
leading to uncertainty of the validity of the model fit. As a result a model employing the AR1 
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covariance structure was used as it gave a lower AICC value compared to the compound 
symmetry covariance structure. It should also be noted that the outcome of the LMM did not 
differ between the different covariance structures. The LMM had source (context/sequence) 
and recollective experience (Remember/Familiar judgments) as repeated measures factors. 
Source and recollective experience were also entered as fixed factors along with a source by 
recollective experience interaction.  
Table 3. Comparison of covariance structures assessed in the linear mixed model for 
Experiment 1.  Lower Corrected Akaike’s Information Criterion (AICC) value indicates a better fit 
of the model. 
Covariance structure AICC 
First-order autoregressive (AR1) -8.71 
Compound symmetry -1.16 
Unstructured -51.13 
 
Additionally, accuracy was compared to chance level performance using one-sample t-tests 
to see whether performance in the sequence or context conditions would be significantly 
above the expected level if participants were merely guessing. Chance level performance 
was 0.1667. 
The R/K procedure employed in the current study, although being a useful procedure for 
assessing participants’ recollective experience, only gives one measure of recollection and 
familiarity and does not characterise how past information is remembered. For example, 
temporal information can be retrieved through the use of trace strength where an item is 
placed in time by assessing the amount to which the strength of its memory trace has 
decayed since being encountered. Comparatively, contextual information could be 
remembered by retrieving some aspect of the original context to guide retrieval, which could 
open up the possibility of errors due to feature overlaps between contexts, e.g. remembering 
that an item was encountered when it was dark outside without being able to remember 
whether it was seen in thunder or snow. To give further evidence of whether source 
information is fully reinstated during retrieval or if source information can be represented in 
some graded manner as outlined above, the potential use of trace strength or context 
similarity to guide retrieval was examined by assessing the proportion of error responses 
made during both context and sequence questions. The aim was to characterise each 
source retrieval condition, either as operating through a discrete threshold function where 
errors would be randomly distributed as either the correct source would be fully reinstated in 
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memory or not at all. Alternatively, source retrieval could be represented by a continuous 
trace strength or feature similarity process, in which the proportion or errors gradually drop 
off with increasing distance from the correct source response. One-sample t-tests were used 
to compare the proportion of errors in the serial positions curves to chance levels to assess 
whether the frequency with which they were made differed from what would have been 
expected if errors were made at random. Here chance levels were calculated as 1 minus the 
proportion of correct responses, divided by the number of incorrect response options to give 
a level at which all errors could be distributed evenly.  
Information presented at the beginning or the end of a sequence tends to be remembered 
better than information presented in the middle, giving rise to primacy and recency effects. 
To examine whether any results seen in the source accuracy analysis could be due to higher 
proportion of accurate responses for items presented in the beginning and end of the study 
presentation sequence, accuracy for temporal and contextual questions was analysed for 
each position of the presentation sequence, i.e. whether source accuracy was higher for the 
1st item in the study sequence compared to the 3rd or 4th item in the presentation sequence. 
Finally, to examine whether participants rated their answers to either source of recollective 
experience as more or less confident, confidence levels were analysed across sources 
(Time/Context) and recollective experience (R/F) within participants. 
Behavioural analyses across all experiments in this Chapter were carried out using SPSS 
version 22 (IBM). 
3.2.3 Results 
3.2.3.1 Object Recognition. Participants’ performance on the object recognition task was 
very high, with an average hit rate of 0.959 (SD=0.044) and a correct rejection rate of 0.988 
(SD=0.033). Consequently, discrimination sensitivity measured by d′ was 3.80 (SD=0.560), 
indicating a high sensitivity in discriminating old from new items. Finally, decision criterion 
was at 0.169 (SD=0.221), which was significantly different from 0, t(28)=4.13, p<0.001, 
d=106.25, indicating a conservative bias across the sample. The mean d′ points towards a 
ceiling effect in the object recognition task since participant performance was nearly flawless. 
This does not pose a problem as object recognition is not a central measurement in this 
study. Additionally, source accuracy for misses will not be examined due to too few cases of 
misses.  
3.2.3.2 Proportions of R-F-G Judgments. The mean proportion of questions justified 
by R, F, and G judgments was assessed to examine whether the rates of these judgments 
were the same both within and between source questions. For context questions the rate of 
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R responses was higher, 0.898, (SD=0.262), compared to F, 0.102 (SD=0.262), while no G 
responses were given. The same pattern was seen for sequence questions where the rate of 
R judgments was 0.916 (SD=0.228), which was higher than F judgments at 0.082 
(SD=0.228), where the rate of G responses was near to none at 0.002 (SD=0.013). G 
responses, included to remove contamination of R and F responses by actual guesses 
(Gardiner et al., 1996), were not analysed any further. 
A 2 (recollective experience: R/F) x2 (source: context/sequence) ANOVA was run to ensure 
that there was no difference in the mean proportion of questions justified by Remember and 
Familiar judgments, presented above, between context and sequence questions. No main 
effect of source was found, F(1,28)=1.00, p=0.326, ƞp2=0.034, while a main effect of the 
retrieval experience was shown, F(1,28)=82.38, p<0.001, ƞp2=0.746. The interaction between 
source and recollective experience was also found to be non-significant, F(1,28)=1.37, 
p=0.252, ƞp2=0.047. This shows that there was no significant difference in the proportion of 
R and F judgments given for context and sequence questions, while there was a significantly 
larger proportion of R judgments given compared to F judgments. 
3.2.3.3 Source Memory by Recollective Experience. Context questions following an 
R judgment were responded to with an average accuracy of 0.668 (SD=0.211), and those 
coupled with an F judgment had an average accuracy of 0.659 (SD=0.289). Looking at 
sequence questions, accuracy for answers subsequent to R judgments, 0.788 (SD=0.174) 
were somewhat higher than that for F judgments, 0.610 (SD=0.415) (Figure 10). Analysing 
these accuracy scores using the linear mixed model described above found that neither 
recollective experience (whether questions were justified by R or F responses), F(1,71.60)=3.43, 
p=0.068, nor source, F(1,44.88)=2.32, p=0.135, were significant predictors of source accuracy. 
The recollective experience by source interaction was also non-significant, F(1,43.36)=1.21, 
p=0.2781. This suggests that neither recollective experience nor source had a significant 
effect on memory accuracy, and that accuracy was not different across conditions.  
To further illustrate that there was no difference across conditions, one sample t-tests 
comparing source accuracy to chance level performance (Figure 10) revealed that 
performance was significantly above chance levels for context questions coupled with R 
judgments, t(27)=12.59, p<0.001, d=11.41, and F judgments, t(7)=4.82, p=0.002, d=5.86, as 
well as for sequence questions justified by R, t(27)=18.99, p<0.001, d=21.57, and F 
                                                
1 Effect sizes for the Linear Mixed Model were not reported, as there is currently no standardized way 
of calculating effect sizes for LMMs. A measure of R2 for LMMs has been developed to give a 
generalized indication of model fit. However, this approach has been implemented for LMMs in the 
programming environment R (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013), which currently does not allow for the 
assessment of various covariance structures, thus making it difficult to run the exact same analysis 
reported here in R. 
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judgments, t(7)=3.02, p=0.019, d=2.51. These results demonstrate that performance was 
significantly above chance in all conditions, and that questions following F judgments were 
answered as accurately as those following R judgments. 
 
Figure 10. Context and sequence accuracy by R and F judgments.  Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. ** = p<0.01 and *** = p<0.001 compared to chance level 
performance (dotted line, 0.1667). 
 
3.2.3.4 Trace Strength. The trace strength analysis was carried out to characterise 
whether source memory was represented by an all-or-nothing process or in a graded 
manner where errors would be systematically made for source options similar to the correct 
source in either time or visual features. For sequence questions this was done by looking at 
the proportion of responses around items presented in the 3rd and 4th sequence positions 
(the 3rd and 4th sequence positions were chosen to maximise the ability to examine the tails 
of the serial position curves, Figure 11A). For context questions, serial positions of errors 
were ranked from the most frequent incorrect response down to the least common error for 
each context. These distributions were then averaged across all contexts. It should be noted 
ordering of the serial positions in the context condition were carried out in such way to give 
the greatest opportunity to detect a gradual drop-off in the serial position curve, if one should 
be present (Figure 11B). 
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The trace strength analysis for sequence questions, found that only the proportion of errors 
in Pos-1 (one sequential position after the correct response) were significantly higher than 
chance level, t(28)=7.54, p<0.001, d=1.40 (Figure 11A). Proportions of errors across all other 
sequential positions were not significantly above chance. The majority of errors being 
attributed to one sequential position after the correct response illustrate forward asymmetry 
in retrieval where participants tended to state that items were seen more recently than they 
actually were. 
For contexts, the proportion of errors was nearly but not significantly above chance for the 
most common errors responses (Rank 1), t(28)=2.04, p=0.050, d=0.380, and not for any of 
the other ranks (Figure 11B). These errors demonstrate that there was no real interference 
between contexts due to some contexts being quite similar, which could argue that 
contextual information was retrieved through a recollective threshold process.  
 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 11. Trace strength serial position curves in Experiment 1.  A) Trace strength for 
sequence questions. 0 indicates the correct responses, while positive and negative values 
indicated temporal positions behind or ahead of the correct response respectively. B) Trace 
strength for context questions. C corresponds to the proportion of correct responses across 
contexts. Rank 1 (R1) corresponds to the average of the most frequent error for each context; 
Rank 2 (R2) is the 2nd most frequent error, etc. Dotted lines indicated chance level performance. 
Error bars represent confidence intervals. 
 
3.2.3.5 Confidence Ratings. Confidence was rated on a scale from 1 to 3, and analysed 
to examine whether participants’ confidence levels differed between sources as well as 
between R and F judgments. Confidence levels for context questions where somewhat 
higher following R judgments, 2.59 (SD=0.240) compared to following F judgments, 1.95 
(SD=0.721). For sequence questions confidence was more even across R, 2.66 (SD=0.330) 
and F judgments, 2.51 (SD=0.615). A 2 (source: context/sequence) x2 (recollective 
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experience: R/F) repeated measures ANOVA showed no significant main effects of either 
source, F(1,3)=0.495, p=0.532, ƞp2=0.142, or recollective experience, F(1,3)=2.02, p=0.234, 
ƞp2=0.423. The source by recollective experience interaction was also non-significant, 
F(1,3)=0.364, p=0.589, ƞp2=0.108. However, this ANOVA was extremely underpowered as it 
was only based on four participants that reported R and F for both context and sequence 
questions. 
3.2.3.6 Serial Position Effects. Primacy and recency effects were assessed to examine 
whether this could explain participants’ ability to accurately retrieve source information using 
familiarity (see Figure 12 for descriptive statistics). A 2 (Source: context/time) x 6 (Position: 
sequence position 1 to 6) factorial ANOVA was run to see whether there was a difference in 
source accuracy across the different sequence position between conditions. This analysis 
revealed a main effect of both Source, F(1,23)=8.33, p=0.008, ƞp2=0.266, and Position, F(5, 
115)=4.53, p=0.001, ƞp2=0.164. However, the Source by Position interaction was non-
significant, F(5,115)=0.874, p=0.501, ƞp2=0.037. This means that sequence memory was 
overall more accurate than context memory, and that accuracy for both sources varied 
across the presentation sequence. To further examine the slope, one way repeated 
measures ANOVAs were carried out comparing accuracy across all 6 sequence positions for 
each source condition to assess whether a quadratic trend was present, which could indicate 
a U-shaped curve which would expected if primacy and recency effects were presented. 
Additionally, polynomial contrasts were run to test whether there was a difference in 
accuracy between the 1st sequence position and the 3rd and 4th positions individually, as well 
as the mid-positions and the 6th position at the end of the sequence, resulting in 4 individual 
contrasts (1st vs. 3rd, 1st vs. 4th, 3rd vs. 6th, and 4th vs. 6th) giving further indication whether 
questions were answered more accurately for items at the beginning or at the end of the 
presentation sequence. There was a significant quadratic trend in both the Sequence, F(1,166) 
= 8.04, p=0.005, and Context, F(1,165) = 4.05, p=0.046, conditions. The polynomial contrasts 
further revealed that there was a significant difference in accuracy between items presented 
in the 1st and 3rd position for both Context, t(165)=1.90, p=0.029, d=0.449, and Sequence, 
t(166)=2.99, p=0.003, d=0.922, questions. The same pattern was seen in the contrast 
between items presented in the 3rd and the 6th position, where again there was a significant 
difference in accuracy in both the Context, t(165)=1.93, p=0.027, d=0.454, and Sequence, 
t(166)=2.18, p=0.030, d=0.589, conditions. This demonstrates that source accuracy was 
significantly higher for items presented in the beginning and end of the sequence for both 
Context and Sequence questions. (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Source accuracy serial position curve for Experiment 1. Context accuracy across 
presentation sequence positions 1-6 was: 0.704 (SD=0.333), 0.593 (SD=0.305), 0.537 
(SD=0.406), 0.629 (SD=0.349), 0.652 (SD=0.246), and 0.707 (SD=0.340). Sequence accuracy 
across presentation sequence positions 1-6 was: 0.893 (SD=0.184), 0.724 (SD=0.338), 0.664 
(SD=0.299), 0.780 (SD=0.285), 0.705 (SD=0.346), and 0.830 (SD=0.264). Error bars represent 
SEM. *=p<0.05, ***=p<0.001 
3.2.4 Discussion 
Experiment 1 was carried out to assess whether memory for time and context are supported 
by the same retrieval processes. It was hypothesised that accurate retrieval of both time and 
context would involve the use of recollection, as the dual-process theory posits that source 
memory is inherently served by a recollective process (Yonelinas, 1999), and further that 
temporal information could be retrieved using familiarity to some extent, based on the 
findings by Easton and colleagues (2012). The hypothesis was partly supported in that 
context and time could be remembered accurately when coupled with both R and F 
judgments.  
Source accuracy was analysed using a LMM due to missing values in the data set. This 
analysis found that neither source nor recollective experience were significant predictors of 
retrieval accuracy, meaning that accuracy did not differ across conditions and response 
categories. This was further supported by findings showing that participants performed 
above chance at source judgments regardless of whether these questions came following R 
or F responses, and that there was no difference in accuracy between R and F judgments 
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for either context or sequence questions. These results are somewhat counterintuitive, as 
memory for the source of an event should require recollection (Yonelinas, 1999), while here 
accurate memory for time and context were also coupled with judgments of familiarity. The 
results further contradict the findings by Eacott and colleagues (2012), where context 
required recollection for above chance accuracy, and could not be retrieved using familiarity. 
The use of familiarity in retrieving source information was further demonstrated by the 
forward asymmetry in temporal retrieval indicating that participants’ errors were made 
systematically for temporal positions close to the correct response. This indicates the use of 
trace strength to retrieve temporal information where the time point of an item is judged 
based on the decaying memory trace since the item was encountered, a process associated 
with familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002). No such effect was observed for context questions no 
error rates were significantly above what would have been expected by random guesses, 
giving further indication that contextual information was retrieved through an all-or-nothing 
threshold process. 
Additionally, the use of familiarity to retrieve both contextual and temporal information could 
be explained by primacy and recency effects as the serial positions analysis revealed that 
memory for both time and context were significantly better for objects presented first or last 
in the study sequence. It is thought that recency memory can be supported by familiarity as it 
relies on memory strength, which could be used to place an event either at the start or end 
of a sequence, as these should have the weakest and strongest memory strengths 
respectively (Dobbins, Rice, Wagner, & Schacter, 2003; Yonelinas, 2002).  
A further explanation as to why source information could be retrieved through the use of 
familiarity is that Familiar and Remember judgments were given at an item level, and as 
such did not necessarily reflect the processes at play during the source memory questions. 
Participants could have remembered that the cue item was encountered during study using 
either recollection or familiarity, but without relating this judgment to any of the source 
information in the virtual environment. This could be due to non-criterial recollection, which is 
a process where a previous event can be recollected except for the crucial piece of 
information or criteria that is trying to be remembered (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996). In the 
current study it could be posited that participants could recall aspects of the study episode 
not related to the source information they were supposed to remember. At test, participants 
could recollect being in the testing room, sitting in front of the screen, or even how they felt 
or what they were thinking when a particular item was presented, which led to a feeling of 
familiarity for the item and resulted in an F judgment. Once participants were presented with 
the source response options, these could have been sufficient as cues to trigger the retrieval 
of the correct item-source association. Such non-criterial recollection has been shown to 
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inflate reports of familiarity as the task irrelevant features that can be remembered provide 
evidence that an item has been seen previously. However, the crucial information 
surrounding the item at study, such as the time or context in the current study, cannot be 
remembered (Parks, 2007; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996). As non-criterial recollection is 
equivalent to normal, criterial, recollection rather than being more akin to a familiarity-based 
process (Parks, 2007) it might be expected that this process would generate R, rather than F, 
judgments. However, as participants were explicitly to evaluate how they came to their 
decision regarding the item identity, it is possible that the study environment was recollected 
while the virtual environment was merely familiar. 
As discussed above, a problem with the current study was that judgments about the 
recollective experience were given at the item, rather than the source, level. A second study 
was conducted where R-F-G judgments were asked for following source questions, similar to 
the methodology used by Easton and colleagues (2012), to see whether the same pattern of 
data would be obtained. This manipulation was further done in an attempt to increase the 
number of Familiar judgments. Asking for ratings of recollective experience at the source 
level could increase the number of Familiar judgments, as source questions would be more 
difficult to answer.
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3.3 Experiment 2 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Experiment 2 was conducted in order to assess whether the results from Experiment 1 
would be replicated when Remember, Familiar, and Guess judgments were given at the 
level of the source rather than at the level of the item. Reporting R-F-G after the source 
question should have made participants more prone to relating their judgment back to the 
study episode, it was predicted that this would better reflect the subjective experience of 
retrieving source information. As this methodology more closely follows that of Easton et al 
(2012) it is hypothesised that accurate memory for context will rely on recollection but not 
familiarity, while sequence information could be remembered accurately using both 
recollection and familiarity. 
3.3.2 Materials and Methods 
All materials and definitions used and provided to participants in Experiment 2 were identical 
to those used in Experiment 1. 
3.3.2.1 Participants. There were 32 participants (22 female) with an average age of 21.8 
years. Four participants stopped the study early, two due to feelings of nausea brought 
about by the high level of immersion, and two due to technical errors. The results from the 
remaining 28 (19 female) participants with an average age of 22.0 years were used for 
analysis. Experiment 2 was carried out under the same ethical approval as Experiment 1 as 
no major changes were made between studies (see Appendix B for letter of ethical approval). 
All participants gave informed consent prior to taking part in the study. Participants were 
compensated at a rate of £5/hour for taking part in the study. 
3.3.2.2 Procedure. The study phase did not differ from Experiment 1. The only change 
made in Experiment 2 was in the memory test, where Remember, Familiar, and Guess 
judgments were asked for after, instead of before, context and sequence questions (Figure 
13). These judgments were given after confidence ratings, so as not to influence the level of 
confidence assigned by participants (Williams, Conway, & Moulin, 2013).  
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Figure 13. Structure of test phase in Experiment 2. Illustration of the sequence of questions 
asked in the study phase, where the only change from Experiment 1 is that judgments of 
recollective experience are asked for after the source recognition rather than prior to it. 
3.3.2.3 Data Analysis. The analysis followed the same structure as in Experiment 1. 
However, R-F-G judgments will be reported after object recognition, even though they were 
asked for last, since it is of interest to know the overall proportion of these before examining 
their relation to context and sequence accuracy. As in Experiment 1, guess judgments were 
only used when looking at the proportions of R-F-G responses and were excluded from 
analysis beyond that stage. 
Similar to Experiment 1, due to missing values a Linear Mixed model was used to analyse 
differences in source accuracy. This approach was again justified by participants not 
reporting the use of familiarity having significantly higher confidence ratings than those 
participants who did use familiarity, t(54)=2.80, p=0.007, d=0.762. The model evaluation 
showed that the AR1 covariance structure provided the best model fit, demonstrated by 
lower AICC values compared to the compound symmetry and unstructured covariance 
structures (Table 4). The AICC values were overall larger in Experiment 2 compared to 
Experiment 1, which would indicate that likelihood function in the AICC, explained in Section 
3.2.2.4, was higher in Experiment 1 and could indicate that this data fit the models better, 
seeing as the number of parameters were constant in the covariance structures fitted 
between experiments. 
Table 4. Comparison of covariance structures assessed in the linear mixed model for 
Experiment 2.  Lower AICC value indicates a better fit of the model. 
Covariance structure AICC 
First-order autoregressive (AR1) 8.71 
Compound symmetry 11.14 
Unstructured 17.06 
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3.3.3 Results 
3.3.3.1 Object Recognition. Accuracy for the object recognition was high, with the 
proportion of correctly identified targets (hits) at 0.940 (SD=0.132) and correctly identified 
lures (correct rejections) at 0.947 (SD=0.139). Discrimination sensitivity measured by d′ was 
3.62 (SD=1.15) and criterion 0.074 (SD=0.229), indicating that participants were accurate in 
telling new and old objects apart, and were statistically unbiased in their decisions (one 
sample t-test comparing criterion to 0, t(27)=1.70, p=0.099, d=1.32). 
3.3.3.2 Proportion of R-F-G Judgments. Proportions of R, F, and G responses were 
similar across context and sequence questions. Context hits were followed by R judgments 
at a rate of 0.813 (SD=0.296), with F at 0.152 (SD=0.260) and G at 0.035 (SD=0.074). For 
sequence hits, R judgments were given at a rate of 0.862 (SD=0.264) F at 0.107 (SD=0.199) 
and G at 0.031 (SD=0.093). A 2 (recollective experience: R/F) x2 (source: context/sequence) 
ANOVA comparing the R and F response rates for context and sequence, presented above, 
revealed a main effect of recollective experience, F(1,27)=65.20, p<0.001, ƞp2=0.707, showing 
that R responses were given at a significantly higher rate than F responses. There was 
additionally no significant main effect of source, F(1,27)=0.400, p=0.843, ƞp2=0.001, nor was 
the recollective experience by source interaction significant, F(1,27)=1.46, p=0.237, ƞp2=0.051, 
meaning that R and F responses were not given at significantly different rates across context 
and sequence questions.  
3.3.3.3 Source Memory by Recollective Experience. Accuracy for context responses 
coupled with R judgments was 0.682 (SD=0.253), and 0.210 (SD=0.194) when giving F 
judgments. Sequence questions followed a similar pattern where accuracy was higher for R 
judgments, 0.739 (SD=0.233), than for F judgments, 0.434 (SD=0.329) (Figure 14). The 
LMM analysis of this source memory accuracy found that both recollective experience and 
source were significant predictors of source memory accuracy, F(1,79.95)=52.98, p<0.001 and 
F(1,44.96)=5.64, p=0.019 respectively. Examining at the individual parameters a significant 
effect of recollective experience (R/F judgments) was found, β=-0.371, SE=0.078, p<0.001, 
d=0.890, indicating that source responses justified through R judgments had a significantly 
higher accuracy than F judgments across both sequence and context questions. There was 
no significant main effect of source (context/sequence), β=-0.057, SE=0.055, p=0.302, 
d=0.197, indicating that accuracy was equally high between context and sequence questions. 
Nor was the source by recollective experience interaction significant, β=-0.111, SE=0.098, 
p=0.262, d=0.215. 
It was hypothesised that contextual information could be retrieved accurately using only 
recollection and not familiarity, whereas accurate retrieval of sequence information could be 
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achieved through the use of both recollection and familiarity. To fully assess this, 
performance under the different retrieval strategies were compared to chance level 
performance to ensure that subjects could accurately retrieve source information, and were 
not merely guessing (Figure 14). Using one-sample t-tests to compare performance against 
chance levels it was found that performance on context questions was only above chance 
for R, t(25)=10.37, p<0.001, d=2.01, but not for F judgments, t(15)=0.901, p=0.382, d=0.225. 
Performance on sequence questions was above chance for both R, t(27)=12.99, p<0.001, 
d=1.85, and F judgments, t(11)=2.82, p=0.017, d=0.813. This analysis demonstrates that 
context responses were only above chance levels when based on recollection-based 
retrieval, whereas sequence questions can be answered correctly using both recollection 
and familiarity.  
 
Figure 14. Context and sequence accuracy by R and F judgments in Experiment 2.  Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean. * = p<0.05 and ** =p<0.01 compared to chance level 
performance (dotted line, 0.1667). 
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3.3.3.4 Trace Strength. In the trace strength analysis of sequence errors (Figure 15A) it 
was found that proportion of errors for Pos-1 (one sequential position behind the correct 
response) were significantly above chance level, t(27)=5.21, p<0.001, d=0.985. This indicates 
that error judgments followed a forward asymmetry where errors were likely to be made for 
time points that were one step ahead of the correct option in the sequence. 
In the analysis of context errors (Figure 15B) only the proportion of errors for Rank 1, which 
is the average of the most common error made for each context question, was significantly 
higher than chance level, t(27)=2.26, p=0.032, d=0.427. None of the proportions of errors for 
the other ranks were significantly above chance. This suggests that contexts could have 
been retrieved by narrowing down the response options to contexts that were visually similar, 
and subsequently selecting the option generating the greatest sense of familiarity in relation 
to the cue item. 
 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 15. Trace strength serial position curves in Experiment 2.  A) Trace strength for 
sequence questions. 0 indicates the correct responses, while positive and negative values 
indicated temporal positions behind or ahead of the correct response respectively. B) Trace 
strength for context questions. C corresponds to the proportion of correct responses across 
contexts. Rank 1 (R1) corresponds to the average of the most frequent error for each context; 
Rank 2 (R2) is the 2nd most frequent error, etc. Dotted lines indicated chance level performance. 
Error bars represent confidence intervals. 
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3.3.3.5 Confidence Judgments. Assessing confidence ratings, context questions were 
coupled with higher confidence ratings for R, 2.71 (SD=0.282), compared to F judgments, 
2.09 (SD=0.375). A similar pattern, albeit not as pronounced, was seen for sequence 
questions with somewhat higher confidence ratings for R, 2.77 (SD=0.202), compared to F 
judgments 2.29 (SD=0.255). A 2 (recollective experience: R/F) x2 (source: context/sequence) 
ANOVA found a main effect of recollective experience, F(1,5)=15.93, p=0.010, ƞp2=0.761, 
while the effect of source was non-significant, F(1,5)=0.081, p=0.787, ƞp2=0.002. Finally, the 
source by recollective experience interaction was found not to be significant, F(1,5)=0.008, 
p=0.933, ƞp2=0.002. This means that questions justified by R judgments were made with 
significantly higher confidence compared to those justified by F judgments, across both time 
and context. Nevertheless, as with the confidence analysis in Experiment 1, this ANOVA 
was also underpowered and included only 6 of the participants due to missing data. 
3.3.3.6 Serial Position Effects. A 2 (Source: context/time) x6 (Position: sequence 
positions 1 to 6) factorial ANOVA was run to assess any primacy and recency effects (see 
Figure 15 for descriptive statistics). The analysis found a main effect of Source, F(1,19)=10.32, 
p=0.005, ƞp2=0.352, and Position, F(5,95)=7.51, p<0.0005, ƞp2=0.283. The Source by Position 
interaction was not significant, F(5,95)=0.990, p=0.428, ƞp2=0.050. Similar to Experiment 1 this 
shows that accuracy was overall higher for sequence compared to context questions, and 
that accuracy varied across the sequence positions for both source conditions (Figure 16). 
Similar to Experiment 1, repeated measures ANOVAs examining source accuracy across 
the presentation was carried out for each source individually to test for quadratic trends, and 
to assess differences in accuracy between the first and mid-items, and the mid and final 
items using polynomial contrasts. Here, a quadratic trend was found in the Sequence 
condition, F(1,155)=32.78, p<0.001, where there was also a significant difference in the 
contrasts assessing source accuracy between the 1st and 3rd items, t(155)=4.04, p<0.001, 
d=1.12, the 1st and 4th item, t(155)=3.83, p<0.001, d=0.952, 3rd and 6th, t(155)=4.47, p<0.001, 
d=1.10, as well as between the 4th and 6th item in the presentation sequence, t(155)=4.25, 
p<0.001, d=1.31. This demonstrates that memory for temporal information was significantly 
better for items presented in the beginning and the end of the study sequence. No quadratic 
trend was detected in the Context condition, nor were any of the contrast significant. These 
results argue that there could have been a role of primacy and recency in retrieving temporal 
information using familiarity. 
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Figure 16. Source accuracy serial position curve for Experiment 2. Context accuracy across 
presentation sequence positions 1-6 was: 0.608 (SD=0.420), 0.517 (SD=0.351), 0.491 
(SD=0.355), 0.524 (SD=0.344), 0.616 (SD=0.282), and 0.602 (SD=0.358). Sequence accuracy 
across presentation sequence positions 1-6 was: 0.851 (SD=0.215), 0.646 (SD=0.340), 0.522 
(SD=0.358), 0.529 (SD=0.427), 0.780 (SD=0.254), and 0.886 (SD=0.163). Significance indicates 
a difference in the sequence condition. Errors bars represent SEM. * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01 
 
3.3.4 Discussion 
Experiment 2 was carried out to examine whether asking for R and F judgments on the level 
of the source, rather than on the level of the item as in Experiment 1, would result in 
participants evaluating their recollective experience in line with the initial hypothesis that 
accurate context memory would rely on recollection alone while sequence memory could be 
retrieved accurately using both recollection and familiarity.  
The results first demonstrated that item recognition was again near ceiling level, which is not 
surprising seeing as the same number of objects were used in both Experiment 1 and 2. 
Further, there continued to be a significantly greater proportion of R compared to F 
judgments meaning that asking for these judgments at the source level did not increase the 
number of F judgments as expected. The low proportion of F judgments meant that as in 
Experiment 1 there was a large proportion of missing data as many participants only 
reported using recollection across the entire experiment, or that both recollection and 
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familiarity were used to answer context questions but that sequence responses were only 
based on recollection or vice versa. To some extent the low proportion of F judgments here 
is not entirely surprising since, according to the dual-process theory (Yonelinas, 1999), 
correct retrieval of a source through the use of familiarity should be rare which is indeed 
what was found on the current study. 
The source by recollective experience analysis revealed that both time and context were 
remembered equally accurate, and that responses justified by R judgments were 
significantly more accurate than ones justified by F judgments for both time and context. 
Further one-sample t-tests comparing accuracy to chance level performance showed that 
context accuracy was only above chance if these responses were supported by recollection, 
but not familiarity. Conversely, sequence questions could be answered accurately when 
participants reported using both recollection and familiarity. These results are consistent with 
previous work (Easton et al., 2012; Saive et al., 2015), giving support to the hypothesis that 
contextual information requires recollection to be retrieved correctly while accurate retrieval 
of temporal information can be achieved through both recollection and familiarity. This was 
further supported by the findings that errors in temporal judgments tended to cluster around 
the correct response with a degree of forward asymmetry, as only the proportion of 
responses one temporal position ahead of the correct time point was significantly above 
what would have been expected by chance. These results indicate that participants used 
trace strength to place objects in time, a process thought to rely on familiarity (Yonelinas, 
2002). However, the familiarity-based retrieval of time could be accounted for by accuracy 
being higher for items in the beginning and end of the presentation sequence to some extent. 
It was demonstrated that source accuracy was higher for the first and last items for temporal 
questions, meaning that memory for time through the use of familiarity could be explained in 
part through primacy and/or recency in this study. Taken together, the results further 
evidence to the idea that there are instances when temporal information violates the 
assumptions of source memory under the dual-process theory (Easton et al., 2012), which 
states that accurate memory for source information requires the use of recollection 
(Yonelinas, 1994, 1999).  
It was also the case for context questions that the proportion of responses to the most 
commonly made error for each individual context (Rank 1) was significantly above the level 
expected if errors were made at random. These results would indicate that memory for 
context was not all-or-nothing, similar to the trace strength process during memory for time, 
where the visual similarity of different contexts could have guided participants’ responses. 
Nevertheless, the overall accuracy demonstrated that, while participants might have 
attempted to retrieve the correct context in this manner, this did not lead to increased 
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accuracy since correct context memory was only above chance level performance when 
participants reported using a threshold recollection process. 
The forward asymmetry of errors displayed in the trace strength analysis suggests that there 
was some forward telescoping when attempting to place items in the correct temporal 
position. This is similar to what is seen when participants retrieve dates of both personal and 
public events, which tend to be reported as having occurred more recently than what was 
actually the case (Janssen et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 1988). The questions are why 
retrieval through trace strength might give rise to telescoping, and why the distribution of 
errors was only seen in the forward direction? Research on telescoping has suggested that 
this effect can be due to more recent memories being remembered clearer and as a results 
as having taken place closer in time (Brown et al., 1985), or according to the accessibility 
principle the more information that can be remembered about an event, the more recently it 
will be placed in time (Wright et al., 1997). None of these accounts can give a satisfactory 
explanation of the pattern of results in the trace strength analysis, as it was suggested that 
the trace strength effect was based on familiarity-based processing meaning that it is difficult 
to interpret this as forward errors were made since items were remembered more clearly. 
The one account that could give some explanation is that the overall familiarity of items was 
high, indicated by the item recognition performance. This means that temporal estimates 
might have been constricted similar to accounts holding that events that are remembered 
more clearly, i.e. having higher familiarity, will be judged to have occurred more recently 
(Brown et al., 1985; Burt & Kemp, 1991). An additional explanation is that, as the trace 
strength analysis only applied to items from the middle of the presentation sequence for 
which source information was less memorable. For these less memorable items it is possible 
that duration estimates using trace strength led to an underestimation in the time that had 
passed since the item was encountered, which has been demonstrated in previous work 
(Eisler, 1976; Ferguson & Martin, 1983).  
The results from Experiment 2 supported the hypothesis that temporal, but not contextual, 
information can be retrieved through the use of familiarity, while both time and context rely 
on recollection. However, as in Experiment 1, this study suffered from a low proportion of F 
judgments making comparisons across source questions difficult and leaving some analyses 
underpowered. This meant that many of the analyses were based on a significantly larger 
number of R compared to F judgments. In order to try and further increase the number of F 
judgments to allow for a more reliable analysis of contextual and temporal retrieval accuracy, 
a third experiment was run where the number of objects to-be-remembered were increased 
in each study trial in an attempt to make the task more difficult which in turn might increase 
the proportion of F judgments. 
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3.4 Experiment 3 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Experiment 3 was carried out in an attempt to further increase the proportion of Familiar 
judgments in relation to Remember judgments. The number of objects to-be-remembered in 
each context and temporal position was increased in order to increase the cognitive load 
during the study phase, which in turn was predicted to increase the use of familiarity during 
the test phase. 
3.4.2 Materials and Methods 
3.4.2.1 Virtual Environment and Stimuli. The virtual environment was altered to 
replace the barrier behind which the stimuli was located in Experiment 1 and 2, to create 
three individual stalls along the far wall of the Main Room in which the stimuli could be found 
(Figure 17). Items were drawn from the same pool of stimuli as in Experiment 1 and 2, with 
144 items randomly selected for each participant. 108 of these items were presented during 
the study phase, and the other 36 were used as lures in the test phase. 
 
A 
 
B 
  
Figure 17. Layout of environment in Experiment 3. A) Overview of the Virtual Environment in 
Experiment 3 when objects were presented in three individual stalls in each study trial. B) 
Example images depicting the stalls in which objects were located during each study trial. 
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3.4.2.2 Participants. 29 participants (20 female) with an average age of 22.7 were 
recruited. 5 participants stopped the study early due to technical errors. This left 24 
participants (16 female) with an average age of 23.0 years whose data were analysed. 
Ethical approval for the study was obtained through an amendment for the ethical 
application from Experiment 1 and 2 (Appendix B) due to an increase in study length, from 
the University of St Andrews’ University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (see 
Appendix C for letter of ethical approval). All participants gave informed consent prior to 
taking part in the study. Participants were compensated at a rate of £5/hour for taking part in 
the study. 
3.4.2.3 Procedure. The Study Phase in Experiment 3 followed the same structure as in 
Experiment 1 and 2, with the exception in each trial participants encountered 3, rather than 1, 
items. Across 6 study-test blocks of 6 trials this gave a total 108 to-be-remembered objects 
over the entire study.  
In each new trial different objects were placed in each of the 3 individual stalls with a barrier 
in front of each one, obscuring the view of the objects as participants entered the room. 
Participants were instructed to approach to one stall at a time, upon reaching a stall the 
barrier would disappear and the object would be visible for five seconds before disappearing 
(Figure 17B). The reason for limiting the time each item could be seen was in an attempt to 
further increase the number of F judgments given by reducing the time participants could 
spend forming an association between each item and the temporal and contextual sources 
and thereby minimising R responses. 
Test Phases consisted of 12 self-paced trials, where only 1 of the 3 to-be-remembered items 
from each study trial was presented, meaning that participants would have had to encode 
each item-source association across trials in order to answer the questions accurately. Aside 
from this the Test Phase was identical to that in Experiment 2 (Figure 13). There were 6 
study-test blocks resulting in a total of 36 target trials (18 context and 18 sequence trials) 
and 36 new lure trials over the entire experiment. 
3.4.2.4 Data Analysis. As in the previous two experiments, a linear mixed model was 
used to analyse the source accuracy data due to missing values. This was, again, justified 
by significant higher confidence judgments for participants not using familiarity compared to 
those who reported using familiarity, t(46)=3.53, p=0.001, d=1.30. The model evaluation found 
that the AR1 covariance structure provided the best fit with a lower AICC value compared to 
both a compound symmetry and unstructured variance structure (Table 5). 
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Table 5. Comparison of covariance structures assessed for the linear mixed model in 
Experiment 3. Lower AICC value indicates a better fit of the model. 
Covariance structure AICC 
First-order autoregressive (AR1) 33.79 
Compound symmetry 37.65 
Unstructured 41.70 
 
3.4.3 Results 
3.4.3.1 Object Recognition. Object discrimination remained relatively high despite the 
increase in objects to-be-remembered, with hits at 0.852 (SD=0.188), and correct rejections 
at 0.916 (SD=0.180). The d′ was 2.85 (SD=1.28) and the decision criterion was 0.223 
(SD=0.310) which was significantly higher than 0, t(23)=3.53, p=0.002, d=0.721, indicating a 
conservative bias where participants were less inclined to respond “old” compared to “new”. 
3.4.3.2 Proportion of R-F-G Judgments. Similar to Experiment 2, proportions of R-F-G 
judgments for source hits were roughly equal for context questions, with R judgments being 
given 0.891 (SD=0.177) of the time and F, 0.109 (SD=0.167), and sequence questions, 
where R judgments had a rate of 0.844 (SD=0.157) and F at 0.156 (SD=0.157). No G 
judgments were given for either context or sequence questions in Experiment 3, meaning 
that the proportions of R and F judgments were not independent and that an ANOVA could 
not be carried out to compare these proportions. Instead a paired sample t-test was carried 
out to compare the proportion of R responses between context and sequence questions, 
which was non-significant, t(22)=1.49, p=0.151, d=0.281. This shows that the proportions of R 
judgments given to context and sequence questions were not different, and in extension 
demonstrating that the proportions of F judgments for context and sequence were not 
significantly different. 
3.4.3.3 Source Memory by Recollective Experience. Source accuracy when followed 
by R judgments was equally high for context, 0.470 (SD=0.288), and sequence questions, 
0.535 (SD=0.207). When justified by F judgments, source accuracy was lower for context, 
0.247 (SD=0.339), and sequence questions, although to a lesser extent, 0.384 (SD=0.317) 
compared to questions justified by R judgments (Figure 18). 
Results from the LMM found that both recollective experience, F(1,83.72)=9.26, p=0.003, and 
source, F(1,50.32)=4.15, p=0.047, where significant predictors of source memory accuracy. 
Assessing the individual parameters of the LMM it was shown that there was no significant 
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effect of recollective experience, β=-0.150, SE=0.082, p=0.069, d=0.376, nor was there an 
effect of source, β=-0.065, SE=0.069, p=0.354, d=0.190. Finally, the source by recollective 
experience interaction, β=-0.077, SE=0.110, p=0.488, d=0.142, was non-significant. These 
results illustrate that source accuracy did not differ between R and F judgments across 
context and sequence questions, and that accuracy was not significantly different between 
context and sequence questions. 
As in previous experiments, accurate source retrieval across R and F judgments was 
examined using one sample t-tests (Figure 18).  Here it was demonstrated that accuracy for 
context was above chance level when justified by R, t(23)=5.16, p<0.001, d=1.05, but not for F, 
t(17)=1.01, p=0.327, d=0.238. Performance on sequence questions, was above chance when 
justified by both R, t(23)=8.70, p<0.001, d=1.77, and F judgments, t(19)=3.07, p=0.006, 
d=0.686. This mirrors the results found in Experiment 2, and further demonstrates that 
context questions could only be answered accurately using recollection, but not familiarity. 
Conversely, both recollection and familiarity contributed to the accurate retrieval of source 
information. 
 
Figure 18. Context and sequence accuracy by R and F judgments in Experiment 3.  Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean. ** = p<0.01 and *** = p<0.001 compared to chance 
level performance (dotted line, 0.1667). 
 
 
118 
 
3.4.3.4 Trace Strength. The trace strength analysis found that the proportion of errors 
were above chance for both Pos1, t(23)=2.62, p=0.015, d=0.535,  and neg1, t(23)=3.35, 
p=0.003, d=0.684. Here errors cluster symmetrically around the correct temporal position, 
which could argue for the retrieval of temporal information through the use of trace strength 
(Figure 19A). This function could narrow the correct temporal accuracy down to a scale of +1 
to -1 position and give a general estimate of when in the sequence an item was encountered, 
in line with trace strength spanning the most temporal proximal positions. 
For context errors, similar to the previous experiments only the proportion of errors for Rank 
1 was significantly higher than chance level, t(23)=2.34, p=0.028, d=0.478. Similar to 
sequence errors, the proportions of context errors were not randomly distributed across all 
response options as would be expected if errors would be based on guesses (Figure 19B). 
 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 19. Trace strength serial position curves in Experiment 3. A) Trace strength for 
sequence questions. 0 indicates the correct responses, while positive and negative values 
indicated temporal positions behind or ahead of the correct response respectively. B) Trace 
strength for context questions. C corresponds to the proportion of correct responses across 
contexts. Rank 1 (R1) corresponds to the average of the most frequent error for each context; 
Rank 2 (R2) is the 2nd most frequent error, etc. Dotted lines indicated chance level performance. 
Error bars represent confidence intervals. 
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3.4.3.5 Confidence Judgments. Confidence ratings for context questions were higher 
when these were coupled with R judgments 2.66 (SD=0.465), compared to when F 
judgments were given 1.77  (SD=0.366). The same pattern was found for sequence 
questions where, again, confidence ratings were higher for questions coupled with R 
judgments 2.56 (SD=0.403), compared to F judgments 1.82 (SD=0.299). A 2 (recollective 
experience: R/F) x2 (source: context/sequence) ANOVA was run, revealing a main effect of 
recollective experience, F(1,5)=72.77, p<0.001, ƞp2=0.936, but not for source, F(1,5)=4.60, 
p=0.085, ƞp2=0.479, nor the source by recollective experience interaction, F(1,5)=2.46, 
p=0.177, ƞp2=0.330. As in Experiment 2 this demonstrates that questions justified by R 
judgments were overall more confident than F judgments across both context and sequence 
questions.  
 
3.4.3.6 Serial Position Effects. As in previous experiments, a 2 (Source: context/time) 
x6 (Position: sequence positions 1 to 6) factorial ANOVA was run to examine any primacy 
and recency effects during memory for time and context (see Figure 20 for descriptive 
statistics). Neither a main effect of Source, F(1,16)=1.15, p=0.300, ƞp2=0.067, nor for Position, 
F(5,80)=0.989, p=0.430, ƞp2=0.058, was found. The Source by Position interaction was also 
non-significant, F(5,80)=1.35, p=0.252, ƞp2=0.078, demonstrating that temporal retrieval using 
familiarity was not based on memory for items toward the beginning or end of the 
presentation sequence (Figure 20). Testing for any quadratic trends using one way repeated 
measures ANOVAs, as in previous experiments, no trends were found in either the Context, 
F(1, 96)=3.19, p=0.077,or Sequence, F(1, 129)=1.22, p=0.271, conditions. The polynomial 
contrasts did, however, reveal a significant difference between the 1st and 4th sequence 
position in the Context condition, t(96)=1.86, p=0.033, d=0.455, while all other contrast across 
sources were non-significant indicating that neither primacy nor recency had much influence 
on the results. The absence of any primacy and recency effects for both the temporal and 
contextual questions further demonstrates that increasing the number of objects removed 
the primacy and recency effects seen in Experiment 1 and 2, which is expected based on 
earlier work showing that these effects tend to disappear as list length is increased (Murdock, 
1962). 
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Figure 20. Source accuracy serial position curve for Experiment 3. Context accuracy across 
presentation sequence positions 1-6 was: 0.529 (SD=0.408), 0.299 (SD=0.339), 0.401 
(SD=0.321), 0.360 (SD=0.331), 0.515 (SD=0.401), and 0.417 (SD=0.473). Sequence accuracy 
across presentation sequence positions 1-6 was: 0.496 (SD=0.370), 0.463 (SD=0.353), 0.511 
(SD=0.397), 0.397 (SD=0.338), 0.397 (SD=0.295), and 0.548 (SD=0.324). Error bars represent 
SEM. 
3.4.4 Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 3 was to increase the number of Familiar judgments given to source 
questions to examine whether the same effect as in Experiment 2 would be obtained with 
greater statistical power, which would give further support to the hypothesis that time can be 
retrieved through both recollection and familiarity while context memory relies on recollection 
alone. This was done by increasing the number of objects to-be-remembered in each study 
trial from one to three objects to increase the cognitive load during encoding. Apart from this 
manipulation, Experiment 3 followed the exact same structure as Experiment 2. Item 
recognition remained relatively high in this experiment despite there being three times as 
many objects to encode in each study phase compared to Experiment 1 and 2 (18 compared 
to 6 objects). The criterion, indicating whether item recognition had a conservative or a 
liberal bias, differed across experiments. In both the current Experiment 3 and Experiment 1 
there was a conservative bias, indicating that participants were less likely to respond that 
objects were “old”. This might have been due to objects being quite distinct and memorable 
in these experiments, indicated by high item recognition performance across all experiments 
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even in Experiment 3 that had more objects to-be-remembered. This, in turn, could have led 
participants to set a higher decision threshold for accepting items as old, further motivated 
by the knowledge that there were only going to be a limited amount of ‘old’ objects at test, 
meaning that “old” responses had to be reserved for well recognised items. However, this 
conservative bias was not seen in Experiment 2 where participants’ old/new responses were 
statistically unbiased, i.e. they were neither more likely to respond “old” nor  “new”. It is not 
clear why there was no bias in Experiment 2 seeing as there was the same amount of 
objects to-be-remembered as in Experiment 1, the test phase followed the same structure as 
in Experiment 3, and the same objects were used across all experiments. Additionally, this 
could not be explained by better item recognition performance in Experiment 2, as both hit 
and correct rejection rates were higher in Experiment 1.  
Unfortunately the manipulation to increase the number of objects did not serve to increase 
the proportion of F judgments given, which were significantly lower than the number of R 
judgments, nor were the proportion of F judgments higher relative to Experiment 2. As in the 
previous two experiments, due to missing data a LMM was used to analyse the main results. 
When evaluating the fit of the covariance structures to the data from Experiment 3, it was 
found that all AICC values were higher compared to previous experiments. This was most 
likely due to the data having an overall poorer fit to this data-set relative to the previous 
studies, which would give a lower log-likelihood value as outlined in Section 3.2.2.4 and in 
turn give higher AICC values. The main results of the LMM comparing source accuracy 
across R and F judgments mirrored those found in Experiment 2, with the only difference 
that accuracy was overall somewhat lower in the current study. This means that it was again 
demonstrated that accuracy for context questions was only above chance level performance 
when an R, but not an F, judgment justified responses (Easton et al., 2012; Saive et al., 
2015). This was not the case for sequence questions where accuracy was above chance 
level performance when participants gave both R and F judgments, meaning that temporal 
information could be remembered using both recollection and familiarity while accurate 
retrieval of contexts relied solely on recollection. Similar to Experiment 2, there was some 
involvement of trace strength in memory for temporal information as errors for sequence 
questions clustered symmetrically around the correct time point, with the proportion of errors 
for both the time points ahead of and behind the correct option being significantly above the 
expected level had errors been randomly distributed. This gives further support to the 
hypothesis that time is not only remembered through an all-or-nothing threshold process, but 
can also be represented in a graded manner where familiarity can contribute to accurate 
retrieval through evaluation of the strength of an item’s memory trace (Yonelinas, 2002). 
Similar to Experiment 2, the familiarity-based retrieval of time could not be explained through 
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a primacy or recency effect. However, in the current experiment this was due to the serial 
position analysis finding that source memory was equally accurate across serial positions. It 
has previously been shown that effects of primacy tend to be reduced when the study list 
length is increased (Murdock, 1962), suggesting that the absence of a serial position effect 
in this experiment could be due to having multiple items being associated with each temporal 
position, reducing the benefit of primacy and recency since it was no longer just one item 
that had been encountered in the first and last trials but three items.  
A question that emerges from these analyses is that if familiarity did contribute to retrieval of 
both time and context through the use of trace strength and some feature overlap between 
contexts, then why was familiarity-based retrieval only accurate for time? Using trace 
strength to narrow down the temporal position in which an item was encountered could be 
used to make an accurate response as time falls on a continuum across which items can be 
traced. For example, participants might remember that the item was encountered towards 
the beginning of the sequence but it was not the first, as the first and last items in a 
sequence tend to be more memorable (Bjork & Whitten, 1974; Lewandowsky & Murdock, 
1989; Murdock, 1962), and not one of the middle objects. A reasonable assumption would 
then be that the item was presented in the 2nd time point, a decision that could be made 
based on tracing the item across the sequence to the correct position. For context questions, 
however, this might not have been possible to the same extent. While in cases when 
complete contexts could not be reinstated it is possible that participants retrieved some 
feature of the associated context, such as knowing that an item was encountered in a dark 
context but not being able to remember if it was snow or thunder. This could have lead to 
errors being made for contexts sharing some feature overlaps as participants tried to use the 
partial context information to guide retrieval without being able to retrieve the crucial 
information setting contexts apart, thus explaining the non-random distribution of errors.  
 !
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3.5 General Discussion 
Across three experiments memory for time and context and their associated retrieval 
processes were assessed. Based on previous studies examining the underlying retrieval 
processes of source memory (Easton et al., 2012; Saive et al., 2015) and the theoretical 
account of recollection and familiarity in the dual-process model of source memory, it was 
hypothesised that recollection would be necessary for correct context memory, while 
accurate sequence memory would be supported by either recollection or familiarity. The 
outcomes of the three experiments differed, with two out of the three studies supporting the 
hypothesis stated above. 
All three experiments found that time and context could be remembered equally accurate, 
and that memory for both sources involves the use of a recollective retrieval process. This 
argues that both temporal and contextual information can serve as accurate sources for use 
in separating events in memory. However, across all three experiments it was also found 
that temporal information could be remembered accurately using familiarity as well as 
recollection. The results across all three experiments reported here adds further evidence to 
the theory that contextual information is served by a discrete threshold function, as 
suggested by the dual-process theory, in which context information is either remembered 
correctly or not at all. This further demonstrates that contextual information provides a 
reliable cue that can be used to accurately recollect source information used to identify 
individual experiences, which is in accordance with previous work (Easton et al., 2012; Saive 
et al., 2015). With familiarity being argued not to support memory for episodic source 
information (Yonelinas, 1999), which is held as the main type of identifier for past 
experiences in memory (Johnson et al., 1993; Underwood, 1969), the results across 
experiments puts the use of time in separating past events in memory in to question. This 
does not mean that time cannot be used to identify individual experiences in memory, as it 
can be retrieved using recollection. It does, however, highlight that there are instances in 
which the retrieval of temporal information violates the assumptions of source memory under 
the dual process theory, where memory for a source is argued to rely on recollection alone 
(Yonelinas, 1999). The results further do not suggest a lesser reliance on recollection during 
retrieval of time compared to context. Instead, source questions that would have been given 
the incorrect context response through the use of familiarity were instead given correct 
temporal responses. The data across experiments illustrate that participants were equally 
accurate in retrieving time and context using recollection; meaning that the familiarity based 
temporal responses did not detract from the use of recollection. One consequence of this is 
that while time does not always conform to the definition of a source that can be accounted 
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for under the dual-process theory temporal information could still be argued to be useful as a 
mean of separating events in memory on an everyday basis, as it can be retrieved through 
more than one retrieval process albeit through weaker memory strength. One downside of 
this is that reliance on weaker memory strength makes memory judgments more susceptible 
to errors (Wixted & Squire, 2011).  
Familiarity-based memory for time could be interpreted through the stimulus unitization effect, 
whereby associative information can be retrieved through familiarity if it is encoded as a 
single coherent representation (Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2008; Parks & Yonelinas, 
2015). Under standard encoding conditions item and source information are assumed to 
form extrinsic associations where each component of the association exists independently of 
the other. When stimuli are unitized, however, the source is encoded as a feature of the item 
to form one combined representation (Diana et al., 2008; Parks & Yonelinas, 2015). As an 
example of what is meant by extrinsic associations in contrast to unitized stimuli I have a 
particular mug that is associated with being used across a number of sources. This mug 
exists independently of these sources as I have brought it with me across several locations, 
used it in different contexts and at different points in time, meaning that it has several 
extrinsic associations. As it happens, this mug also has a print of the School of Psychology 
and Neuroscience in St Andrews on it, meaning that this source is also represented as a 
feature of the object, thus the object and source are unitized. This unitization effect has been 
illustrated experimentally by presenting words on coloured backgrounds, for example the 
word ‘Elephant’ on a green background, and either instructing participants to encode these 
as a single unitized representation, i.e. a green elephant, or as an association between two 
separate components, an elephant on a green background. When remembering the object 
and its associated colour it was found that unitized stimuli could be retrieved using familiarity, 
while non-unitized associations could not and instead required recollection to be 
remembered accurately (Diana et al., 2008). This illustrates that as an item and source are 
encoded as a single representation with the source being another feature of the item, this 
association can be retrieved through the use of familiarity (Diana, Van den Boom, Yonelinas, 
& Ranganath, 2011; Diana et al., 2008; Parks & Yonelinas, 2015). This further demonstrates 
that for other, non-unitized, events sources are encoded as extrinsic units, separable from 
the items, requiring an association to be formed between the item and the source. Memory 
for these extrinsic item-source associations require the use of recollection to be accurate 
(Diana, Van den Boom, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2011; Diana et al., 2008; Parks & 
Yonelinas, 2015; Yonelinas, 1999). In the current study the temporal information could have 
been unitized with the item during encoding, represented similarly to the item’s colour or 
shape, and as such allowed for the use of familiarity during retrieval. Context information 
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could instead have been encoded through a standard associative process, where weather 
conditions were encoded as a separate unit to the object. Considering how the two sources 
were presented during study phases, this might be a reasonable assumption. The temporal 
information was a somewhat abstract concept presented to participants without explicit 
visual features and could preferentially have been encoded as part of the object, as the 
temporal value (i.e. the time point in the sequence) was tied to the object identity. Contextual 
information, on the other hand, had clear visual features and could have been seen to exist 
independently of the object. 
Familiarity has been suggested to influence associative memory to some degree through the 
use of trace strength, allowing items to be place in time (Yonelinas, 2002). It is unlikely that 
the task from the current experiments could have been solved solely by the use of trace 
strength since participants gave specific temporal judgments (i.e. the exact temporal position 
an item was presented) rather than a relative judgment where one item were to be placed 
relative to another in the sequence and time can be inferred from the relative familiarity 
elicited by each object (i.e. was object A presented before or after object B?). Nevertheless, 
accurate judgments could have been aided by trace strength by distinguishing the correct 
option from more distant sequential positions and in that way narrowed down the window of 
plausible responses. For example, the trace strength could have place an item at the 
beginning of the presentation sequence, meaning that nearly half of the potential temporal 
responses could be eliminated based in this information. Some evidence supporting this was 
found in the trace strength analysis across all three experiments where it was shown that 
errors in temporal and judgments tended to cluster around the correct response, and that the 
proportions of such error judgments were significantly greater than expected by chance. This 
was also the case for context questions in Experiment 2 and 3 where the proportion of errors 
for the most common incorrect response being significantly above what would have been 
expected had errors been made at random. These results suggests that in cases with 
weaker item-source associations when participants were not able to rely on recollection to 
retrieve the correct source response they had to rely on either trace strength or individual 
features of contexts to make a rough estimate as to when and in which context an item was 
encountered. 
Another important aspect is that there are many ways in which time can be thought of and 
defined in relation to memory (Crystal, 2010; Friedman, 1993). In the present study we have 
used place in a sequence to define time of an event but other studies have utilised 
measures of time, such as how long ago (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Roberts et al., 2008) or 
what time of day an event took place (Zhou & Crystal, 2009). While it is clear that place in a 
sequence can be remembered using familiarity it could be that these other measures of time 
 
 
126 
 
might require recollection for accurate retrieval. For example it could be that the type of 
absolute time used across the current studies encouraged the use of stimulus unitization 
during encoding as participants only had to remember each individual item’s temporal 
position but not the relation between items in the sequence itself. Instead, if participants had 
placed the items in order they were encountered during the study phase they would be more 
likely to draw on their memory for larger segments of the sequence and the relationship 
between individual items to solve the question. The use of this abstract absolute measure of 
time together with distinct visual context could have biased responses in favour of F 
judgment for time and R judgments for context, as weather conditions were explicitly 
displayed as external features to the objects. An additional idea would be to alter the type of 
context used to something less visually distinct, such as defining the context based on a 
scenario in which each item could be used or encountered. This could for example be 
achieved by providing participants with a situation in which a hammer or a book was being 
used, such as ‘building a house’ or ‘completing your homework’. In this way, the context 
would be tied to the object identity in a similar way to the temporal information in the current 
experiments, which could potentially allow for the use of familiarity during retrieval. 
An issue encountered across all three experiments was the significantly lower proportion of 
F compared to R judgments. Despite attempts in both Experiment 2 and 3 to increase the 
number of F judgments this had little to no effect. The low proportion of F judgments led to 
there being a large proportion of missing data in all three experiments as participants 
reported no or few F judgments in some but not all conditions. Nevertheless, this should 
perhaps have been expected as the dual-process theory holds that source retrieval is served 
by recollection and not familiarity, so asking for judgments of recollective experience at the 
source level may in and of itself have biased participants to give significantly larger 
proportion of R compared to F judgments. 
An interesting note for future consideration would be to examine dependencies between 
retrieval of different sources. It is possible that correct retrieval of one type of source through 
recollection would automatically reinstate the full episode in memory, as demonstrated by 
Horner and colleagues (Horner et al., 2015; Horner & Burgess, 2013, 2014). In these studies 
participants learned to form associations between a number of individual features to form a 
coherent representation. During test it was found that retrieval of the association between 
two out of the three features increased the probability that the third feature would also be 
retrieved, and that this third feature exhibited neural reinstatement even when not explicitly 
asked for. This means that if one element from an experience is remembered, we should be 
more likely to remember additional elements, alternatively the entire episode. 
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The results from Experiment 2 and 3 indicate that contextual information is not inferred via 
memory for time. As correct sequence positions could be remembered accurately using 
familiarity, it would be expected that correct contextual memory would also be supported by 
familiarity, if this was based on memory for temporal information. This was not the case as 
contextual source information could only be remembered accurately using recollection. This 
still leaves the possibility for temporal information being inferred via the context of an event. 
For example, if a participant can remember the context an item was encountered in, there 
might be an increased probability that the associated time point is also remembered. 
Unfortunately it was not possible to test this in the current experiments as each item was 
only featured once in the study phase when participants either retrieved its associated time 
or context, but not both. Examining any potential dependencies between time and context 
could give an indication of whether people tend to infer temporal information from the 
contextual source, indicating whether time is simply tacked on to context information.  
In summary, across three experiments this chapter has demonstrated that memory for time 
and context is accurate. However, some discrepancies were revealed when the retrieval 
processes used during memory for time and context were assessed. Experiment 1 found 
that accurate memory for both time and context could be supported by recollection and 
familiarity, contrary to the dual-process theory arguing that source memory should engage 
recollection but not familiarity. One possible explanation is that participants might have given 
R and F judgments to the items alone, rather than the study episode as a whole, and a 
further two experiments were carried out during which judgments of recollective experience 
were explicitly asked for when participants had answered the source question. Both of these 
experiments, Experiment 2 and 3, showed that accurate retrieval of temporal and contextual 
information involves the use of recollection, whereas the former can be remembered 
correctly using familiarity as well. The use of familiarity to accurately retrieve sequential 
information might pose a problem for theories of temporal memory where time is seen as an 
independent source and an entirely separate component to item and space (Eichenbaum & 
Fortin, 2003; Kraus et al., 2013). The current findings instead suggest that in some 
circumstances, time might not be encoded separately from the object or event, but rather as 
another feature under stimulus unitization (Diana et al., 2008; Parks & Yonelinas, 2015). 
The results in these final two experiments support the hypothesis that memory for temporal 
and contextual source information are treated differently on a cognitive level. To further 
assess the extent to which time and context differ, and whether these sources should be 
treated separately rather than as interchangeable dimensions in memory, it would be of 
interest to examine how these types of information are treated on a neural level. Should 
temporal and contextual information be processed differently in the brain this could inform 
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whether time and context either have complimentary roles in separating events in memory, 
where one source informs the other, or whether they function independently, and further 
whether memory for time and context are differentially represented by regions linked to 
recollection and familiarity. 
The next chapter will, as a result, focus on the neural underpinnings of memory for temporal 
and contextual source information using functional MRI. A similar methodology as possible 
to the experiments reported here will be used, in an attempt to capture the same processes 
at play during retrieval of time and context as participants undergo fMRI scans. One of the 
main aspects when examining the neural activity underlying memory for time and context will 
be to look at activity in regions previously associated with recollection and familiarity. Should 
neural activity in such regions reflect the results from the experiments in this chapter, i.e. that 
memory for time elicits greater activity across familiarity related regions compared to context 
memory, this would add further evidence to illustrate the conceptual differences between 
time and context under source memory. Additionally this methodology can give further 
insight in to the general network underlying retrieval of both temporal and contextual source 
information. !
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Chapter 4 
An fMRI Investigation of the Neural 
Substrates Supporting Memory for 
Time and Context  
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4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3 it was demonstrated that the memory for temporal and contextual information 
relies on different retrieval processes in that time can be remembered accurately using both 
recollection and familiarity, while memory for context was only accurate using recollection 
but not familiarity. To further our understanding of the underlying processes involved in event 
separation, a functional MRI (fMRI) study was carried out to examine the neural substrates 
supporting memory for time and context. Contrasting neural activity during retrieval of these 
sources allow us to examine whether they are supported by overlapping or distinct networks, 
which gives an opportunity to identify brain regions that uniquely contribute to memory for 
time and context, giving additional insight in to what type of processing underlie memory for 
these two sources.   
Recollection and familiarity are generally found to be supported by different sets of brain 
regions (Duarte, Ranganath, Winward, Hayward, & Knight, 2004; Ranganath et al., 2004; 
Vilberg & Rugg, 2007; Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005). There are several regions in 
the brain that have been associated with the process of recollection. While there is some 
variation in the regions showing enhanced activity for recollection across studies, there is a 
set of regions in which recollection-related activity appears to be consistent. Referred to as 
the core recollection network, this network consist of the angular gyrus, posterior cingulate, 
medial frontal gyrus, left lateral posterior parietal cortex, left parahippocampal gyrus, 
retrosplenial cortex, and the medial prefrontal cortex (Duarte, Henson, & Graham, 2011; 
Johnson & Rugg, 2007; Rugg & Vilberg, 2013). The core recollection network is suggested 
to be material independent, in that the regions exhibit increased activity when people report 
the use of recollection to remember words, objects, and scenes (Duarte et al., 2011; Rugg & 
Vilberg, 2013). As such, the set of regions engaged during recollection do not seem to make 
a difference between the retrieval of different types of item and source information, and 
should become active as long as memory strength reaches the recollection threshold as 
posited by Yonelinas’ dual-process theory (Yonelinas, 1994, 1999) independent of the type 
of information being remembered. According to the same dual-process model, only 
recollection-related regions should be able to support memory for source information, such 
as the temporal and contextual information used in Chapter 3 and further in the current study, 
as familiarity should not in theory be able to support accurate source memory. This has been 
demonstrated by findings that temporal retrieval engages the angular gyrus (Cabeza et al., 
1997), as does the recollection of scenes (Duarte et al., 2011). Memory for contextual 
information is further strongly associated with activity in the parahippocampal cortex (Bar & 
Aminoff, 2003; Bar et al., 2008; Staresina et al., 2012), while also showing some sensitivity 
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for temporal information (Lehn et al., 2009; Tubridy & Davachi, 2011b). In addition, memory 
for time is linked to medial prefrontal cortex activation (Ekstrom, Copara, Isham, Wang, & 
Yonelinas, 2011; Jenkins & Ranganath, 2016). This illustrates that regions within the 
suggested core recollection network do show increased activity when temporal and 
contextual source information is retrieved. 
Similarly there are several regions across the brain found to become active in relation to 
familiarity-based judgments. These include regions across the parietal (Vilberg & Rugg, 
2007, 2008), medial temporal (Ranganath et al., 2004), and occipital lobe, as well as both 
frontal and prefrontal regions (Yonelinas et al., 2005). Activity in regions associated with 
familiarity should not be sufficient to bring about the memory for previously encoded contexts 
and sequences, as this process does not support memory for source information (Yonelinas, 
1999).  Here regions such as the perirhinal cortex show increased activity in relation to 
retrieval of simple non-associative information, such as items or words, but not source 
information (Davachi et al., 2003; Diana et al., 2010). By examining activity in regions 
associated with recollection and familiarity it is possible to assess whether the behavioural 
results found in Chapter 3 would generalise to a neural level and to further test whether 
temporal information is supported by activity in networks of regions previously shown to 
support recollection and familiarity, while contextual memory relies solely on regions linked 
to recollection.  
Regions linked to recollection- and familiarity-based retrieval might not be content specific, 
though there are brain regions that contribute uniquely to the memory for time and context. 
The next question is whether they are supported by overlapping or distinct networks, which 
can tell us whether memory for time and context are supported by overlapping brain regions, 
or whether these sources are retrieved through contributions from unique regions. The 
neural underpinnings of time and context have been studied in the past, albeit separately 
with few studies directly contrasting them. Within the medial temporal lobe it has been 
argued that contextual information is processed in the parahippocampal cortex, before being 
relayed through the MEC through to the hippocampus (Howard Eichenbaum, Sauvage, 
Fortin, Komorowski, & Lipton, 2012; Ranganath, 2010; see Section 1.3.2 and Section 2.1 for 
detailed discussion). One region outside the MTL linked to context processing is the fusiform 
gyrus, where activity has been found to increase during both the encoding and retrieval of 
contextual information (Duarte et al., 2011; Hayes et al., 2007; Wong, de Chastelaine, & 
Rugg, 2013), indicating that the fusiform gyrus is sensitive to contextual features of events, 
which has been discussed further in Section 1.4.5.  
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The hippocampus has been demonstrated to hold a central position in temporal processing, 
where hippocampal activity has been shown to increase when information presented across 
a temporal gap has to be bound to one representation (Staresina & Davachi, 2009), greater 
levels of activation has also been linked to better performance during sequence retrieval 
(Lehn et al., 2009), and a similar gradual change in the pattern of activity as predicted by the 
temporal context model has been observed in the human hippocampus (Hsieh et al., 2014). 
Outside of the MTL, several studies point to temporal information being processed in regions 
across the frontal lobes, including the medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (Barker, 
Bird, Alexander, & Warburton, 2007; Cabeza et al., 1997; Hannesson, Howland, & Phillips, 
2004; Jenkins & Ranganath, 2016; Jenkins & Ranganath, 2010). This has been 
demonstrated both through patients with frontal lobe damage showing impaired temporal 
processing (Mcandrews & Milner, 1991; Milner et al., 1991; Shimamura et al., 1990) and 
increased frontal lobe activity in healthy participants using fMRI (Cabeza et al., 1997; 
Jenkins & Ranganath, 2016). The neural substrates supporting memory for time has been 
discussed in more detail in Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3. 
Few studies have compared neural activity between time and context directly. A number of 
studies that have contrasted activity during retrieval of these sources have used the 
“yellowcab” game, which is a task where participants are given the task to navigate around a 
virtual environment and deliver items to different locations during a study phase (Ekstrom & 
Bookheimer, 2007; Ekstrom et al., 2011; Kyle, Smuda, Hassan, & Ekstrom, 2014). At test, 
participants first indicate whether a given location was seen in the study phase or not. If a 
location had been encountered previously participants are subsequently given two additional 
locations and report which one was closer to the first location either in time or in space. This 
paradigm has revealed greater activity in both the left (Ekstrom & Bookheimer, 2007) and 
right (Ekstrom et al., 2011) hippocampus during retrieval of spatial context compared to time. 
Similar patterns of activity have been found in the parahippocampal cortex, where spatial 
discrimination have resulted in greater activation compared to temporal discrimination 
(Ekstrom et al., 2011), which is line with studies arguing that contextual information is 
processed in the PHC (Aminoff et al., 2007; Bar et al., 2008; Staresina et al., 2012). 
Additional regions outside of the medial temporal lobe found to be active during context 
memory include anterior and posterior cingulate, the precuneus, and the medial frontal gyrus, 
meaning that memory for context does not only invoke activity within the MTL. Temporal 
memory, on the other hand, has only resulted in greater activity in the inferior frontal gyrus 
compared to context (Ekstrom et al., 2011), again highlighting the role of the frontal lobe in 
temporal processing. These studies demonstrate that memory for time and context can be 
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attributed to separate sets of brain regions and that they are not served by identical 
processes. 
An issue with the studies employing the “yellowcab” paradigm is that it uses relative 
measures of both time and spatial context at test, i.e. participants do not have to know 
exactly when or where something was encountered but rather which of two options that was 
closer in either time or space relative to the cue location. This type of relative memory can 
be argued to be a less accurate measure as it does not require retrieval of the absolute time 
or space something was encountered, only which of the two response options being more 
strongly associated with the cue. As such this relative memory to a greater extent assesses 
the strength of the association between the locations in the presentation sequence rather 
than an explicit memory for the time or context of an event. This paradigm further defines 
context as being spatial, meaning that the contextual information is tied to the place of each 
occasion. Discrimination of events could then be based on the location within an 
environment, rather than the general contextual information. For example, one could 
remember meeting a friend in a particular location without remembering the context of that 
event, such as why you were meeting, what you were talking about, or even the time of day 
or year it happened. As context is not always spatial in nature, e.g. we are capable of 
distinguishing experiences taking part in the same location, it is important to examine non-
spatial definitions of contexts as well.  
The aim of the current study is to extend to results from Chapter 3, as well as building on the 
studies by Ekstrom and colleagues (Ekstrom & Bookheimer, 2007; Ekstrom et al., 2011), to 
further examine the neural substrates supporting memory for time and context using fMRI. 
Here, we adapted the methodology from Chapter 3 to make it fMRI compatible. Videos of 
items in different weather conditions were used, rather than the self-paced navigation around 
virtual environments used in the previous chapter. This was to control for the time spent in 
each study phase and the amount of exposure to each item-source association to ensure 
that all participants had the same experience across study phases. The same six contexts 
used in Chapter 3 were also employed here, again giving six temporal positions in the 
presentation sequence. This methodology allows us to further the results from Chapter 3 to 
examine whether distinct neural regions support memory for time and context, or whether 
they are served by overlapping networks. By using a different measure of time compared to 
relative time the current paradigm also extends beyond the results from Ekstrom et al (2011), 
giving an alternative measure of time and context as participants will have to remember the 
exact source of items rather than simply judging the relative distance between them. Finally, 
the current study used a non-spatial context allowing for the assessment of whether different 
definitions of context would generate similar activity. 
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Based on the results from Chapter 3, it is hypothesised that there would be significantly 
greater activity in regions associated with recollection during accurate context compared to 
sequence retrieval. This is since correct context memory requires the use of recollection and 
should as a result elicit greater levels of activation in recollection-related regions. Accurate 
temporal memory, however, should engage recollection- and familiarity-sensitive regions 
either in the same trials or in alternate trials, where some trials might exhibit more activity in 
regions associated with either type of retrieval process. As some trials will show greater 
levels, and some reduced levels, of activation in recollection-related regions, when 
averaging across trials it would be expected that the overall activity in regions linked to 
recollection should be reduced due to trials in which familiarity-based activity is higher and 
recollection-based activity is lower. This is in contrast to context trials where it is expected 
that activity in recollection-related regions would be high across all trials. Further, it was 
hypothesised that temporal retrieval would result in increased activation across familiarity-
related regions compared to contextual retrieval. Based on the results from Ekstrom et al 
(2011), who found that time and spatial context engage different neural processes both in 
the MTL and across other cortical regions, it is further hypothesised that different networks 
will be involved in memory for time and non-spatial context, with time being more likely to 
activate regions over the frontal lobe, and context memory exhibiting great activation in the 
PHC and surrounding temporal regions. 
4.2 Materials and Methods 
4.2.1 Pre-Screening 
During the piloting stage of the study it was found that retrieval accuracy in each condition 
was less than 60%, corresponding to 25 trials, for one third of participants. Crucially, it has 
been suggested that at least 25 trials per condition for each participants is needed in order to 
accurately estimate the haemodynamic response function during fMRI analysis (Huettel & 
McCarthy, 2001). To ensure that enough data could be gained for meaningful fMRI analysis 
from each participant a behavioural pre-screening procedure was added prior to the fMRI 
scans. The pre-screening consisted of a shorter version of the full experiment, where 
participants completed the equivalent of two scanning runs as described under the 
behavioural procedures. 
Participants were required to get at least 60% of both context and sequence trials correct in 
order to be eligible for the fMRI study. The 60% threshold was set as the same proportion of 
correct trials in the full study would give a sufficient number of trials for analysis. If the 
threshold was not met the participant was debriefed and paid for their time.  
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4.2.2 Participants 
A total of 95 people carried out the pre-screening. To take part participants had to match a 
set of inclusion criteria: being right-handed, native English speakers, aged 18-35 years, and 
to have no history of neurological disorders. Out of the initial pre-screening sample 18 
participants (10 female) with an average age of 21.6 years (SD=2.97) passed the pre-
screening and completed the full fMRI study. Two participants withdrew from the study early 
due to discomfort in the scanner, leaving data from 16 participants (9 female) with an 
average age of 22.0 years (SD=2.9) for the full analysis. 
Participants received £2.50 for completing the pre-screening, which took 30 minutes, and an 
additional £10/hour and £10 towards travel costs for completing the fMRI part of the study. 
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the University of St Andrews’ University 
Teaching and Research Ethics Committee, and the Tayside Committee on Medical 
Research Ethics at Ninewells Hospital and Medical School (See Appendix D, Appendix E, 
and Appendix F for letters of ethical approval). All participants gave informed consent prior to 
taking part in the study.  
4.2.3 Stimuli 
Stimuli for the study phases consisted of videos in which a person approached an object in a 
virtual environment, seen from a first person perspective. Videos were created in an 
800x600 resolution using the Source Filmmaker software (Valve Software). Contextual 
information was manipulated by having different weather conditions in the videos. The 
videos contained six different weather conditions: sun, snow, rain, thunder/lightning, fog, and 
wind. All videos were coupled with sounds to make them more immersive and close to real 
life experiences. The ‘sun’ context consisted of a bright blue sky and bird song. ‘Snow’ had 
snowflakes falling from a dark sky with the crunching sound of a person walking across a 
snow covered ground. ‘Rain’ was a medium bright context with visible rainfall and the 
accompanying sound of heavy rain. ‘Thunder and lightning’ featured a number of lightning 
strikes and the rumble of thunder. ‘Fog’ consisted of a dense grey mist obscuring view of the 
furthest features of the virtual environment along with the sound of a foghorn in the distance. 
Finally, ‘wind’ featured leaves blowing in front of the participant with the sound wind gusting 
around the participant (see Figure 21). Temporal information was manipulated by presenting 
the videos in a sequence, thereby allocating each item to a specific temporal position within 
the study sequence. 
There were a total of 293 objects in the study; each object was coupled with all 6 weather 
conditions giving a total of 1758 individual videos. Objects consisted of normal everyday 
items, such as tools, household items, and food items (see Figure 21). Objects were 
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presented in an outside environment where buildings lined the perimeter of the environment 
and trees scattered around the enclosure. The videos were made in such a way that 
participants’ movement and vision of the environment was kept constant across all videos, 
with the only difference between videos being the object seen and the weather condition it 
was encountered in.  
 
  
  
  
Figure 21. Images of items in each context. From top left: Axe in thunder/lightning, 
Lawnmower in rain, Lantern in snow, Balloons in sun, Antenna in fog, Air conditioner in wind. 
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4.2.4 Behavioural Procedures 
Participants first underwent structural scans during which they read through the instructions 
for the study and completed a practice version of the experimental task, taking a total of 12m 
and 38s. The practice task consisted of one study-test phase with six videos, and a test 
phase in which they were given four item, four context, and four sequence questions in that 
order, to get them familiarised with using the button boxes for all types of questions. Details 
of response options and button boxes will be explained in more detail below in Section 
4.2.4.2 and in Figure 21C. 
Structural scans were followed by six BOLD scans during which the experimental task was 
carried out. In each BOLD scans participants completed four study-test blocks. A study-test 
block consisted of a study phase followed by a test-phase. A total of 288 objects were 
randomly selected to be used over the study for each participant. Half of those objects (144) 
were used as old objects and were shown in the videos during study phases. The second 
half of 144 objects were used as new lures across test phases. Due to a shortage of objects 
in the software used, objects used in the pre-screening were also used during the fMRI study. 
4.2.4.1 Study Phase. In each study phase participants watched six videos, one of each 
context. The order of contexts was randomised throughout the study, minimising any 
influence of context presentation on the temporal information. In each video participants 
passively observed as the camera traversed a short path surrounded by trees in an outside 
environment. At the end of the path they came upon a clearing in which an object was 
placed. The object was placed the same distance away from participants across videos to 
generate similar viewing conditions (Figure 21A). For each video, participants were 
instructed to imagine themselves interacting with the object in the environment to facilitate a 
deeper level of encoding. Each video was 5.75s long, where the object was visible for 2.25s. 
Videos were separated by a 1.75s ITI, during which a fixation point was presented. 
4.2.4.2 Test Phase. In the test phase participants were shown images of the individual 
objects from the videos on a black background. Images showed the objects from the same 
angle as when seen in the video to as great of an extent as possible. Objects were shown 
one at a time in the middle of the screen, with some of the smaller objects appearing bigger 
during test than in the study phase to make them easier to identify. The stimuli were 
projected onto a screen at 1024x768 resolution, situated at the end of the scanner bore and 
visible to the participant via a set of mirrors placed on the head coil. Study and test phases 
were presented to participants using the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et 
al., 2007; Pelli, 1997) for Matlab (Natick, MA). 
 
 
138 
 
There were three types of test phases where participants only had to retrieve one type of 
information from the study phase, ‘Item’, ‘Context’, or  ‘Sequence’, this was done to reduce 
task difficulty and increase the number of correct responses obtained from each participant. 
There was a 50:50 ratio of ‘old’ items and ‘new’ items in each test phase and the questions 
were randomised within participants. All objects from the study phase were included in the 
test phase, giving 6 old and 6 new objects for a combined 12 trials per test phase. What type 
of response participants had to make depended on the given test phase. Test phases were 
randomised to reduce participants’ ability to know what type of information they would be 
tested on at the start of each new study phase. In all conditions participants had four 
seconds to make a response before the image disappeared from the screen. The fixation 
between each trial was jittered and followed a Poisson distribution with a mean lambda of 3 
seconds. Responses were made using two 4-button response boxes, one for each hand. In 
the ‘Item’ test phase participants were shown an image of an object on the screen and had 
to indicate whether it was “old” or “new”, i.e. whether the object had been seen in the study 
phase or not, using the button on the far right on the right hand button box or the far left 
button on the left hand button box respectively. In the ‘Context’ test phase, participants had 
to indicate in which weather condition they had seen the object on the screen, selecting from 
all six options represented by individual icons illustrating each weather condition, or say that 
the object was “new”. Participants could also just select “old” if they remembered seeing the 
object in the study phase but could not retrieve the context. These response options did not 
follow the order of weather conditions seen during the study phase, as not to encourage 
participants to use temporal information to retrieve the correct context. The order of context 
response options on the screen was: sun, fog, wind, rain, thunder/lightning, snow. The order 
of context responses remained the constant across participants and across test phases 
during the study, to avoid making it more difficult for participants to find the right response 
options. In the ‘Sequence’ test phase participants had to select the position in the 
presentation sequence the object had been encountered in. Just as in the ‘Context’ test 
phase all six sequence options were given, as well as the option to select “new” for new 
items or “old” for old objects where the temporal position could not be remembered. 
Sequence response options were labelled with numbers 1 to 6 in the correct temporal order 
(Figure 21B & C).  
A total of 4 study-test blocks were presented during each scanning run, with runs lasting 10 
minutes and 59 seconds. A total of 6 scanning runs were acquired across the study, giving a 
total functional scanning time of approximately one hour and six minutes. In each scanning 
run participants carried out one item, one context, and one sequence test phase plus a 
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repeat of a randomly selected test phase, e.g. two context, one item, and one sequence 
memory test ( 
Table 6). The order of test phases within runs was randomised to minimise the possibility 
that participants would be able to predict the upcoming retrieval condition. However, it was 
still possible that participants could deduce the type of test phase coming up based on the 
preceding test phases. There was an equal number of item, context, and sequence retrieval 
conditions across the study, giving an equal number of trials across conditions. Across the 
study there were 8 test phases in each condition. There was a total of 24 study-test phases 
with 12 trials in each test phase, amounting 48 trials in each condition and a grand total of 
288 trials. 
 
Table 6. fMRI study design. 
  Run # 
 Length 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Study-
Test 1 
10m 59s 
Study- 
Item 
Study- 
Sequence 
Study- 
Context 
Study- 
Sequence 
Study- 
Item 
Study- 
Context 
Study-
Test 2 
10m 59s 
Study- 
Sequence 
Study- 
Context 
Study- 
Sequence 
Study- 
Context 
Study- 
Item 
Study- 
Item 
Study-
Test 3 
10m 59s 
Study- 
Item 
Study- 
Item 
Study- 
Sequence 
Study- 
Item 
Study- 
Sequence 
Study- 
Sequence 
Study-
Test 4 
10m 59s 
Study-
Context 
Study- 
Context 
Study- 
Item 
Study- 
Context 
Study- 
Context 
Study- 
Sequence 
Columns show, from left to right: The number of study-test phases in each run; The length of 
each individual study-test phase, which was the same across runs; Examples of the order of test 
phases across the 6 runs in the experiment. Study phases did not differ between test phases or 
runs, except for the objects and order of context presentation. 
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A. Study Phase 
    
… 
 
1st 0.55s 2nd 0.55s  6th 
B. Test Phase 
Item Context Sequence 
   
‘Indicate whether the Item is old 
or new’ 
‘Indicate the Context the item 
was presented in, or whether it 
was new’ 
‘Indicate when in the Sequence 
the item was presented in, or 
whether it was new’ 
C. Response options 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Behavioural methods. A) Study phase. Illustrating the sequence of videos 
presented. B) Test phases. From left to right: Item, Context, and Sequence. C) Response 
options. Top: Item, participants indicated whether the object on the screen was old (seen in the 
videos) or new (not in the videos) using red buttons. Middle: Context, participants indicated which 
context they object was seen in using the corresponding button, or that it was old (no source 
remembered) or new. Bottom: Sequence, participants indicated when in the sequence the object 
was encountered using the corresponding button on the boxes, or whether the object was old or 
new. 
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4.2.5 fMRI Procedures 
Scanning was carried out on a 3T Siemens PrismaFIT whole body MRI scanner (Siemens 
medical solutions, Erlangen, Germany) using a 20 channel head and neck coil. Padding 
around the head and elbows was used to ensure that the participant was comfortable and to 
reduce head motion. Prior to functional data, structural MP-RAGE and T2 images were 
collected. Functional data was subsequently obtained using whole head echo-planar-
imaging (TR=2.5s, TE=3.0s, FOV = 224mm, Flip angle = 90 degrees). Each volume 
consisted of 37 slices acquired in an interleaved descending order, aligned parallel to the 
AC-PC axis. Slice thickness was 3.5mm with no interslice gap, giving 3.5mm isotropic voxels.  
Pre-processing and fMRI data analysis was carried out using Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM8) software (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London). Slice time 
acquisition correction was carried out by temporally resampling relative to the middle slice 
collected. This was followed by a 6-parameter rigid body motion correction. Functional 
volumes were then spatially normalized to a canonical echo-planar template using 12 
parameter affine and cosine basis transformations and resampled to 3-mm isotropic voxels. 
Volumes were then spatially smoothed with a 6 mm Gaussian kernel. 
4.2.6 Data Analysis 
4.2.6.1 Behavioural Analysis. Over the experiment, three different dependent variables 
were measured. Hits, corresponding to correct responses for Item, Context, and Sequence 
questions. Correct rejections, being correctly identified ‘new’ items in each retrieval condition. 
Finally, the reactions times (RTs) measured the time it took participants to respond to 
questions in the Item, Context, and Sequence conditions. Differences between conditions for 
each participant were analysed using a one way repeated measures ANOVAs for each of 
these three measures (hits, correct rejections, and RTs). Incorrect responses were not 
examined, as there were too few to analyse. No assumptions in statistical tests were violated 
unless explicitly stated. 
All behavioural analysis was carried out using SPSS version 22 (IBM). 
4.2.6.2 fMRI Contrast Analysis. Summary amplitudes across participants were 
extracted by convolving a canonical haemodynamic response function with onsets and 
durations of experimental events to get an estimate of the BOLD response. Onsets were 
modelled as delta functions with durations set to zero. Onsets for correct item, context, and 
sequence questions were entered in to separate variables for each participant to be used in 
the analysis. Incorrect responses were entered in to a separate variable, and were not 
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analysed further as there were too few to contribute to any meaningful analysis. Instead, 
only correct responses across Item, Context, and Sequence trials were analysed. Statistical 
contrasts on the single-subject level were computed by using paired samples t-test to 
compare activity in each individual contrast. Contrast images were saved for each participant 
individually and were subsequently used in the group level contrast analysis. The whole 
brain contrasts were evaluated at a threshold of p<0.001 (uncorrected) for 5 contiguous 
voxels, a standard statistical threshold within memory research. Data from participants 
scoring below 25 correct trials, the cut-off point used in the pre-screening procedure, in any 
condition was not excluded from the analysis. This only applied to one participant who 
scored 23 and 21 correct trials in the Context and Sequence conditions respectively, and 
was included to increase the power of the analysis. 
4.2.6.3 ROI Analysis. Activity in the Medial Temporal Lobe was assessed to examine if 
activation in any regions differed between the Context and Sequence conditions. This was 
analysed by extracting beta values from Regions of Interest (ROI), using the MARSBAR 
toolbox for SPM, (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002). 14 bilateral ROIs (Figure 24A), 
7 in each hemisphere, were defined (Chen et al., 2016), covering the perirhinal cortex (PRC), 
posterior parahippocampal cortex (pPHC), anterior parahippocampal cortex (aPHC), 
entorhinal cortex (ERC), posterior hippocampus (pHIC), mid hippocampus (mHIC), and 
anterior hippocampus (aHIC). ROIs were 4mm diameter spheres. All ROI coordinates and 
diameters were taken from Chen and colleagues (2016). Activity was compared between 
conditions using paired samples t-tests to assess whether either contextual or temporal 
retrieval resulted in greater activity in each individual region. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Behavioural Results 
4.3.1.1 Hits and Correct Rejections. Item recognition was high, with a mean accuracy 
of 0.946 (SD=0.063). Memory for contextual information was lower at 0.781 (SD=0.141), 
while sequence retrieval had an average accuracy of 0.811 (SD=0.143). Accuracy across 
these conditions was compared using a one way repeated measures ANOVA comparing 
mean accuracy of Condition: Item, Context and Sequence hits, revealing an effect of 
Condition, F(2,30)=16.24, p<0.001, ηp2=0.520.  
Post hoc paired sample t-tests were run to identify which conditions that differed. A 
significant difference was found between Item and Context hits, t(14)=4.88, p<0.001, d=1.58, 
indicating higher accuracy for item memory. Significantly higher accuracy was further found 
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for Item hits compared to Sequence hits, t(14)=3.59, p=0.003, d=1.23. No significant 
difference was found when comparing Context and Sequence hits, t(14)=1.40, p=0.143, 
d=0.211 (Figure 23A). This demonstrates that memory accuracy was significantly higher for 
Item trials compared to both Context and Sequence trials, while there was no difference in 
accuracy between the two source conditions. 
Correct rejections were at ceiling across all conditions. In Item test phases proportion of 
correct rejections were 0.985 (SD=0.017), whereas in Context and Sequence test phases it 
was 0.991 (SD=0.016) and 0.996 (SD=0.009) respectively. A 1(Participant) x3 (Condition: 
Item, Context, Sequence) repeated measures ANOVA was carried out to test for any 
differences between the retrieval conditions. This analysis did not show a significant effect of 
Condition, F(2,30)=2.76, p=0.079, ηp2=0.156. 
4.3.1.3 Decision Latencies. Reactions times for correctly identified old items were 
assessed to examine whether participants took longer to respond to any type of question, 
indicating either more difficulty or effort in retrieval. For the simple item recognition, 
participants’ mean decision latency was 1.40 seconds (SD=0.199), whereas for context 
memory it was 2.17s (SD=0.345), and 1.85s (SD=0.288) for sequence memory. To test for 
any differences in decision latencies, a 1(Participant) x3 (Condition: Item, Context, 
Sequence) repeated measures ANOVA was run. The ANOVA found a significant effect of 
Condition, F(2,30)=124.73, p<0.001, ηp2=0.893. Post-hoc paired samples t-tests were carried 
out to examine the source of the main effect. A significant difference was found between 
reactions times in item compared to context memory, t(15)=-14.67, p<0.001, d=2.73, as well 
as in the comparison between item and sequence memory, t(15)=-9.01, p<0.001, d=1.82. 
Finally, a significant difference was also found comparing decision latencies for sequence 
and context retrieval, t(15)=7.24, p<0.001, d=1.01 (Figure 23B). This demonstrates that 
participants made significantly faster responses for items correctly identified as old 
compared to both correct context and sequence retrieval. Further, correct context memory 
was coupled with significantly slower reactions times compared to correct sequence retrieval 
indicating that participants might have found it more effortful to remember contextual 
information, although this is not reflected in the Hits. 
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A 
 
B 
 
Figure 23. Behavioural results. A) Comparison of the proportion of hits between the Item, 
Context, and Sequence conditions. B) Comparison of decision latencies between the Item, 
Context, and Sequence conditions. Error bars represent SEM. ** = p<0.01, *** = p<0.001 
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4.3.2 fMRI Results 
4.3.2.1 Whole-Brain Contrast Analysis. The first part of the analysis focuses on whole-
brain contrasts between retrieval conditions to identify regions exhibiting greater activity 
during retrieval of temporal and contextual information. All coordinates are reported in 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. 
4.3.2.1.1 Source > Item. To find activation associated with source retrieval, brain 
activation averaged across correct Sequence and Context responses were contrasted with 
correct Item responses. This contrast revealed a significant cluster in the lingual gyrus, 
extending in to the calcarine and vermis, located in the occipital lobe and cerebellum (Figure 
23A). Activity in these regions, all linked to processing of visual information, could be 
explained by the significantly longer decision latencies during context and sequence 
questions, whereby longer visual stimulation lead to additional visual processing during 
these trials (Hahn, Ross, & Stein, 2006; Mangun, 1995; Yantis et al., 2002). 
A further cluster was found over the left precuneus, extending to parts of the mid and 
superior occipital lobe, which is associated with the retrieval of episodic memories and 
source information (Cabeza et al., 2003; Cavanna & Trimble, 2006) (Table 7 & Figure 23A). 
The current results give further evidence to suggest that the precuneus holds a central role 
in episodic memory where it has been linked to a number of processes including recollection 
(Henson, Rugg, Shallice, Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; Wagner, Shannon, Kahn, & Buckner, 
2005) and the reinstatement of the visual content of memories during retrieval (Fletcher et al., 
1985). However, the precuneus has also been shown to be involved in familiarity (Rugg & 
Vilberg, 2013; Yonelinas et al., 2005), making it difficult to draw any definitive conclusions as 
to what this activity reflects. Significant activity was shown in a cluster over the post- and 
precentral gyri, including activity in the motor cortex and the supramarginal gyrus. The 
supramarginal gyrus, which is part of the ventral posterior parietal cortex (Shimamura, 2011), 
has been linked to accurate source memory (Diana et al., 2010; Dobbins et al., 2003). No 
significant activity was observed in any MTL regions in this contrast, despite the large body 
of literature demonstrating MTL involvement in retrieval of both temporal and contextual 
information (Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Hannula et al., 2013; Hsieh et al., 2014; Lehn et al., 2009; 
Staresina et al., 2012). 
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Table 7. Significant clusters across whole brain contrasts.   
Contrast Region Lat. BA X Y Z Cluster size Z value 
Source > Item Occipital lobe         
 Lingual gyrus  R 17/18 3 -76 -8 505 5.33 
 Precuneus  L 7/19 -12 -73 49 153 4.96 
 Parietal lobe         
 Postcentral  R 3/4/6 45 -22 43 608 4.49 
  
Time > Item Parietal lobe         
 Postcentral  R 3/4/6 39 -28 49 475 4.70 
  
Context > Item Parietal lobe         
 Precuneus  L 7 -15 -73 55 112 4.55 
 Lingual gyrus  R 17/18 6 -79 -8 150 4.10 
 Postcentral gyrus  R 3/4/6 36 -28 49 217 3.84 
 Occipital lobe         
 Superior occipital 
gyrus 
 L 19 -27 -73 22 75 3.70 
Regions are SPM clusters with at least 5 significant voxels. Region and X, Y, and Z coordinates refers to clusters’ local maxima. Lat. = Laterality. BA = 
Approximate Brodmann’s area, Cluster size = Number of significant voxels in cluster. Coordinates are in MNI space.
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4.3.2.1.2 Sequence > Item. The above contrast averaged over activation in Context and 
Sequence trials to get a measure of Source activation. To examine activity specific to 
Sequence retrieval, in the current contrast only correct Sequence trials were contrasted with 
correct Item trials. This contrast only found one significant cluster, located in the parietal lobe, 
centred over the right postcentral gyrus, covering right precentral, motor cortex, and the mid 
frontal gyrus. Similar to the Source > Item contrast, this could simply reflect the use of more 
response options in the temporal compared to the item condition due to the involvement of 
the precentral gyrus in motor processes (Table 7 & Figure 23B). 
4.3.2.1.3 Context > Item. To get a measure of Context activation, separate from Sequence 
trials, correct Context retrieval was contrasted with correct Item retrieval. Here, significant 
activation was revealed in the precuneus, similar to the activity seen in the Source > Item 
contrast. Previous studies in item-context memory have found significant activation in the 
precuneus (Lundstrom et al., 2003; Lundstrom, Ingvar, & Petersson, 2005), indicating that 
this region could be more sensitive to context associations rather than an overarching 
contextual and temporal source memory, as precuneus activity was not seen in the 
Sequence > Item contrast. A significant cluster was revealed over the right pre- and 
postcentral gyri, extending in to the motor cortex similar to the activity seen in the previous 
contrasts. Significant activity was also found in the right lingual gyrus extending in to the 
calcarine sulcus, and a final cluster of activity was shown over the superior occipital lobe. 
Activity in the final two clusters is most likely due to greater visual processing, as RTs were 
significantly longer during context trials meaning that participants spent more time attending 
to the screen (Table 7 & Figure 23C). 
4.3.2.1.4 Sequence > Context. The contrast between Sequence and Context revealed no 
suprathreshold clusters, indicating that no regions across the brain exhibited significantly 
higher activity during temporal compared to contextual retrieval in the whole brain analysis. 
This finding is opposite to the hypothesis that different brain regions serve memory for time 
and context. The absence of any difference in activity between these conditions was 
unexpected, as distinct brain regions has previously been shown to contribute to memory for 
time, such as the prefrontal cortex (Ekstrom et al., 2011; Jenkins & Ranganath, 2016). 
4.3.2.1.5 Context > Sequence. No suprathreshold clusters were found in the contrast 
between Context and Sequence, suggesting that activity between these conditions did not 
differ in terms of amplitude across regions in the brain. The finding that no regions showed 
greater activity in Context compared to Sequence memory was also unexpected, and is in 
contrast with the hypothesis that memory for contextual information would elicit activity in 
distinct regions, such as the PHC or fusiform cortex, compared to memory for time.  
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Figure 24. Clusters of activity across contrasts. A) Activity over the left hemisphere. B) 
Activity over the right hemisphere C). Clusters in BA 3/4/6, including the motor cortex, X = -8.3. D) 
Clusters over the occipital lobe (bottom cluster) and precuneus (top cluster) illustrating greater 
activity in the occipital lobe and precuneus in Context trials compared to Sequence trials when 
separated from the averaged Source memory contrast, Y = -11.6. Contrasts were analysed with 
a threshold of p<0.001 with five contiguous voxels. 
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4.3.2.4 Medial Temporal Lobe ROI Analysis. Regions in the MTL have been found to 
support retrieval of both contextual and temporal information (see Davachi, 2006 and 
Ranganath & Hsieh, 2016 for reviews), Further, parts of the MTL have further been found to 
support recollection and familiarity, where recollection is represented by activity in the 
hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex while familiarity is associated with activity in the 
perirhinal (Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Ranganath et al., 2004) and entorhinal cortices (Brandt 
et al., 2016). Based on this, activity across MTL regions was compared between time and 
context to assess whether specific regions showed increased activation for retrieval of either 
type of source. 
The 14 bilateral MTL ROIs (Figure 24A) were selected as they represent regions involved in 
memory for time and context, e.g. the HIC and PHC, as well as including regions sensitive to 
both recollection and familiarity, such as the ERC and the PRC. Examining these regions 
can give an indication as to whether areas within the MTL are involved specifically in either 
memory for time or context, or whether memory for either source elicits activity in familiarity-
related regions in the MTL. Assessing the level of activation within each MTL region, paired 
sample t-tests were used to test for any difference in activity between Sequence and Context.  
As multiple tests were carried out the significance level was adjusted for multiple 
comparisons using the False Discovery Rate (FDR; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). The 
corrected significance level for the paired sample t-tests was 0.007, meaning that only p-
values below this level were considered significant. 
The paired samples t-tests found that temporal retrieval resulted in significantly greater 
activity in the right pHIC, t(15)=3.87, p=0.002, d=1.29, as well as the right mHIC, t(15)=3.47, 
p=0.003, d=0.864 (Figure 24A & B). No other regions showed any significant difference 
between retrieval conditions (see Table 8 for results for all ROIs). These results suggests 
that retrieval of temporal information engages the right HIC to a greater extent than does 
contextual retrieval, and agrees with previous work in humans arguing that the HIC holds a 
central role in temporal processing (Ranganath & Hsieh, 2016), while context could be 
processed upstream in the PHC (Bar & Aminoff, 2003; Bar et al., 2008). 
  
 
 
 150 
Table 8. MTL ROIs with coordinates and statistical difference between Context and 
Sequence conditions. 
Region Lat. X Y Z t df p d 
PRC 
R 26 -4 -36 0.614 15 0.548 0.14 
L -26 -4 -36 0.122 15 0.904 0.02 
ERC 
R 26 -16 -28 -2.85 15 0.012 0.59 
L -26 -16 -28 -0.538 15 0.599 0.20 
aPHC 
R 26 -30 -20 -0.914 15 0.375 0.33 
L -26 -30 -20 -0.769 15 0.454 0.27 
pPHC 
R 26 -40 -12 -1.11 15 0.286 0.25 
L -26 -40 -12 0.428 15 0.675 0.11 
aHIC 
R 24 -14 -20 -0.550 15 0.590 0.22 
L -24 -14 -20 -0.149 15 0.883 0.06 
mHIC 
R 26 -26 -12 -3.47 15 0.003** 0.87 
L -26 -26 -12 -1.58 15 0.134 0.38 
pHIC 
R 26 -34 -4 -3.87 15 0.002** 1.29 
L -26 -34 -4 -0.571 15 0.577 0.18 
PRC = Perirhinal cortex, ERC = Entorhinal cortex, aPHC = anterior Parahippocampal cortex, pPHC = 
posterior Parahippocampal cortex, aHIC = anterior Hippocampus, mHIC = mid Hippocampus, pHIC = 
posterior Hippocampus; Lat = Laterality; x, y, and z indicates the central coordinates of the ROI; t, df, 
p, and d show the statistics from paired sample t-tests comparing activity in the Context and 
Sequence conditions for each ROI. **=p<0.007 corrected for multiple comparisons. 
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Figure 25. Activity across MTL ROIs.  A) Location of MTL ROIs. Regions showing significantly 
greater activity for temporal compared to contextual retrieval are in bold. Y=25.3 B) Bar graphs 
depicting the difference in activity in the right pHIC, mHIC, and ERC. Error bars represent SEM.  
* = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01 
The possibility that the MTL ROIs were affected by signal drop-out was also examined, i.e. 
that an absence of activity in ventral MTL such as the PRC was due to this part of the brain 
not being covered during scans. The extent of the volume scanned was assessed by setting 
a very lenient threshold of 0.999 with 0 contiguous voxels to examine the full extent of 
activity in the brain. These results are displayed in Figure 26, where the edge of the scan is 
visible in the cerebellum. Drawing a straight line from the edge of the scan coverage in the 
cerebellum it is clear that slice acquisition did include activity even in the more ventral parts 
of the MTL covering all ROIs, meaning that any absence of activation in these regions was 
not due to a lack of scan coverage. 
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Figure 26. Whole brain coverage during scans. The extent of the volume scanned was 
assessed by setting a lenient threshold of 0.999 and 0 contiguous voxels in the Source > Item 
contrast. Whole brain activity is represented by the blue to red colour scale, with the former 
indicating lower levels of activity and the latter indicating higher levels of activity. The dotted line 
shows the extent of the coverage at the bottom of the brain following the abrupt cut-off of activity 
in the cerebellum. This analysis demonstrates that activity in MTL ROIs was not affected by 
signal drop-out, as coverage included the ventral part of the MTL indicated by the dotted line. 
MTL ROIs are displayed as reference to the extent of activity in the brain. 
4.4 Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the neural substrates supporting memory for temporal 
and contextual information, as time and context are the two main sources of information that 
can be used within episodic memory to distinguish past events. To date few studies have 
directly contrasted the underlying neural activity during retrieval of these sources. The 
purpose of the current experiment was to further the results from Chapter 3 and examine 
whether time and context are supported by separate or overlapping neural substrates. Here 
participants viewed a sequence of six short videos depicting items in different weather 
conditions during a study phase, and subsequently indicated which items that were 
presented in the videos, the weather conditions items were seen in (contextual information), 
or when in the presentation sequence items were encountered (temporal information). 
Based on the results from Chapter 3 it was predicted that retrieval of context memory would 
elicit greater activation in regions associated with recollection, and that memory for temporal 
information would result in greater activity in regions associated with familiarity-based 
retrieval compared to context. It was further hypothesised that time and context would elicit 
activity in separate networks of regions, based on previous research demonstrating different 
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involvement of regions across the brain in temporal and contextual memory (Ekstrom & 
Bookheimer, 2007; Ekstrom et al., 2011).  
The behavioural results showed that participants were significantly more accurate in the 
simple item recognition compared to both retrieval of context and time. This is not surprising 
as item recognition can be solved through both recollection and familiarity, giving a greater 
scope for accurate retrieval, while temporal and context source information should in theory 
only be retrieved through recollection (Yonelinas, 1999). There was further no difference in 
accuracy between memory for context and time, demonstrating that participants could 
retrieve both types of sources equally well, mirroring the results from Chapter 3. Decision 
latencies were significantly faster for item recognition compared both time and context 
memory, mirroring the results from hits, again demonstrating that item memory can be 
retrieved through a faster familiarity-based process (Mandler, 1980). Decision latencies for 
context memory was significantly longer compared to both item and temporal retrieval, which 
could be an indication of recollection, as this process is often suggested to be slower and 
more elaborative than familiarity (Mandler, 1980). However, if the longer decision latencies 
during context memory indicated greater use of recollection, this should also be reflected in 
the retrieval accuracy where Sequence accuracy should be lower since attempts to retrieve 
time through the use of familiarity should lead to lower accuracy according to the dual-
process theory (Yonelinas, 1994, 1999). Alternatively, Sequence accuracy should be higher, 
as participants should be able to retrieve time using both recollection and familiarity as was 
demonstrated in Chapter 3. Neither of these scenarios were the case, with Context and 
Sequence accuracy not being different. As a result it is not clear that the longer Context 
decision latencies reflected a greater reliance on recollection at test. 
The first hypothesis tested regarding differences in neural activity was that memory for 
context would elicit greater activity in regions linked to recollection, whereas higher activation 
would be observed over regions associated with familiarity during temporal retrieval. Support 
for this hypothesis was not found, with no evidence to suggest that memory for context 
generated any significantly greater activity in any regions associated with recollection or 
evidence in favour of familiarity-based activity during memory for time. 
Contrary to the previously stated hypothesis significantly greater activity was found in the 
HIC, a region associated with recollection (Diana et al., 2007; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; 
Ranganath et al., 2004), in the Sequence compared to the Context condition. However, it is 
difficult to attribute the activity in the HIC to recollection specific processing since the 
hippocampus has not only been linked to recollection but also to the processing of temporal 
information (Hsieh et al., 2014; Jenkins & Ranganath, 2010; Lehn et al., 2009). As a result it 
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is more likely that the activity in the HIC in the Sequence condition reflect temporal 
processing rather than recollection and further illustrates the central role of the HIC in 
memory for time (Ranganath & Hsieh, 2016), something that will be discussed in more detail 
further below. 
Activation in no regions previously linked to recollection showed greater levels of activation 
in the Context compared to the Sequence condition, further illustrating the absence of 
evidence supporting the recollection-related hypothesis. This was similar to the hypothesis 
that the Sequence condition would exhibit great activity in familiarity-related regions 
compared to the Context condition, while no such difference was revealed. It is possible that 
the null findings relating to both of these hypotheses can be traced to the same source, 
namely the pre-screening procedure introduced in this experiment to ensure that participants’ 
performance would be sufficiently good for participation in the full fMRI study. By 
emphasising the importance of getting a certain proportion of trials in the study correct it 
could be that participants emphasised the use of recollection at test to respond accurately, 
which would have obscured any familiarity-based processing. Additionally, by selecting only 
a subset of participants with above average memory performance it could be that these 
people naturally favoured recollection-based processing or simply could retrieve complex 
information via recollection with little effort. Any of these options would have led to a 
reduction in familiarity-based activity and an increase of recollection-based activity in the 
Sequence condition, resulting in no differences across familiarity- or recollection-related 
regions between Sequence and Context memory. However, due to the difficulty of the study 
the pre-screening was an unfortunate but necessary procedure as not pre-screening 
participants could have led to too few trials to analyse per participant, thus drastically 
reducing the power across all analyses. To overcome the difficulty of the study participants 
would have had to be informed about the content of the test phase prior to each study phase, 
so they could focus on the aspect of the videos that they would be tested on. This could, 
however, bias the fMRI results towards a difference in activity between conditions and would 
not reflect a natural encoding condition. Another solution would have been to increase the 
number of trials each participant completed to ensure that everyone would be able to get at 
least 25 trials correct over the course of the study. Unfortunately this solution was not 
feasible as the total scan time was already 1.5 hours long, and increasing the study length 
would mean a drastic increase in the amount of time each participant would spend inside the 
scanner.  
The one region that could have provided support for the hypothesis that context memory 
would elicit greater activity in regions linked to recollection would be the activity seen in the 
precuneus, which has been linked to recollection (Wagner et al., 2005), in the Source > Item 
 
 
 155 
and Context > Item contrasts. As this activity was not seen in the Sequence > Item contrast, 
it can reasonably be attributed to context memory alone. However, a number of studies have 
also found increased activity in the precuneus during familiarity-based retrieval (Rugg & 
Vilberg, 2013; Yonelinas et al., 2005), making the role of the precuneus in recollection and 
familiarity somewhat unclear. The precuneus has further been linked to accurate source 
memory, and specifically memory for contextual information (Dobbins, Foley, Schacter, & 
Wagner, 2002; Lundstrom et al., 2003, 2005). It is therefore more likely that the current 
results give further evidence to suggest that precuneus is involved in context memory, where 
it has been suggested to play an important part in the mental imagery evoked during 
recollection (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Fletcher et al., 1985). It has also been proposed that 
the precuneus can be divided in to functionally dissociate anterior and posterior parts, where 
the former part is linked to visual imagery and the latter to a more general role in episodic 
memory (Buckner, Raichle, Miezin, & Petersen, 1996; Fletcher, Shallice, Frith, Frackowiak, 
& Dolan, 1998; Lundstrom et al., 2003). The activity in the current study corresponded to the 
posterior precuneus, giving further evidence to suggest that activation seen resulted from 
retrieval of contextual source information rather than a general recollective process.  
The HIC activity in the Sequence condition and the precuneus activity in the Context 
condition demonstrate that, while there was no difference in activation across recollection- 
and familiarity-related regions, there are regions showing content specific retrieval 
processing. This is line with the prediction that memory for time and context would engage 
different brain regions. While the precuneus activity during context memory is in agreement 
with previous work (Lundstrom et al., 2003, 2005), and suggests a role of the posterior 
precuneus in the retrieval of contextual source information, the difference in HIC activity 
between Context and Sequence is in contrast with previous studies and requires some 
further examination. 
Memory for context has been linked to activity in the HIC in previous fMRI studies (Davachi 
et al., 2003; Hannula et al., 2013; Ranganath et al., 2004), although no part of the HIC 
exhibited significantly greater activity for Context compared to Sequence in the current study. 
Instead the opposite pattern of activity was found where temporal retrieval engaged the HIC 
more than contextual retrieval. This in contrast to the findings by Ekstrom and colleagues 
(2011) who found the reverse pattern of activity, namely that the hippocampus showed 
greater activation during contextual compared to temporal retrieval. This discrepancy could 
be due to they way in which context was defined in the current study and that of Ekstrom 
and colleagues (2011). Previous research have mainly focused on activity during memory for 
time and spatial context (Ekstrom & Bookheimer, 2007; Ekstrom et al., 2011; Kwok, Shallice, 
& Macaluso, 2012), rather than the non-spatial context used in the current study. The 
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existence of time and place cells in the HIC has been demonstrated in rodents, indicating the 
processing of time and space respectively (Eichenbaum, 2014; Manns et al., 2007; O’Keefe, 
1976), and a large body of research has found evidence in favour of both spatial and 
temporal processing in the human hippocampus (Barnett, O’Neil, Watson, & Lee, 2014; 
Burgess, Maguire, & O’Keefe, 2002; Ekstrom et al., 2011; Lehn et al., 2009; Miller et al., 
2013; Ranganath & Hsieh, 2016). It is thus possible that the lesser degree of contextual HIC 
activity found here is due to non-spatial contexts not being processed to the same extent as 
the spatial equivalent in the HIC. It should be noted that the results did not reveal an 
absence of HIC activity for context memory, meaning that contextual retrieval did elicit 
activation in the HIC, albeit not to the same extent as temporal retrieval. 
There were a number of contrasts that produce significant differences between conditions 
that are likely the result of perceptual or behavioural differences between conditions. These 
include the significant activity found over the lingual gyrus in the Source > Item and Context > 
Item contrasts. As Context responses had significantly slower decision latencies, meaning 
that participants attended to the screen for a longer period of time while making context 
responses compared to making both item and temporal responses, it is likely that once an 
item or temporal response was made participants stopped paying attention to the screen 
while attention was sustained during Context memory. This could have lead to increased 
activity in visual processing regions, such as the lingual gyrus, in the Context condition. This 
is supported by studies showing that the allocation of visual attention to a specific location 
within an environment leads to an increase in ERP amplitudes in early visual regions 
(Mangun, 1995), with fMRI further corroborating this picture by demonstrating that 
extrastriate regions (including the lingual gyrus) show increased activity when attention is 
sustained, i.e. attention to a specific location is maintained, while this activity is not seen 
during shifts of attention from one location to another (Hahn et al., 2006; Yantis et al., 2002). 
Activity was further found in the right pre- and postcentral gyrus, which are prominent motor 
regions (Porro et al., 1996; Shibasaki et al., 1993; Yousry et al., 1997) in the Source > Item, 
Context > Item, and Sequence > Item contrasts. This is likely to reflect the use of multiple 
response options in the source memory conditions compared to the use of only two buttons 
in the item recognition, and as such do not tell us much about the underlying memory 
processes.  
Somewhat surprising there was no significant activity in regions over the frontal lobes, nor 
any other regions across the brain, in the Sequence > Context contrast, which would have 
been expected considering previous studies where activity in the frontal lobes have been 
found in relation to temporal processing (Jenkins & Ranganath, 2016; Milner et al., 1991; 
Shimamura et al., 1990) and in contrasts between time and space (Ekstrom et al., 2011). A 
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potential explanation for the absence of such activity is that participants used alternative 
ways to remember time that did not depend on the frontal lobes. The pre-screening 
procedure meant that participants knew the structure of the experiment and the importance 
to get enough trials correct prior to going in to the scanner. It is therefore possible that they 
employed some mnemonic strategies to encode and retrieve time in a manner different from 
what would be expected under normal non-experimental conditions, such as some form of 
stimulus unitization that was discussed in Chapter 3. However, this is somewhat speculative 
as participants were not asked about specific encoding or retrieval strategies used during the 
study. It is also possible that different measures of time could generate different neural 
activity, where studies previously finding involvement of the frontal lobes in temporal 
processing asking participants to remember sequentially presented stimuli (Cabeza et al., 
1997; Shimamura et al., 1990; Suzuki et al., 2002) rather than isolated temporal positions as 
in the current study. 
As different measures of time and context have found results differing from those in the 
current study, future work could aim to compare absolute and relative measures of source 
memory in order to see whether such changes would have any effects on neural activity. As 
differences in activity have previously been found in both the HIC and PHC between time 
and spatial context using relative measures of time (Ekstrom & Bookheimer, 2007; Ekstrom 
et al., 2011), it is possible that the results in this study differ due to the use of an absolute 
measure of source where participants had to select the exact context or time point when an 
item was encountered rather than judging the relative distance between two items. 
Additionally it would be of interest to examine whether different measures of time engages 
separate parts of the HIC, as the absolute sequence memory used in the current study 
resulted in greater activity in the pHIC while relative time measures have been found to 
increase activation in the aHIC (Ekstrom et al., 2011; Jenkins & Ranganath, 2010). It is 
possible that representations of time could vary along the hippocampal axis, with absolute 
temporal representation at the posterior end, e.g. remembering the exact time point of an 
item, and relative representations in the anterior region, e.g. remembering which of two 
items occurring earlier in the sequence. This could be corroborated to some extent by the 
finding that smaller event narratives, i.e. less complex episodes with fewer connections 
between individual features, is processed in the pHIC while more complex event narratives 
are processed in the aHIC (Collin, Milivojevic, & Doeller, 2015). The temporal information in 
the current study could be argued to reflect a smaller event narrative as participants in 
theory only had to remember the specific point in the sequence an item was encountered 
without the need to relate it to the bigger picture of the study episode as a whole. In relative 
measures of time, temporal information cannot be retrieved in isolation but instead has to be 
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related to surrounding features of the original sequence for memory to be accurate, which 
would resemble a more complex event narrative. 
In summary, the current study examined neural activity while participants watched a 
sequence of videos in which items were presented in different weather conditions. During 
test, participants were presented with a recognition test for the items alone, the contexts in 
which items had been encountered in, or when in the presentation sequence items were 
seen. Whole brain contrasts revealed greater activity in the postcentral gyrus, lingual gyrus, 
and the precuneus in context compared to item recognition. The only region being more 
active in temporal compared to item recognition was the postcentral gyrus. Analysis of 
activity within the MTL demonstrated that temporal retrieval elicited significantly greater 
activity in the right mHIC, and pHIC compared to contextual retrieval. No support was found 
to suggest that context memory engaged activity in regions sensitive to recollection 
compared to temporal memory. Additionally, no evidence arguing that temporal memory 
would increase activity in familiarity-related regions was found. It was further demonstrated 
that some regions in the brain showed content specific activity during retrieval, with the 
hippocampus being more sensitive to memory for time and the precuneus being more active 
during memory for contextual information. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
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5.1 Overview 
The overarching aim of the current thesis was to examine memory for time and context from 
both cognitive and neural perspectives in order to elucidate the processes underlying 
retrieval of these sources. This involved the assessment of how accurately these types of 
source can be remembered, indicating whether they could be considered useful for 
disambiguating past events, as well as the underlying cognitive and neural processes that 
contribute to retrieval of temporal and contextual source information. These aims were 
assessed across five experiments in three experimental chapters, each using different 
methodologies to gain a comprehensive view of the processes involved. This discussion 
section will first give an overview and summary of the experimental chapters and their 
findings, before examining the results across experiments in more details and relating the 
findings to more general frameworks in sections below.  
Chapter 2 of the thesis aimed to examine the neural substrate supporting the integrated 
memory for items in contexts, more specifically whether such integration could take place in 
the lateral entorhinal cortex (LEC). This was done by training rats on an odour-context 
association task, where animals were taught to dig for rewards in a bowl filled with scented 
sand in different environmental contexts. After being trained on this task until a specified 
performance criteria was met, rats underwent surgery where they either received bilateral 
lesion in the LEC, or sham lesions in the same region. Upon recovering from surgery 
memory for the previously learnt odour-context associations was tested to see whether the 
LEC lesions had any effect on performance. Following surgery rats were further tested on 
simple odour and context recognition tasks, to assess whether LEC lesions could have any 
impact in the processing of the individual components of the odour-context association, to 
ensure that any deficits seen could be attributed to the appropriate feature. The results 
revealed that rats in the LEC lesion group were significantly impaired in the odour-context 
association task compared to the sham lesion group. Interestingly neither the LEC nor the 
sham lesion group showed any deficits in either the individual odour or context processing 
tasks. These results mean that LEC lesions interrupt memory for previously learned odour-
context associations without impacting odour or context processing alone, arguing that this 
region is crucial for the accurate retrieval of contextual associations which in extension is 
necessary for disambiguating past event in memory.  
To further elucidate the neural correlates of context memory, in Chapter 3 a task was 
constructed for human participants that allowed for the assessment of memory for both 
context and time, as well as the evaluation of the recollective experience underlying 
temporal and contextual source memory with the aim of examining the accuracy with which 
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human participants are capable of remembering different types of source information. The 
reason for moving from animal to human subjects was that human participants can evaluate 
and report how they remembered an event, such as whether recollection or familiarity was 
used. The aim was further to conduct an fMRI study that would allow for the study of larger 
networks in the brain involved in memory for both time and context. Alongside the measures 
of source memory accuracy, participants further reported their recollective experience when 
remembering both temporal and contextual information across experiments, i.e. whether 
they could remember details surrounding the event through the use of recollection, or 
whether memory details were sparse and responses were based on a sense of familiarity. 
The study phases in all three experiments took place in a virtual environment, where 
participants moved from a starting room through to the main room in which objects were 
encountered, while big windows facing an outside courtyard displayed a range of weather 
conditions that represented the contexts, while the sequence of objects presented 
represented the temporal information. At test in Experiment 1, participants were first asked 
for object recognition, i.e. if the object on the screen was seen in the virtual environment or 
not, after which they were to give a judgment of their recollective experience, i.e. whether 
their previous response was based on recollection or familiarity. Participants were 
subsequently presented with a source questions, and encoded the objects associated 
context or time point in the sequence, and finally to rate their confidence in this response. 
The results revealed that accurate memory for both time and context was supported by 
judgments of both recollection and familiarity, contrary to the dual-process theory which 
holds that source information should only be supported by recollection, and not familiarity 
(Yonelinas, 1999). However, it was posited that these results could have been obtained due 
to participants judging their recollective experience based on the items alone, without 
relating this to the source information. A second experiment was conducted where 
recollective experience was asked for following source questions to increase the probability 
that participants related these judgments to the source information. Apart from this change, 
Experiment 2 followed the same structure as Experiment 1. The results from this study found 
that recollection supported accurate memory for both time and context, while familiarity was 
enough for accurate temporal, but not contextual, retrieval. These results replicate previous 
work (Easton et al., 2012; Saive et al., 2015), and argue that there are instances when 
temporal information does not conform to the definition of a source under the dual-process 
theory. Nevertheless, this study suffered from a low proportion of F compared to R 
judgments, making the analysis somewhat low powered. As a result, a third experiment was 
carried out in an attempt to increase the number of F judgments. In Experiment 3 the 
number of objects to-be-remembered in each study trial was increased from one to three 
objects to generate more F judgments. While the proportion of R and F judgments remained 
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similar to that of Experiment 2 despite this manipulation, it was again found that context 
could only be remembered accurately using recollection whereas time could be retrieved 
through both recollection and familiarity. Overall the experiments demonstrated that 
participants could remember both temporal and contextual information using a virtual 
environment paradigm, thus making this a valid approach for examining the neural 
substrates supporting memory for time and context using fMRI. 
In Chapter 4, participants underwent fMRI scans while retrieving temporal and contextual 
source information to assess the neural substrates of memory for time and context. A similar 
methodology to that used across experiments in Chapter 3 was used, with the main 
difference being that a sequence of items presented in different weather conditions was 
used instead of self-paced navigation. At test participants retrieved item, context, and 
sequence information in separate test phases. It was hypothesised that regions linked to 
recollection would show greater activity during memory for context compared to time, as 
Remember and Familiar judgments were not given in this study meaning that neural activity 
for time and context would be averaged over trials involving the use of both recollection and 
familiarity, meaning that recollection-related activity during memory for time would be diluted 
by those trials in which familiarity was used. Additionally, it was hypothesised that regions 
linked to familiarity would exhibit greater activity during memory time compared to context, 
based on the results from Chapter 3. The behavioural results showed that item recognition 
was significantly more accurate than both time and context, but that there was not difference 
between the two sources. Decision latencies were significantly faster for item recognition 
compared to time and context, and significantly slower for context questions compared to 
both item and time. This could indicate that item recognition was primarily based on 
familiarity, as familiarity-based memory judgments tend to be made faster (Mandler, 1980; 
However, see Dewhurst, Holmes, Brandt, & Dean, 2006), while the longer decision latencies 
in the source memory conditions suggest a greater contribution of recollection, which tends 
to be a slower process (Mandler, 1980). Examining activity in regions that was specific to 
either temporal or contextual memory, the precuneus exhibited increased activation during 
retrieval of context whereas no region showed greater levels of activity as time was being 
retrieved. There was no difference in activity across recollection-related regions, somewhat 
mirroring the results from Chapter 3 that accurate memory for both time and context involve 
the use of recollection. Though this did not provide any support for the initial hypothesis, that 
activity in such regions would be higher during context memory. Closer examination of 
activity in the MTL found that activations was greater as participants retrieved temporal 
source information compared to context source information in the right posterior and mid 
sections of the hippocampus, interpreted as the hippocampus being more sensitive to 
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memory for temporal information compared to non-spatial context. These results further 
demonstrate that there were overall differences in the neural substrates supporting memory 
for time and context, illustrating that these sources are represented by some unique brain 
regions. 
The use of different methodologies across chapters ensured that the main aims could be 
examined at different levels. Looking at context memory in rats allowed for a neural 
manipulation through excitotoxic lesions that is not possible with human participants, which 
provided the opportunity to investigate the effect of direct damage to a region on a particular 
behaviour. The study carried out provided evidence for the necessity of the LEC in memory 
for item-context associations. Moving from animals to human participants gave the ability to 
ask for both temporal and contextual memory, which was not possible with the rats since the 
item-context task in itself was quite complex and difficult for rats to learn. Second, human 
participants can evaluate their memories and make judgments on how they came to their 
memory decisions, which proved valuable to distinguish the differences in how temporal and 
contextual information can be retrieved. Finally, whole brain activity could be examined using 
fMRI to get a bigger picture over the network of brain regions involved in the retrieval of both 
time and context. Though in the fMRI study it was suggested that participants used complex 
strategies to encode and retrieve the study information. Additionally, fMRI does not reveal 
whether a region, or a set of regions are necessary for the specific function assessed, 
making it a complementary tool to lesion studies. In summary, the experiments across all 
chapters have built on previous work and contributed new knowledge using a range of 
methods to assess different cognitive and neural mechanisms of how time and context are 
remembered. The overall findings in this thesis suggest that memory for time and context 
are served by dissociable cognitive and neural processes, and highlights the importance of 
considering the definition of a source when studying memory. 
 !
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Table 9. Overview of experimental chapters. 
 Methods Procedure Hypothesis Measures Results 
Chapter 2 Rodent Rats trained on odour-
context association task, 
then received LEC or 
sham lesions. Re-tested 
on odour-context task after 
recovery from surgery. 
Rats with LEC lesions 
would have impaired 
odour-context memory 
compared to sham 
lesioned animals. 
Performance on 
odour-context 
association task post-
surgery. 
Results supported 
the hypothesis and 
demonstrated that 
rats with LEC 
lesions showed 
significantly 
impaired odour-
context memory 
Chapter 3 Human behaviour Participants encountered a 
sequence (temporal 
information) of objects 
presented across different 
weather conditions 
(contextual information) in 
a virtual environment. 
Indicated item and source 
associations at test, and to 
report whether this was 
retrieved through 
recollection or familiarity. 
Retrieval of temporal 
information would be 
supported by both 
recollection and 
familiarity, while 
accurate context 
memory would rely on 
recollection alone. 
Source memory 
accuracy for retrieval 
through recollection 
and familiarity. 
Across three 
experiments, two 
found support for the 
hypothesis, while on 
study found that 
time and context 
could be retrieved 
using both 
recollection and 
familiarity. 
Chapter 4 Functional MRI Participants presented 
with a sequence of videos 
in which items were 
presented in different 
weather conditions in a 
virtual environment. 
Indicated when in 
sequence or in which 
context items had been 
encountered at test. 
Activity in regions linked 
to recollection would be 
higher during accurate 
context memory, 
whereas activity in 
regions associated with 
familiarity would be 
higher during accurate 
temporal memory. 
Neural activity during 
correct context and 
sequence memory. 
No regions linked to 
recollection showed 
higher activity during 
memory for context 
compared to time. 
Nor did any regions 
linked to familiarity 
show greater activity 
during memory for 
time compared to 
context. 
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5.2 The Influence of Event Segmentation on Memory for Context 
and Time 
The results from experiments in both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 can be discussed in relation 
to the demonstrated effect that segmentation of continuous experiences into discrete 
episodes can impair memory for information across event boundaries (Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2006; Radvansky et al., 2011) and that information presented within the same 
context is remembered better (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011; Horner et al., 2016). The most well 
known example of this effect is that walking through doorways causes forgetting, which was 
demonstrated by having participants carry objects either within or between rooms 
(Radvansky & Copeland, 2006). The objects were not visible to participants once picked up, 
and after carrying the objects for a certain distance they were asked if they could remember 
the identity of the object they were currently carrying. It was found that when a spatial shift 
between rooms had occurred memory for the objects were significantly worse than when a 
new room had not been entered (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006). This has been expanded 
through findings that sequence memory is worse for items separated by a spatial boundary, 
such as a doorway, compared to items that were encountered in the same spatial context 
(Horner et al., 2016). This effect has been explained through the updating of event models 
as context boundaries are crossed (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Radvansky et al., 2011). 
An event model is essentially a representation of the current situation one is in, which can 
include current perceptual input, object information and relationships between different 
objects, as well as semantic information pertaining to the situation (Swallow, Zacks, & 
Abrams, 2009). When a contextual boundary is crossed, this alters the situation and updates 
the current event model, and such updates can reduce the availability of information 
associated with previous events in memory (Radvansky et al., 2011). 
Most studies on this topic have used some form of spatial context, where for example 
walking through a doorway from one location to another is seen as a shift in context (Horner 
et al., 2016). Across experiments in the current thesis contextual information was defined as 
the physical features of the environment, independent of changes in spatial location. Instead, 
all contexts have remained in the same place, where changes have instead been made to 
the colour and texture of the walls and floor (Chapter 2) or by altering the weather condition 
(Chapters 3 and 4), thus ensuring that contextual discrimination did not rely on the specific 
location where an item was encountered. Despite the differences in the definition of context 
between studies demonstrating impaired memory across context boundaries and the 
definition of contexts in the current thesis, it could be expected that the context boundary 
effect would influence results in Chapters 3 and 4. The reason for this is that the effect has 
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not only been demonstrated using explicit spatial boundaries such as doorways separating 
two distinct locations (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Radvansky et al., 2011), but also using 
more conceptual boundaries such as temporal shifts in narratives (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011). 
This illustrates that segmenting an event by contextual information does not require a shift in 
space, and an event model could be updated as long as there is a sufficient shift between 
two events. Consequently, it could be argued that a similar effect would be seen in the 
experiments in this thesis, as each item in the sequence was encountered in a discrete 
context separated either by walking through doorways in Chapter 3, or by the fixation point 
between each video in the fMRI study in Chapter 4. However, it was not possible to assess 
whether such event boundaries affected the relational memory between items in the 
sequence, as serial position memory where participants recall the correct order of items was 
not measured in either Chapters 3 or 4.  
Segmenting the study sequence by presenting items in different contexts could instead have 
facilitated temporal retrieval. By associating each item with a unique context the interference 
from items presented before or after the cue item could be reduced and thus improve 
memory for individual time points, in a similar way that it has been suggested that context 
acts as an organisational cue for individual events (Smith, 1982). One thing that can further 
be inferred from the behavioural results in Chapters 3 and 4 is that memory for absolute 
temporal information as used in these experiments is not affected by event boundaries, as 
temporal memory was equally accurate compared to context memory and significantly above 
chance level performance. As argued above, it might even be that event boundaries could 
have been helpful for the retrieval of absolute time. This could lead to a further proposition 
that the segmentation of events via different contextual identifiers aids memory for discrete 
events or absolute measures of source information. This is in agreement with work finding 
that the distribution of learning across multiple contexts improves memory (Smith, 1982; 
Smith & Rothkopf, 1984), and could be argued to demonstrate that segmenting experience 
through contextual changes enhances memory for the information encountered within those 
context, be it information regarding items or sources, while memory across contexts would 
be less accurate due to the updating of event models (Radvansky et al., 2011; Swallow et al., 
2009). This could be assessed by presenting participants with sequences of items either 
segmented by different contexts or in a single stream without context changes. It would then 
be possible to test temporal memory for absolute (i.e. specific time points) and relative (i.e. 
time relative to another item) measures of time in both the segmented and non-segmented 
conditions. This would examine whether memory for absolute time is more accurate 
compared to memory for relative time in the segmented condition, and whether no such 
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difference would be found in the non-segmented condition, as there would be no context 
boundaries to disrupt the associative encoding of items. 
5.3 The Use of Time and Context to Separate Events in Memory 
One of the overarching topics of this thesis has been the use temporal and contextual in 
separating events in memory. Evidence in favour of the use of both time and context in this 
process has been found across all experiments, which will be related to the general 
framework of temporal and contextual memory here. 
In Chapter 2 it was demonstrated that rats could learn fairly complex item-context 
associations over time, which corroborates previous work showing that rats are capable of 
integrating features of an event with the surrounding context that the information was 
encountered in (Boisselier et al., 2014; Wilson, Langston, et al., 2013; Wilson, Watanabe, et 
al., 2013), and that this ability can be used to construct animal models of episodic memory 
where rats use contextual information to distinguish which items have been encountered in 
which locations, discussed in more detail in Section 5.6 (Eacott & Norman, 2004; Langston & 
Wood, 2010). The fact that results from this thesis and from previous studies have 
demonstrated this ability to encode and retrieve contextual information in rats provides 
evidence to suggest that the use of rodent models is a viable method for assessing the 
underlying neural mechanisms of event separation in more detail. While the study in Chapter 
2 did not examine rats’ memory for the integration of temporal information in to memory, 
other studies have illustrated that rats are capable of this by showing that they can encode 
and retrieve sequences of odours in the correct order (Ergorul & Eichenbaum, 2004; Fortin 
et al., 2002; Manns et al., 2007). The challenge going forward would be to devise a task that 
would allow for the contrast between memory for time and context directly in rats, similar to 
the tasks used across experiments in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Experiments in both Chapters 3 and 4 assessed retrieval accuracy for contextual and 
temporal sources, and found that memory for both sources tended to be equally accurate 
and that accuracy was significantly above chance level. As one of the main criteria to 
accurately disambiguate events in memory is to be able to remember the unique source of 
an event that sets it apart from similar occasions, these results argue that both time and 
context are viable sources in this process. The accurate memory for contextual information 
shown in Chapters 3 and 4 is in agreement with research arguing that individual contexts 
can act as organisational cues for information encountered over time (Smith, 1982), as the 
contexts used across experiments could have prevented interference from surrounding items.  
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The accurate memory for time could be interpreted as support for early definitions of 
episodic memory in which more emphasis was placed on temporal information as the main 
way to identify different experiences (Tulving, 1972, 2002b). Having accurate memory for a 
sequence of items argues that an item’s place in time can act as a successful cue of when it 
was encountered. This could further be interpreted in light of theories proposing that 
experiences unfold over time and that new events naturally become associated with a 
unique point in time (Eichenbaum, 2014; Howard & Kahana, 2002). The sequences used 
across experiments did not give participants any explicit temporal information, instead the 
temporal component was integrated in to the experience meaning that as participants went 
through each study phase every new item encountered marked the progression of time. This 
means that memory for time does not necessitate the use of human based concepts of time 
such as measured by clocks or calendars, since memory for such information has been 
shown to be rather inaccurate (Friedman, 1993; Janssen et al., 2006). Instead, in order to 
accurately place an event in time it might be better to relate it to the sequence of 
experiences in which it took place. 
Most analyses found that both time and context were remembered equally well. However, 
there were some indications in both Chapters 3 and 4 that memory for temporal information 
was in fact better compared to context. In Experiment 1 and 2 in Chapter 3 it was found that 
when collapsing responses across R and F judgments in the serial position analysis, 
accuracy for time was significantly higher than context across the presentation sequence. In 
Chapter 4, while no difference was found in the accuracy between time and context, the 
decision latencies were shown to be significantly slower for context compared to temporal 
questions, likely due to participants finding these questions more difficult to answer. These 
results are in contrast to some of the literature discussed in Chapter 1, suggesting that 
temporal information is not necessarily remembered very accurately. For example, it has 
been demonstrated that memory for dates are often subject to telescoping where estimates 
of when an event took place are thought to be either before or after the actual time of the 
event (Thompson, 1982; Thompson et al., 1988). Further, estimates of how long ago an 
event took place or the duration of some interval tend to be fraught with errors, both over 
long (Ferguson & Martin, 1983; Janssen et al., 2006) and short term (Eisler, 1976), while 
theoretical models of sequence memory have not been able to account for empirical data 
(Henson et al., 1996). How is it then that temporal information was remembered more 
accurately than context? One answer to this question is that temporal information could be 
retrieved through the use of both recollection and familiarity, while context could only be 
retrieved through recollection. This means that there would be a higher probability of giving 
the correct response to a sequence question, as sequence questions that did not elicit 
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recollection could still be retrieved accurately using familiarity while context questions could 
not. In addition, time could be encoded as both discrete item-time units, such as that the 
football seen was the in the third temporal position, but also through associations between 
the individual objects, such as that a bicycle was presented after the football. This would be 
supported by both simple associative chaining models suggesting that sequence memory 
can be guided by the connections between items (Friedman, 1993; Lewandowsky & 
Murdock, 1989), or the temporal context model arguing that sequentially presented items 
share an overlapping representations where retrieval of one item reinstates its associated 
temporal context and as a result making it easier to remember surrounding items (Howard & 
Kahana, 2002). However, as discussed previously, items presented across event boundaries 
such as doorways show decreased associative strength. Still, the memory for sequentially 
presented items is not eradicated when divided by event boundaries and as such can still 
guide retrieval as for when an item was encountered. These types of associations, item-time 
and item-item, could give participants two cues as to when an item was encountered during 
the study phase. For contextual information, on the other hand, information would instead 
have been encoded mainly through a discrete item-context association, resulting in fewer 
cues that could be used for accurate retrieval. 
Finally, temporal accuracy in Chapters 3 and 4 could be explained by the definition of time 
used in these experiments. As mentioned above, previous studies demonstrating errors in 
temporal judgments have used dates of events (Burt & Kemp, 1991; Janssen et al., 2006; 
Thompson, 1982) or judgments of how long ago something took place (Ferguson & Martin, 
1983; Janssen et al., 2006) as measures of time. While the date of an event can be 
considered an absolute measure of time, as each event has a specific time point, placing an 
event at the correct date among a large number of possible options would open up to a 
greater probability of errors. It has been suggested that the degree of encoding for events 
differ depending on whether they are classified as more or less memorable, where everyday 
life events would most likely be classified as the latter. This, in turn, could mean that 
information relating to the date of an event will not be encoded as well as other event 
information, making it possible that people use alternative strategies to link an event to the 
correct date such as judging how long ago it took place, which, again, has been argued not 
to results in accurate temporal memory (Janssen et al., 2006). Additionally, during instances 
when trace strength was indicated to have been used to retrieve time by estimating how long 
ago an item was encountered, memory could have been aided by the fact that the sequence 
used was quite short compared to the range of dates that can be selected when examining 
the dating of events in long-term memory (Ferguson & Martin, 1983). Additionally, this 
process could have been aided by estimating the number of intervening objects to get a 
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sense of how far back in the sequence an item was presented rather than judging the 
duration based on minutes and seconds (Fraisse, 1984), which again could have resulted in 
high accuracy due to the relatively short sequence used. 
In summary, despite some theories suggesting that events are preferentially identified by 
either time or context, the results at this level argue that time and context can be 
remembered equally well, and as a result can both be used to accurately separate events in 
memory under most circumstances. The reason for adding the caveat that these sources 
can be useful under most, but not all, circumstances has to do with the findings relating to 
the retrieval of time and context via the use of recollection and familiarity, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the subsequent Section 5.4. These conclusions are in agreement 
with a paradigm modelling episodic memory in animals. This paradigm, often referred to as 
the what-where-which occasion model, proposes that rather than experiences being 
identified through either the time or context at which an event took place, a broader scope 
should be used whereby events are identified by the occasion at which they happened 
(Eacott & Easton, 2010; Easton & Eacott, 2008). An occasion, as defined by this paradigm, 
includes both temporal and contextual identifiers of events meaning that either time or 
context can be used to distinguish individual episodes. Despite the suggestion that temporal 
source information was remembered more accurately than contextual source information, 
this does not change the fact that accuracy for both sources were significantly above what 
would have been expected by chance, and as such are both viable source identifiers of 
individual experiences. 
5.4 The Involvement of Recollection and Familiarity in Memory for 
Time and Context 
The retrieval processes underlying memory for past events, recollection and familiarity, were 
examined explicitly in Chapter 3 through subjective judgments, and implicitly in Chapter 4 by 
assessing the level of activation in brain regions linked these processes. Results from all 3 
experiments in Chapter 3 found evidence in favour of familiarity-based retrieval of time, but 
not of context. As has been discussed the thesis, such as Sections 1.2 and 3.1, the dual-
process model of recollection and familiarity argues that item memory can be supported by 
both recollection and familiarity whereas source memory is only supported by recollection 
(Yonelinas, 1999).  
Different methods were used to assess recollection and familiarity between experiments in 
Chapters 3 and 4, as mentioned above. The only difference in assessment of recollection 
and familiarity between experiments was that in Chapter 3 participants were asked to 
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explicitly judge their recollective experience during the source retrieval, whereas in the fMRI 
study participants did not make any explicit judgments and the recollective experience was 
instead inferred indirectly through the neural activity during source retrieval. It is to be 
expected that the same processes should be apparent even when assessed through 
different measures, as asking participants to give R/K judgments after memory responses 
should not alter the processes involved during retrieval, if all else is kept constant. Since 
there were few differences between experiments in Chapters 3 and 4 it is reasonable to 
expect that the results across experiments in Chapter 3 showing familiarity-based retrieval of 
time would also be obtained in the fMRI experiment in Chapter 4. However, it was noted in 
Section 5.1 that this was actually not the case, and no evidence was found in the study in 
Chapter 4 to suggest that temporal retrieval engaged familiarity-based processing to any 
greater extent than did context memory.  
The discrepancy in results between experiments in Chapters 3 and 4 resulted from 
experiments in the former finding that temporal information could be remembered accurately 
when participants reported using familiarity, whereas the experiment in the latter found no 
evidence to suggest that memory for time engaged regions associated with familiarity to a 
greater extent than during memory for context. This difference in results could be due to 
slight differences in methods between experiments, such as the inclusion of a pre-screening 
procedure in the fMRI experiment. As explained in Section 4.2.1 the pre-screening was 
included to ensure that participants would get a sufficient number of trials correct for 
meaningful data analysis in the study. After completing the pre-screening procedure, while 
not aware of the purpose of the study, participants had some indication of the importance of 
getting a sufficient number of trials correct. This could have led them to alter their encoding 
or retrieval strategies during study or phases to emphasise the use of recollection, which 
should increase the accuracy of source retrieval and remove the influence of familiarity on 
memory for time seen across experiments in Chapter 3. This in turn would have led to the 
pattern of results obtained in Chapter 4, where memory for time and context did not differ in 
terms of activity across recollection and familiarity-sensitive regions. Additionally, including 
only participants passing the pre-screening meant that only those with comparatively 
superior memory completed the fMRI study, potentially biasing the sample to include 
participants with better memory who might be more prone to using recollection, which could 
be why they passed the pre-screening in the first place. 
The results across experiments in Chapter 3 showing that temporal information could be 
retrieved via the use of familiarity could be explained under the dual-process theory. This 
include explanations such as that temporal information was retrieved through stimulus 
unitization or alternatively that participants engage in non-criterial recollection, which could 
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have inflated reports of both recollection and familiarity (Parks, 2007; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
1996b) as explained below. Stimulus unitization is a process by which an item and its 
associated source are encoded as a single coherent representation, where the source 
becomes another feature of the item, as compared to the source being encoded as an 
external representation existing independently of the item. For example, being presented 
with the word ‘Boat’ on a blue background can either be encoded as a blue boat where the 
source is encoded as a feature of the item, or as a boat sailing on the blue ocean where the 
item and source are represented independently and thus not unitized (Diana et al., 2008; 
Parks & Yonelinas, 2015; Staresina & Davachi, 2010). The crucial point here is that unitized 
information can be retrieved accurately through familiarity, as the components of the 
association are treated as a single unit source retrieval can be accurate through simple item 
memory. However, in non-unitized conditions the source is encoded as a detail of the 
episode external to the item, and thus requires recollection for accurate retrieval. It was 
argued in Section 3.5 that the temporal information in these studies could have been 
encoded through stimulus unitization, which would then allow for the retrieval via familiarity.  
Non-criterial recollection could give a further account of the familiarity-based retrieval of time, 
which occurs in a situation when features of an experience can be recollected but not the 
target piece of information that is assessed during the retrieval test (Parks, 2007; Yonelinas 
& Jacoby, 1996). An example of this can be if you are asked whether you have seen a 
particular item previously, such as a Christmas tree, and knowing you saw that item since 
you remember thinking about how excited you are for Christmas when the item was 
encountered. However, despite having a clear memory for seeing the Christmas tree you 
might not be able to retrieve the time or context in which the item was presented, which is 
the information used to assess whether the item is recollected or not, meaning that retrieval 
in this case is non-criterial. It has been found that such non-criterial recollection can increase 
reports of familiarity, as the partial information that can be recollected is sufficient to elicit a 
feeling that a stimulus has been encountered previously (Parks, 2007). Over the 
experiments in Chapter 3 it is possible that participants could recollect features from the 
study episode during sequence questions without being able to retrieve the correct temporal 
position. This non-criterial information could, however, lead participants to a particular point 
within the sequence and to choose a response that elicited a greater sense of familiarity. 
Both stimulus unitization and non-criterial recollection are discussed in more detail in Section 
3.5. 
The next question to be answered is to what extent familiarity can be used to accurately 
retrieve temporal information? First, according to the results from this thesis, familiarity-
supported source memory can only be accurate when retrieving temporal information, and 
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as such limits the use of familiarity to instances when the temporal, but not contextual, 
source of an event is used to identify an experience. In situations when no temporal 
information is associated with an event, or the temporal information cannot be remembered, 
then familiarity cannot support accurate retrieval. Second, it could be argued that familiarity 
would only be useful when the temporal information is confined to a short sequence of 
events where individual episodes can be easily distinguished, such as those sequences of 
events used in Chapter 3 as well as in Easton et al (2012) who also found evidence for 
familiarity-based retrieval of time. In a short sequence of events with fewer time points to 
which an item could belong, such as the sequences used by Easton and colleagues (2012) 
consisting of two time-points, the probability that a correct response can be made using 
familiarity-based retrieval increases, for example through retrieval via trace strength. Over 
longer time periods in everyday life it is reasonable to assume that trace strength will be less 
useful as there will be more source options to distinguish and the original event will be 
remembered less clearly thus making it more difficult to place in time, which is one 
explanation for the telescoping effect (Burt & Kemp, 1991; Thompson et al., 1988). Third and 
final, temporal information can be supported by familiarity when an absolute measure of time 
is used, as this could be encoded through stimulus unitization and does not require the 
relational binding between successive items in the sequence. Taken together, familiarity-
based retrieval can support memory for temporal information, and the separation of events in 
memory, in a limited number of situations, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. However, it is not 
clear whether this use of familiarity would generalise to further situations when longer 
sequences have to be remembered or when different measures of time are to be retrieved. It 
is entirely possible that recollection would be required for relational measures of time, such 
as when the time point of one item has to be related to another item in the sequence, 
compared to the discrete associations used in this thesis, since this would require memory 
for two extrinsically associated items. For example, having to decide which of two items 
appeared first in a sequence, or remembering whether one item was encountered prior to or 
after another item could not easily be achieved through stimulus unitization since an item’s 
individual time point is not sufficient to distinguish it from surrounding items. It is currently 
difficult to corroborate this hypothesis with the current literature as the vast majority of 
studies examining recollection of temporal information use hippocampal activity as a proxy 
for the involvement of recollection (Eichenbaum, Fortin, Ergorul, Wright, & Agster, 2005; 
Lehn et al., 2009; Tubridy & Davachi, 2011b), which is similar to what was seen in Chapter 4, 
but does not measure whether recollection is necessary or to what extent familiarity 
contributes to accurate retrieval. A simple way of assessing this would be to compare 
participants temporal memory on two different types of sequences, either asking for 
relational temporal information such as which of two items appeared first or for an absolute 
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temporal measure such as at which time point was an item encountered? Combining this 
with judgments of recollective experience, i.e. R/K, would give an indication of whether 
different measures of time are supported by recollection alone, while the non-relational 
measure of time used across in experiments in Chapter 3 could be retrieved using familiarity. 
The findings demonstrating accurate retrieval of temporal information using familiarity go 
against what is held by the dual-process theory and the assumption that all associative 
information has to be retrieved through the use of recollection (Yonelinas, 1994, 1999). 
Rather than assuming that the results challenge the foundation of the dual-process theory, it 
is more likely that the results from experiments in Chapter 3 are more due to problems 
arising from the experiments than the dual-process theory itself. It could be argued that the 
experimental design in Chapter 3 biased participants to retrieve temporal information using 
familiarity to a certain extent. As discussed earlier it has been demonstrated that memory 
accuracy for information encountered across event boundaries is lower compared to 
information encountered within boundaries, or within the same context, and that segmenting 
events, such as by walking through a doorway, can serve to bind information in to a discrete 
‘event’ (Ezzyat & Davachi, 2011; Horner et al., 2016; Radvansky & Copeland, 2006). In both 
Chapters 3 and 4 event boundaries were present between each study trial, either by having 
participants walk through a doorway or by inserting fixation points between videos. These 
event boundaries between objects could have reduced participants’ ability to form 
associations between items in the sequence, and as such increased the use of unitization to 
create an association between the item and its temporal position, as this would be the most 
prominent temporal cue available. This would have made it more difficult to encode the 
objects in a sequential manner, and subsequently impaired the use of relational information 
between items to infer the correct temporal position during retrieval. Instead participants 
would have to rely on the temporal properties of the individual items, and as such increased 
the use of familiarity by encoding and retrieving the temporal information as another feature 
of the item itself. 
In summary, there are instances in which temporal information can be retrieved via the use 
of familiarity. This was the case in experiments from Chapter 3, but not the fMRI study 
reported in Chapter 4. Here it was argued that a likely reason for the familiarity-based 
retrieval of time was due to the methodology of the experiments in Chapter 3, where 
participants might have been biased to retrieve temporal information using familiarity as this 
information was more abstract and likely to be tied to the identity of the items. These results 
did not extend to the fMRI experiment in Chapter 4, where no difference in activation in 
familiarity-related regions was found between temporal and contextual memory. This 
discrepancy was argued to be due to the pre-screening procedure introduced in Chapter 4, 
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which could have led participants to prioritise the use of recollection at test since they were 
aware of the importance of making correct responses. Similarly, the pre-screening could also 
have led to a biased sample of participants with above average memory capabilities that 
were able to use recollection more readily than the sample of participants from experiments 
in Chapter 3. 
5.5 The Neural Underpinnings of Temporal and Contextual Memory 
The studies in Chapters 2 and 4 both examined the neural underpinnings of contextual and 
temporal retrieval, albeit using different methods. Chapter 2 examined the involvement of a 
specific part of the brain in the memory for item-context associations, while Chapter 4 looked 
at activity across the entire brain during memory for both item-context and item-time 
associations. Both of these methods carry their advantages, with the lesion study in Chapter 
2 allowing for the assessment of the direct involvement of the LEC in item-context memory, 
but this did not give any information of the large-scale processes during this associative 
retrieval. Functional MRI, on the other hand, does not allow for direct inference of how each 
brain region contributes to retrieval, but instead gives an overview of the network of areas 
that are involved in the memory for a specific source. This section will relate the findings 
from these experiments to both a recollection and familiarity framework, as well as 
discussing what the outcomes of the different neural substrates underlying memory for time 
and context mean in more general terms. The main focus of this section will be on the MTL, 
as Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 found somewhat different effects within this network of regions.  
The first question we need to pose is whether we can compare results across species, as 
the experiment in Chapter 2 involved rats while the fMRI study in Chapter 4 had human 
participants. As a result we need to establish that results obtained in rodents can be 
transferred to the human domain. One way to do this is to examine results obtained from 
research with rodents and see whether these have been demonstrated in humans, and vice 
versa. In doing this we can get a sense of whether the neural processes in rodents are 
similar or the same as those observed in humans, which would be a good indicator of the 
extent to which we can generalise from the rodent study in Chapter 2 to the human domain 
and the results from the fMRI experiment in Chapter 4. 
There is evidence to suggest that it is viable to compare and contrast results from rodents to 
what has been found with human participants, as several results found in the rodent MTL 
has also been demonstrated in the human MTL. One clear example of this is that 
representations of space by place cells, cells that fire when an organism is in a particular 
location and first demonstrated in rodents (O’Keefe, 1976), have been shown to exist in 
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humans (Miller et al., 2013). Additionally, several findings in the rodent MTL have been 
corroborated in human participants and vice versa, such as the involvement of the PRC in 
the memory for items (Davachi, 2006; Kesner et al., 2001), the role of the PHC in memory 
for scenes and contexts (Bar et al., 2008; Norman & Eacott, 2005), and also results 
demonstrating that the HIC is important for temporal memory (Fortin et al., 2002; Lehn et al., 
2009) as well as being crucial for intact episodic memory in both humans (Vargha-Khadem, 
1997) and rodents (Langston & Wood, 2010). With sufficient similarity between experiments 
it should therefore be reasonable to assume that results found in one species can be applied 
to the other species as well. 
The tasks used in the studies from Chapters 2 and 4 carried significant similarities, which it 
will be argued here, makes it further viable to contrast the results from these experiments. In 
Chapter 2 rats were tasked with learning, and later remembering, item-context associations, 
which is arguably similar to the task used in Chapter 4 where participants also had to encode 
item-context as well as item-time associations and later had to retrieve this information at 
test. The main differences between these experiments were the way in which the mnemonic 
information was presented and how rodents and human participants made their responses 
at test. In Chapter 2 items were represented by scented sand in pots place in a physical 
context surrounding the rat. A response was subsequently made by digging in the scented 
pot associated with that context. Conversely, in Chapter 4 items were represented by normal 
everyday objects encountered in a virtual environment, where the virtual environment 
ensured that the presentation of contexts were similar to that used with rodents. Responses 
were made by simply pressing buttons to indicate the correct option, different from the more 
physical response resulting in a reward from Chapter 2. Despite these differences between 
experiments, which were both necessary adjustment to make when working with difference 
species as it is difficult to use the exact same methods in rodents and humans, the 
underlying information assessed was still the same, namely the memory for items in contexts 
with the additional temporal component in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 2 only focused on the LEC, finding that this region is necessary for odour-context 
memory, whereas Chapter 4 examined activity across regions in the MTL and found higher 
activity in the pHIC, and mHIC in the Sequence compared to Context condition. As the 
hippocampus has strong links to recollection, it could be hypothesised that the activity in this 
region could reflect a recollective process during memory for temporal information. This 
hippocampal activity further ties in with the demonstrated role of the hippocampus in 
processing time (Howard & Eichenbaum, 2013; Ranganath & Hsieh, 2016), which could 
indicate that the hippocampus is sensitive to recollection of temporal information to a greater 
extent than recollection of context.  
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As memory for associative source information is thought to require the use of recollection 
under the dual-process theory (Yonelinas, 1999), the odour-context associations used in 
Chapter 2 could be argued to require the use of recollection in order to be remembered 
accurately. As such, the results from Chapter 2 are in contrast to findings linking recollection 
to the hippocampus and familiarity to the entorhinal cortex, suggesting instead that memory 
for associative information, and by extension recollection, can be processed prior to the 
hippocampus in the LEC. This is in agreement with previous research finding that the LEC is 
involved in associative memory in rats (Boisselier et al., 2014; Wilson, Langston, et al., 2013; 
Wilson, Watanabe, et al., 2013), and argues that the hippocampus might not be the only 
region within the MTL to support recollection and to process associative information. 
Contrary to the results in Chapter 2, the fMRI study in Chapter 4 did not find that neural 
activity over the entorhinal cortex differed between contextual compared temporal retrieval, 
suggesting that this region is not specifically tuned for context memory. Nevertheless, the 
entorhinal ROI specified in Chapter 4 did not differentiate between the LEC and MEC, 
meaning that greater context activity could still have been present in the LEC while the MEC 
could have been more active during memory for time, as this region has previously been 
shown to be sensitive to temporal information in rats (Kitamura et al., 2014; Kraus et al., 
2015). However, it is also possible that neither memory for time nor context resulted in any 
increased activity in the ERC or its sub-regions, which in itself could be interpreted as an 
absence of familiarity-based processing, as the ROI covered the entorhinal and parts of the 
perirhinal cortices, both of which have been linked to familiarity in studies on humans with 
ERC lesions (Brandt et al., 2016) and fMRI studies with healthy human participants (Diana et 
al., 2007; Ranganath et al., 2004). While there was some indication that activity in the right 
ERC was greater during memory time compared to context, this difference was not 
significant when corrected for multiple comparisons (see Section 4.3.2.4). 
Despite not being able to make any strong inferences from the results on ERC function 
across experiments in Chapters 2 and 4, it was demonstrated that associative information 
involved the ERC since item-context memory was impaired following damage to the LEC. 
The results from the experiment in Chapter 2 challenges the assumption that associative 
information, and by extension recollection, is processed in the hippocampus alone with the 
individual item and source components simply being relayed through ERC. An argument 
against the interpretation that recollection takes place on the level of the LEC is that the task 
used in Chapter 2 did not require the use of recollection. Alternatively, we cannot assume 
that rats possess the capacity for recollection or should such a capacity exist it would be 
served by the same neural mechanisms across rodents and humans. These propositions 
could explain why the human ERC is sensitive to familiarity, while the rodent equivalent is 
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found to process associative source information. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be the 
case. 
First, as the task used in Chapter 2 involved the formation and retrieval of an item-context 
association, which according to the dual-process theory should require the use of 
recollection and is further supported by the results from Chapter 3 demonstrating that item-
context associations can only be remembered via the use of recollection in human 
participants. The existence of both recollection and familiarity has further been demonstrated 
in rodents through measures of recollection and familiarity that is also used to assess 
retrieval in human participants (Eichenbaum et al., 2010; Sauvage, 2010). Selective 
impairments can also be induced to either recollection or familiarity in rats, again by 
damaging areas associated with these processes in humans (Eichenbaum et al., 2010), 
indicating that these processes are supported by the same neural substrates across species. 
As rats possess the capacity for recollection, and the task used in Chapter 2 should for all 
intents and purposes require this retrieval process it is highly likely that recollection was 
involved during retrieval of the learned item-context associations. As a result this indicates 
that recollection can take place in other MTL regions and not only in the HIC. 
The results across Chapters 2 and 4 discussed here have demonstrated that while both 
memory for time and context require recollection and engage recollection-sensitive regions 
to the same extent, as illustrated in Chapter 4, there seems to be some content-specific 
activity in regions in the MTL. This included the finding from the experiment in Chapter 2, 
demonstrating the involvement of the LEC in context memory, whereas the fMRI study in 
Chapter 4 found that the HIC was more sensitive to temporal compared to contextual 
information. Finally, it was suggested that the results from Chapter 2 indicated a shift away 
from the view that associative memory and recollection takes place in the hippocampus but 
not in its input regions. 
5.6 Time and Context in Animal Models of Episodic Memory 
The findings in this thesis could potentially have implications for models used to test episodic 
memory in animals. These models have been developed as a way of assessing episodic 
memory as defined by the content that is being retrieved rather than the subjective 
experience that comes with the retrieval of past events, as we cannot ask animals to report 
their subjective experience of retrieval. Based on Tulving’s original definition of episodic 
memory stating that it is “memory for that receives and stores information about temporally 
dated events and the temporo-spatial relations between them” (Tulving, 1984), the content of 
episodic memory is thought to consists of the integrated memory for three features of an 
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event: what happened, where it happened, and either when or at which occasion it 
happened (Easton & Eacott, 2008; Eichenbaum & Fortin, 2003; Ergorul & Eichenbaum, 
2004). This has been operationalized the demonstration of rodents’ ability to remember an 
object, the place it was encountered, and either the time or context in which it was 
encountered (Babb & Crystal, 2005; Eacott & Norman, 2004; Ergorul & Eichenbaum, 2004; 
Langston & Wood, 2010).  
This final component is the most crucial one in relation to this thesis, namely that events can 
be defined by when they happened, giving a temporal identifier, or at which occasion they 
happened, giving a contextual identifier. It is this feature that gives an episodic memory its 
unique source, and allows it to be distinguished from similar events. There has been some 
debate whether time or context is a more appropriate type of source to use in these animal 
models. The argument in favour of using temporal information to separate events stems from 
work by Tulving where he made the distinction between episodic and semantic memory, 
arguing that the former can be related to a specific time at which an event took place while 
the latter does not involve any temporal identifier of an event, merely the knowledge of some 
information (Tulving, 1972). It has further been suggested that episodic memories unfold 
over time giving them a natural temporal identifier and that vivid recollection of an event 
should allow people to remember details of what took place both before and after the 
remembered event, indicating temporal associations between everyday experiences 
(Eichenbaum & Fortin, 2003). A number of studies have successfully managed to 
demonstrate that rats are capable of encoding and retrieving information pertaining to what 
happened, where it happened, and when it happened, more concisely referred to as What-
Where-When or WWWhen memory (Babb & Crystal, 2005, 2006; Ergorul & Eichenbaum, 
2004). Others have argued that time is a too narrow term to define the sole source of an 
experience, and that the occasion of an event better captures both temporal and non-
temporal identifiers of events for a more inclusive approach, although when operationalized 
the occasion of an event tends to be defined almost exclusively in terms of environmental 
context (Eacott & Easton, 2010; Easton & Eacott, 2008). Rodents have again been shown to 
have the ability to encode and retrieve information about an experience that contain details 
about what happened, where it happened, and at which occasion or in which context it 
happened, abbreviated as WWWhich memory (Eacott et al., 2005; Eacott & Norman, 2004; 
Langston & Wood, 2010). 
In order to get a better understanding of whether time or context is a better identifier of an 
event in these animal models, or even if they are equally good, these temporal and 
contextual models of episodic memory should be tested in human participants since the 
models aim to capture the fundamental features of human episodic memory. The 
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experiments across this thesis only ever examined memory for two of the three components 
used in animal models of episodic memory, namely what happened, and when or at which 
occasion, the latter being represented by contextual information. Despite not looking at 
‘complete’ episodic memories according to animal models of episodic memory, i.e. including 
all features of WWWhen and WWWhich, the results obtained could still provide input in to 
the assessment of episodic memory in animals. If time and context differ both in terms of the 
cognitive and neural processes involved during retrieval it could be argued that these 
sources should not be used interchangeably in models of episodic memory, as they would 
not index a homogenous set of functions that would represent episodic memory. 
First, it was found that memory for time and context was significantly above chance levels 
across experiments in Chapter 3, indicating that both temporal and contextual information 
can be used to model human episodic memory in animals. However, the picture becomes 
more complex when considering the retrieval processes involved as these sources are 
remembered. It has been argued that retrieval of episodic memories should require the use 
of recollection as episodic memory involves memory for an integrated representation of the 
association between what happened, where it happened, and either when or at which 
occasion it happened. If we accept this view, that for a memory to be episodic according to 
the WWWhen/WWWhich definitions, it would require recollection in order to be remembered, 
then the use of contextual information would be a more appropriate source to use with 
animals since correct context memory relies on recollection alone. Memory for time, on the 
other hand, can be supported by both recollection and familiarity and as such would be 
susceptible to retrieval strategies that would not match the criteria set to unambiguously 
demonstrate the existence of episodic memory in animals, i.e. that animals can remember 
what and where something has happened as well as the source of the event, where time 
does not always conform to the definition of a source. One caveat here is how time is 
defined in the specific test used, since, as mentioned earlier in Section 5.3, it is entirely 
possible that different measures of time could result in the use of different retrieval 
processes. The finding that the absolute measure of time used in Chapter 3 could be 
retrieved using familiarity should not be taken as evidence that all types of temporal 
information can be retrieved in a similar manner using the same processes. 
A further issue when trying to unify these paradigms is that retrieval of time and context 
engages somewhat different neural mechanisms. This would make it difficult to study the 
neural substrates of episodic memory as a whole, as the use of a model emphasising either 
time or context as the main event identifier could result in different outcomes. For example, 
as seen in Chapter 4 there were some functional specificity in regions linked to recollection 
during retrieval of both contextual and temporal information. These findings suggest that if 
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modelling episodic memory using contexts as event identifier less dependence on the 
hippocampus might be found leading to the potentially incorrect conclusion that the 
hippocampus does not hold such a central role in episodic memory as previously thought. 
The opposite scenario can also be imagined, in which a model emphasising time is used 
finding that episodic memory relies heavily on the hippocampus but little on cortical regions 
outside of the medial temporal lobe. Rather than using one model over another, it is more 
likely that a compromise will have to be found. Considering that episodic memory is a 
complex memory system likely involving the use of both time and context, the use of both 
temporal and contextual models of episodic memory could give a more complete picture of 
the processes at play during the retrieval of episodic memories. It is highly probable that 
there is no gold standard, or specific format, which all episodic memories follow and that 
memories instead share some characteristics and differ in others, which would again make 
the use of either time or context valid to examine episodic memory in animals. Rather than 
putting too much focus on whether events are separated by a temporal or contextual 
component, care should instead be taken to ensure that the processes used during retrieval 
mirror those used in human episodic memory. 
In summary, using both time and context in models of episodic memory could allow for the 
study of a diverse range of functions that underlie this memory system, as it is likely not 
confined to one source only. The critical point in these models should instead be how the 
information is retrieved, rather than exactly what type of information it is that is being 
remembered. 
5.7 Conclusions and Future Considerations 
This thesis was carried out with the aim of assessing the cognitive and neural processes 
supporting memory for time and context to elucidate how these two sources of information 
can be used to separate events in memory. The objectives were carried out across three 
experimental chapters where the neural substrate serving the integration of item-context 
information was assessed, followed by 3 experiments in which retrieval of time and context 
along with the underlying retrieval processes were assessed, and finally the neural 
substrates of memory for time and context was examined using fMRI. The results over these 
experiments have provided novel insights in to the cognitive and neural processes 
underlying memory for time and context, and can hopefully inform future research. While the 
research conducted here adds to an already large body of literature one temporal and 
contextual memory, the picture is far from complete and there is still scope for plenty of 
research to be carried out on this topic. 
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One of the more interesting avenues of research on time and context is the focus on how the 
two interact, while this thesis has mainly focused on the ways in which memory for time and 
context differ. These two source dimensions do not exist in isolation where only one is 
attended to at a time, as both are present around us and are likely to be encoded either 
implicitly or explicitly on a day-to-day basis. It has been demonstrated that time and context 
interact during both encoding and retrieval, showing that contextual information can alter 
memory for time by segmenting an experience in to discrete episode in different contexts, 
which disrupts sequential retrieval of items encountered in different contexts (Ezzyat & 
Davachi, 2011; Horner et al., 2016; Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Radvansky et al., 2011).  
Changing a task more frequently will lead participants to rate a duration as being longer 
compared to a situation when they carried out the same task for the same duration (Block & 
Reed, 1978), whereas leaving the environmental context unchanged throughout two equally 
long tasks will lead participants to rate the first task as having been longer. Changing the 
environmental context in the middle of the first task reduced the discrepancy in duration 
ratings between the two tasks although they were still the same temporal length (Block, 
1982). Since it appears that the perception of and memory for time is modulated by the 
surrounding contextual information of an event it would be of interest to study the extent to 
which this is the case. For example, whether the duration a specific context is present for 
affects memory for information encountered within it such as that longer context duration 
would produce the same effects as a shorter context. Contexts in real life can also be less 
distinct than an abrupt shift in environmental context, such as the shift between cooking and 
eating without changing the physical context, opening up the question of whether more 
situational contexts would generate similar effects on memory as the distinct breaks in 
location or surroundings as used in previous research. It could even be conceived that there 
are multiple levels of contexts associated with an experience. A friend’s birthday party would 
be a context for an event, but within this we could identify sub-contexts, such as being at the 
friend’s house, even spending time in different parts of the house where cake was had in the 
living room and dinner in the kitchen, or having conversations with different people 
throughout the evening. Despite the change in contexts over the course of the experience 
we might still be able to track the sequence of events that took place quite accurately. Any 
prediction of the outcome of such experiments would be purely speculative at this point, and 
these questions will instead be left for future experiments to answer. This is just a small 
sample of some of the questions that remain to be answered, but as we can see the 
complexity of memory is nowhere near to being solved just yet. 
In conclusion, this work has been carried out with the hope of shedding even just a little light 
on how the episodic memory system operates, and how individual experiences are identified 
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and kept separate within this memory system. There are still many questions left to be 
answered, some of which are outlined above, that might provide even greater clarity in to the 
function of the human memory system. While it has been said that “man lives only in the 
present, in this fleeting instant: all the rest of his life is either past and gone, or not yet 
revealed” (Aurelius, 1964, p.59), the connection to the past through memory is arguably one 
of the most important capacities that gives our present life a sense of meaning. It is therefore 
imperative that research in to this ability to connect with the past and predict the future is 
continued. 
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“Time is a river, the resistless flow of all created things. One thing no sooner comes in to 
sight than it is hurried past and another is borne along, only to be swept away in its turn.” 
   - Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 
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